

# **CONFLICT AND STATE**

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**EXPLORATION IN THE BEHAVIOUR OF  
THE POST - COLONIAL STATE IN INDIA**

**PRASANTA RAY**









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
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Dedicated  
to  
my parents



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# INTRODUCTION

## I

The state's choice regarding the form of its response to conflicts directed against it is a vital input in state formation, in consolidation of a rudimentary state form, and in state reformation. An identification of the nature of choice made by the state is an essential step in an understanding of the dynamics of state process. The focus here is on a particular post-colonial state, India.

Conflicts which are directed against the state represent vertical movement of organized collective discontent and antagonistic contention from political formations of a people to the state. It is the public conception of state power in terms of capacity to intervene in the life of a people in diverse ways, which locates the state at the top of a notional power stratification. At the 'material' level, those who have the authority and ability to use state power, compose the super - ordinates- the targets of conflict. In vertical political conflicts, then, what is conflictually challenged is the purpose and the form of use of state power. Such conflicts possibly have consequences for the quality of dominance by a class or a class-alliance in state power ; often such is the design. But it does not reduce the focus distinctive of vertical political conflicts. These are state-centered conflicts. Whatever be the consequences of vertical political conflicts and of their management by the state for the classes, other social formations and their political representations in terms of control over state power, the quality of successive conflict management feeds back into the state that organizes conflict management. State power can change hands through social revolutions but the state need not wither away. Alternative state apparatuses may develop without doing away with the mode of operation of the state, particular to the phenomenon. A pristine state can break up as a territorial state, but the outcome is secondary state formation. This is obviously not to deny the reality of horizontal conflicts in

which classes, ethnic groups, religious communities, linguistic groups, and genders engage each other in antagonistic relationship, or their bearing on state formation. Because there is direct, immediate and interactive relationship between vertical political conflict and state formation, we believe that the post-colonial state formation can be studied through an examination of the state's responses to vertical political conflict.

The state's response to conflict includes a wide range of state behaviour. A state behaviour can be a response because it is intended, or perceived or functional that way. The notion of choice, however fits state behaviour intended to be a response to an on-going conflict, or an emergent one, or an anticipated type of a conflict.

The state's possible choices may be categorised as conflict regulation, conflict repression and conflict resolution. The classificatory criterion derives from (i) the different elements in a conflict process to which the state's choice is primarily oriented, and (ii) the different consequences of the state's choices for a conflict process. Conflict regulation concerns expressions of a conflict, for example, froms and incidence of conflict. The result is institutionalization and routinization of conflict. Conflict repression is directed towards a contender, an individual, a group or an institution. It coercively terminates overt conflict engagements. Conflict resolution focuses on causes of a conflict. These are eliminated through bargaining and redistribution. Usually, a varying combination of choices characterises the state response.

The three choices define state's efforts towards management of conflict. It is inconceivable that any state can finally eliminate conflict as well as possibility of conflict. But every state needs to manage conflict, particularly vertical political conflict. The minimum to which conflicts must be kept in order to sustain the institutional viability of a state, is obviously variable. The minimum is measured not so much in numbers as in the perceived intensity of conflicts and the strength of conflict formations, either as individual contending units or as allied formations, as against perceived efficacy of repressive and ideological apparatuses of a state.



The choice of a combination of forms of state response — in which the forms are unlikely to be equally mixed or mixed in a permanent ratio — is a function of, again, a combination of factors. These must include: the intensity of challenge to social class/class alliance in state power as perceived by the same, the state of repressive and ideological apparatus, the range of possible choices of form of the state response to vertical political conflict within a given normative framework, the remembered experience of results of past choices, the imperative of international or regional alliance/a relationship, military and/or economic, and the nature of personality of the key members of a 'state class'. Among themselves, these factors play uneven role in determination of the state's choice.

The focus of this enquiry is on the three exercises of conflict regulation, conflict repression and conflict resolution of vertical political conflict. But the state can undertake other exercises, or do something which may have unintended and unrecognized bearing on the conflict management process. The former usually take the form of anticipatory conflict management because these reduce the incidence and intensity of potential conflicts. Since politics centres on conflict, one way of managing conflict can be de-politicising issues or diminishing political participation by inducing political apathy or by cultivating quiescence among the potential antagonists, individuals or social formations. If the potential antagonists can be induced to think that state policy is in pursuance of their interests or that the policy is best under the circumstances, they may tend to become apathetic, and hence may not go for conflictual engagement or be easily susceptible to mobilization drive by a counter-elite. Further, through symbolic manipulation the state can manage to preempt possibility of conflict. The state can operate also to secure consensus over goals among the individuals and social formations. If the issues which necessitate state intervention can be kept within manageable limit, the conflict management institutions and processes can be correspondingly stress-free. A more complex process is manipulation of the structure of social hierarchies in order to produce sufficient cross-cutting between politically relevant cleavages. An appropriate technique is to maintain subordinate membership in and loyalty to many groups. (Pirages in Gurr, 1980, pp 446-451). It is obvious that, compared to the techniques

we have chosen for this enquiry, all of these techniques operate at a more fundamental level as does democracy as a response to problems of conflict management. (Pirages, 1976, pp 70-90). But because the results of their application take time to manifest and are difficult to be isolated, it is methodically difficult to exactly ascertain their efficacy.

It is very difficult to generalize about post-colonial state formation; more so about the possible interaction between conflict management and state formation. We have also to guard against a tempting tendency to project 'post-colonial' as an analytical category. It is just a historical variation of the state phenomenon. We need to remember that a state is a state, and state formation is state formation. We can at best try to locate some peculiarities regarding the cohort of post-war post-colonial states, which relate to conflict, conflict-management and state formation.

The post-colonial identity is rooted in conflictual process of secondary state formation. Though conflicts—overt, coercive interactions between contending formations—have their genesis fundamentally in structural conditions of a society and hence independent of transformation of the collective political status of a people, liberation politics is likely to accelerate percolation of a conflict culture. Increasingly greater number of social and political formations resort to conflict as a mode of articulation of demands trying to pressurise the post-colonial state for a favourable redistribution of whatever the respective conflict elites value positively. Since the state is the common referent in expressive as well as instrumental conflicts and more often than not becomes a party to a conflict, the distinction between horizontal and vertical political conflict becomes very weak and unstable. A classification of social conflicts in India may be a convenient guide to the types of conflict which confront the post-colonial state :

1. Conflicts expressing in effect socio-economic and class contradictions, both bourgeois and pre-bourgeois.
2. Conflicts expressing traditional contradictions in the socio-cultural and ideological fields.
3. Conflicts expressing subjective ambitions of professional politicians taking advantage of traditional caste,

religious, and ethno-regional group relations in their quest for political clout and power. The caste, religious, and ethnic conflicts often combine elements of the above contradictions, a factor that complicates the overall political process. (Kotovskiy, 1984, p. 1141).

The conflicts are process-level conflicts as well as structural conflicts. A process-level conflict "occurs when the actors have contradictory goals, preferences, or beliefs about specific conditions, outcomes, decisions, or activities within a given social structural or institutional context". In a structural conflict "actors disagree about the conditions under which or the ways in which they are to relate to one another and interact". (Baumgartner, Burns and Deville in Kriesberg, 1978, pp. 107-108). What a number count or classification of conflicts can not capture is the dynamic interlink between conflicts at one point of time, and over time. There is interlinkage of another kind : between domestic contenders and other states, contiguous or otherwise, and between a post-colonial state and its ally states. Domestic political conflicts often become connected with international political conflicts. (for a review, without any particular reference to the post-colonial state though, Stohl in Gurr, 1980, pp. 297-330).

The 'post-colonial' is a state-centered identity. True, a people gains political freedom from an alien state. But it is true also that this freedom of the collectivity becomes abstracted as state autonomy in a community of states. Such an identity becomes the medium of transaction within a world system. Also, the post-colonial state becomes the focal institution for all conflicts taking place within its territorial boundary. This is because the post-colonial state formation unlike the European state formation is characterised by 'explosion', that is, extension of central authority across ethnic and class boundaries. (Nettl, 1968, pp. 550-591). Indeed, the post-colonial state becomes the central factor in conflict process in various ways: (1) It is the institutional space within which conflicts are organized. (2) It becomes the locus of conflict consciousness of various contenders. (3) As an apparatus, it becomes an object over which conflicts break out. (4) As a new medium of legitimation and prioritization, it receives demands in tension and conflict among themselves. (5) It conditions development of antagonistic classes

through its economic and cultural policy and performance. (6) It seeks to create a new consciousness of kind in course of nation-building, in the process interfering with self-images and power structures of sub-national communities. (7) It becomes the institutional articulator of an adopted ideology or a mix of ideologies, projecting a claim to superiority over endogenous values. (8) The post-colonial state's drive for resources from external sources – other states and international financial institutions – involves terms adversely affecting domestic producers or traders or some section of working class.

To multiplex conflicts the post-colonial state must respond in order to develop and sustain its institutional viability. It is true, though, that institutional viability need not be a function of consistently successful state response only ; occasional failures can induce development of alternative processes and structures of conflict management. After all a government, through which a state materializes, is a learning system.

However, this has been no easy task for the post-colonial states. The culture of conflict management that the post-colonial state inherits from the empire state mainly remains juxtaposed to the indigenous, pre-colonial culture of conflict management. The inheritance is also selective like the laws without the legal philosophy (rule of law). Many states in the post-colonial Africa exemplify such a situation.

....the outer order of the new nation state, being moulded upon precedent set in Europe, is a derivative of European law and legal history, whereas much of the inner order is validated today by a plurality of native norms that differ not only from the received law but also from each other.

and,

African societies are ready to accomodate the most extreme manifestation of coercive power on the part of their governing authorities without becoming either disorganized or demoralized, as long as it appears that these incidence of rule are sanctioned by the general belief system.



and,

.....all African norms in the field of conflict resolution diverge from those perfected in the Occident by virtue of the fact that they are projections of traditional non-literate ways of thought and communication.....African systems of conflict control emanate from established social practice, rather than abstract arrangement of ideas, legislative enactments or innovative empirical agreements reached in response to unprecedented conflict situations.

(Bozeman, 1976, p232, p181 and p 228)

A second peculiarity of conflict management process is its internationalization. This is a concomitant of a congenital lack of insularity of state formation following national liberation. The very emergence of the post-colonial state had to do with reorganization of the international order. We find collaborative conflict management in which a dominant geopolitical partner - could be another post-colonial state - 'lends' its advice, advisers, arms, and appliances to a post-colonial state responding to domestic conflicts. (Chomsky and Herman, 1979). Diplomatic pressures, use of economic assistance to compel a receiving state to handle domestic political dissidence in a manner acceptable to a donor state, international public opinion—all affect choice of conflict management technique by the post-colonial state. Super-powers, power blocs, world bodies, international organization like Amnesty, prominent alien intellectuals—all may interfere with conflict management by the post-colonial state.

Also noticeable is a relative weakness of consensus-producing political socializing processes. The state's socializing exercises are contingent on development of crisis situations, sporadic and seldom anticipatory. The traditional socializing structures like family, kin associations, religious organizations are not only unfit to impart consensus among groups poised for conflict with the state ; these become very often structures to socialize their members into conflict culture. Additionally, there

are new structures for conflict socialization. Thus, what might have reduced the state's reliance on repressive management of conflict, is itself very weak and tentative. The weakness of ideological apparatus has to be compensated by persistent reinforcement of repressive apparatus. Once the process of compensation sets in, and number, variety and complexity of conflicts increase, repressive apparatus grows at the expense of ideological apparatus and urgent socio-economic development. As a result, repressive conflict management tends to reproduce conflict. The post-colonial state is an adopted state in the sense that the liberation elite has adopted the state form of the colonizing state — usually the capitalist liberal democratic state form with its institutions of conflict management. So the post-colonial state formation would consist of consolidation of the transplanted institutions. Any body can speculate on the preconditions for consolidation. Take for example :

A state could.....develop only if a politically supported regime remains in power for a considerable time and is able to transpose its own norms across the high threshold of time and internalization of legitimacy into a situation of stateness, within which interests can eventually be articulated and institutionalized by cleavage structures.

(Nettl, 1968, p. 589)

But it would be difficult to secure consensus on symptoms of consolidation. (And there is still a more uneasy question ; what would signal the end of the post-colonial state ? Would it be when a certain generation of citizens finally would lose sight of the post-colonial point of departure ? Would it be when the post-colonial state would be exactly like the West European/North American state ? But that Eurocentric models do not provide secure clues is being increasingly acknowledged by political scientists ( for example Rudolph, 1987 ).

## II

There is a noticeable dearth of research on the responses to vertical political conflict by the post-colonial state of India. A few analyses which use the concept of conflict management, do not command sufficient data. These either identify the nature of conflicts drawing principally on concepts peculiar to modernization theory in which India figures as a passing example of a developing country (Pirages, 1976) ; or, locate the dominant conflict management configuration, conceptualized as pluralist mediated conflict management (Gorden, 1972). In it, open conflict is considered to be normal and functional not aberrational as in command dominated and in command mediated political systems ; conflict management is directed to long-term goals, goals which are neither towards creation of a better ethical system in the distant future as in command dominated system nor focussed on the present material needs as defined by the elite in a pluralist participant system. The citizens are given broad exposure to information regarding political issues, neither too narrow as in command dominated nor too wide as in pluralist participant system, in which organizations for action towards conflict management are pluralistic rather than monolithic. The latter exercise is by way of setting up a typology, at best of some heuristic value. Calman's (1985) study of the Naxalite movement on Srikakulam and the Maharashtra movements, Shramik Sanghatana and Bhoomisena - brings out the state's response to challenge, characterised by coercive - repressive conflict management. It comes closer to this exploration into the state behaviour in face of conflictual challenge, much of which was generated by the state itself.

But unlike Calman's work, this exploration does not concern the tribals/poor peasants. One of the two principal foci relates categorically to service sector state employees at the lowest levels in the hierarchy of state personnel. At least in two ways this mainly urban occupational group differs from the tribals/poor peasantry. They have been relatively less impoverished but more acutely aware of relative deprivation in terms of income and status. They are a critical factor in the consolidation of the post-colonial state because their role performance must be crucial in ensuring the viability of the design of the post-colonial state.

The creation and sustenance of a network of service organizations to take care of re-distribution of services among the people stimulated to look up to the state, depend to a great extent on these lower category service sector state employees. But many of them come from the working class and/or under circumstantial pressure to be incorporated into the working class movement. The income and other conditions of work against which they work in a service sector organization are determined by the state, their employer. As they think that income and other benefits do not correspond to the services they produce on behalf of the state, they naturally engage the state in a series of conflicts. These usually spill over the bounds of organisations within which they work. The capability to render civilian service must be impaired in the process. The other focus is not on any chosen class or group. It is on conflict and conflict management, patterns and tendencies in both. There is no attempt to pursue a particular conflict or a major conflict and the state's response to it. The intention is to develop an understanding of conflict and conflict management based on data on small scale, brief conflicts, and discreet conflict management exercises by the state which join up to reveal the character of both. We feel that in order to identify the general state of conflict and directions in conflict management exercises by the state, it is urgent as well as gainful to concentrate on low profile conflicts which usually slip away from public memory. But such conflicts also create somewhat covertly a conflict culture as each conflict helps materialize another through a feed-forward of experience. The phenomenon of conflict becomes institutionalized. The more violent, more prolonged conflicts draw on more regular but low-key conflicts, both consciously and unconsciously from the legitimacy of conflict incrementally established over time.

The search for data related to dimensions of conflict process, interplay between the state policy and conflict process, actual process of conflict management and development of conflict management techniques with consequences for public perception of the state. Stating categorically, the following were the areas to which the search for data was mainly directed :

- A 1) Incidence, intensity and extensiveness of conflicts over time.



- 2) Character of conflict formations.
- 3) Convergence of conflict processes.
- 4) Quality of political support for conflict formations.
- 5) Issues generating conflict.
- B 1) State policy as a source of conflict.
- 2) Conflict as an influence on the state policy regarding choice of conflict management techniques.
- C 1) Incidence of use of different techniques of conflict management.
- 2) Consequences of use of different techniques for contenders, contender-formations and conflict process.
- 3) Contenders' perception of character of conflict management techniques.
- D 1) Development of conflict management apparatus induced by the state's perception of nature of conflict.
- 2) Formation of conception of the state among contenders and citizens through exposure to process of conflict management by the state.

We looked for quantitative data as well as qualitative data ; official data as well as contenders' reports. Quantitative data are good pointers to, among other things, trends over time in incidence of conflict, variation in intensity and extensity of conflict, variation in the state's choice of techniques of conflict management and in consequence of their use. Qualitative data are useful in locating perception of each other by the state and contenders. Official data reveal the state's policy, the states estimate of results of implementation of policy and the state's motives for choice of conflict management techniques. The contenders' reports are seldom used in academic research. But these offer vital clues to the processes internal to conflict formations and to motivations and responses of individual contenders. Qualitative data particularly can be gleaned from contenders' reports.

The principal source of data for the first exploration is Ananda

Bazar Patrika, the largest circulating vernacular daily. There are, of course, problems in using newspapers as source of conflict data. A possible political bias, overt or covert is likely to dictate newsreporting. An investigation is likely to lose in terms of adequacy and accuracy of data. One way of guarding against it would be to use a number of news dailies which are known to have opposite political bias, and to locate the area of agreement. But it is illogical to think that would point to perfectly valid and reliable data. Again, the insufficiency of staff even in a leading newspaper, Particularly in the early years of post-colonial India, must mean that many conflicts remained unreported. One wonders whether the increase in number and complexity of conflicts is matched by an increase in size and agility of the news-gatherers. Usually the conflicts taking place in the principal urban/semi-urban political centres and in which the principal political parties, social formations or public organizations are involved, are reported. Protracted conflicts are seldom persistently pursued by the newspapers. Conflicts are reported only when and for a period it is manifest, acute, dramatic and problematic. This creates problems for one trying to reconstruct biography of conflicts. Further, there is a large incidence of half-manifest conflicts in the vast political hinterland, conflicts which are less dramatic, involve non-metropolitan symbols, and quickly hide themselves behind the facade of consensus. We acknowledge the limitations of data due to the nature of their source, but still feel that newspapers remain the single most important easily available record of conflict.

For the second exploration, the data have been collected from both official reports and contenders' reports. There are certain sectors like state employment on which annual ministerial reports are available. Such reports contain a rich variety of data which illuminate various dimensions of conflict between the state and the employees' conflict formations - associations and unions. It is unfortunate that all the ministries do not produce such reports. Hence we have concentrated on conflicts between the post-colonial state and the subordinate employees in the Posts and Telegraph Department (later renamed Department of Communications). Since financial demands motivate the majority of conflicts, a few other official reports like Pay Commission reports have also been examined In case of stable conflict

formations, like those for the above mentioned state employees, we are usually in a position to study their newsletters/bulletins, pamphlets, posters, occasional publications of their history and development and even memoirs of leaders of working class movements. Certain news dailies, for example, the mouthpieces of left parties, provide greater and better coverage of contenders' aspirations, apprehensions and experience of the state response and its assessment.

For both the explorations, each clue of a conflict has necessitated painstaking pursuit of its origin and development, and of the state responses it provoked. In the latter exploration, the leaders of unions and associations could be consulted to meet data gap relating to conflict processes; and reports on parliamentary debates for data relating to conflict management by the state.

It was in course of analysis of data for the two focal enquiries that the need for another kind of data was felt for an adequate understanding of the state responses to conflict. For after all, the state in a way is an experience - for the contenders an experience of pain and agony. We needed additionally qualitative data, which have different articulating power. Hence, as a complementary case study, we have sought to locate measures of the state repression on left radicalism - on the Naxalites mainly in West Bengal in the late 1960s and early 1970s - in poetry, short story, novels and mass songs composed during and in the aftermath of that phase of the movement. One can glean data also from paintings, posters, cartoons, drama and films.

# CONFLICT AND STATE

## I

Conflicts directed against the state and the state's response to such conflicts, are a processual couple. Each shapes the other in a continuing process of unequal reciprocation of experience and apprehension. It is necessary to know the nature of conflict and that of the state's choice of techniques to manage conflict to locate the character of reciprocation. This is evidently focusing on only what happens on the political surface; something useful to begin with in an exploratory study of political conflict in India.

The conflicts identified here were between the post-colonial state in India and men in subordinate positions (mainly categories III and IV employees) in the state services concerning health, municipality, transport, dock and port and administration; school teachers, wage-earners in industry, peasants, refugees, students, political parties, and men demanding better food supplies - the contenders. What most of these men could have in common must be a sense of being marginal in respect of income, power, social security and future life chances. We did not choose these categories of men in conflict. We looked for conflict data in a particular social document, namely, newspapers, and in the process came to locate these categories in conflict. We have identified 1078 such conflicts in alternative blocs of five years between 1948 and 1981. The data were connected on the basis of a Content Analysis Manual for the purpose. (Appendix 6).

## II

The first sub-set of data relates to some mainly quantitative dimensions of conflict. This is just by way of a heuristic decomposition of conflict in order to focus on the details of process of conflict. But since these go into the determination of the

nature of conflict we have allotted score to each conflict drawing on its position on each of the dimensions, the positions being measured in weights. A similar procedure is used to weigh different choices regarding conflict behaviour made by the contenders. The first of the summated scores measures 'extensity' of a conflict, the second, 'moderation-extremity' of conflict behaviour by the contenders in a conflict. The measurement of 'extensity' of a conflict is based on the following :

**Range of membership of the contenders' conflict formation :** The three possible ranges of 'national', 'regional' and 'local' have been weighted from highest to lowest in that order. Our assumption is : the greater the range of membership, greater is the strength of the contenders due not only to number but also to likely class or party alliances they can forge ; greater also is the possibility of political fall-out of a particular choice regarding the form of managerial response by the state.

**Spread of conflict :** A conflict which expands its theatre is rated higher to one which does not. Our assumption is : A conflict which spreads beyond the point of its origin is likely to mobilize a greater number of contenders by inducing a more inclusive consciousness of kind ; also to acquire allies, and to compel problematic choice of techniques of conflict management by the state.

**Duration of conflict :** We have chosen six possible time spans, namely, 1-3 days, 4-7 days, 8-15 days, more than 15 days but less than one month, 1-2 months, and more than 2 months. The time spans of duration were rated highest to lowest, the largest being given the highest weight. Our assumption is : the greater the duration, the greater is the likelihood of a conflict drawing public attention to the state's choice of technique of conflict management (which becomes an additional constraint on the state's choice), and the contenders' conflict formation developing a more effective conflict tactics and apparatus.

**Number of allies to the contenders, and allies' political significance :** The four possible ranges we have chosen are : none, 1-2, 3-4, and more than four; and these have been weighted from 'least' to 'greatest' in that order. Regarding political significance, we operate on four possibilities: no political significance, a local



party/parties or its/their frontal organization, a regional party/parties or its/their frontal organization, and a national party/parties or its/their frontal organization. These are rated from 'least' to 'greatest' in that order. Our assumption is : the greater the number of allies and their political significance, the greater is the strength of the contenders; the greater also is the challenge to the state power.

Nature of demands and issues on the part of the contenders : A conflict due to material demands like employment, income, food, shelter, is rated low ; a conflict due to ideological commitment of the contenders is given a moderate weight; a conflict due to a combination of material demands and ideological commitment is given the greatest weight. Our assumption is : a conflict formation based on such a combination is likely to be highly resilient in the face of the state power. It is unlikely to be constrained by the temporal nature of a conflict process typical of a conflict formation based exclusively on material demands, or by a lack of such a level of political literacy on the part of the contenders as is needed to respond to an exclusively ideological motivation.

The measurement of 'moderation-extremity' of conflict behaviour on the part of the contenders is similarly based on the summated score each conflict receives on the following choices/contingencies regarding form of conflict behaviour :

Demands, articulations through communication to public through press, deputation-agitation, office rally and its like, and 'no-work'.

Pressurising authority through 'gherao', strike-notice and strike.

Peaceful movement in the forms of procession by the contenders, procession by the contenders and their allies, i.e., by broader formations, and holding public meeting.

Defiant movement in the forms of civil disobedience, and disruption of public life.

Violent movement in the forms of damage to public property, violent clash with policemen, and causing death to policemen.

We have given weights to the components of all the five major

forms from 'least' to 'greatest' in the sequence in which we have mentioned the forms here – indicating a variation between moderation and extremity in conflict behaviour. We have added to this measure, varying weights to four possible directions in transition in forms of conflict behaviour over time : from a moderate to a relatively extreme form, from a moderate to a relatively extreme form to again a moderate form, from an extreme form to a relatively moderate form, and a case of no transition any way. We have given these weights indicating positions between 'extreme' and 'moderate'. These transitions symbolize the dynamic nature of conflict process. These are functions of changes in the contenders' organizing capacity, in understanding of the state's actual or potential response, in their leadership, in the tactics of conflictual engagement, in perception of legitimacy in the eyes of the relevant community, etc.

The second sub-set of data relates to the state response. We postulated three forms of the state's response, hoping to direct our attention to a range of the state behaviour to manage vertical political conflicts: conflict regulation, conflict repression and conflict resolution. Conflict regulation as a technique of conflict management operates at the level of the modality of conflictual contention and of incidence of conflict. The result is routinization of conflict. Conflict repression is directed towards the behaviour of the collective contender. It coercively terminates overt conflict engagements. Conflict resolution is directed towards the causes of a conflict. These are sought to be eliminated through bargaining for a redistribution. Each can be conducted at various scales, and usually a varying combination of techniques characterizes the state's choice.

We approached the practice of conflict management by the post-colonial state in India with a range of indicators for each major technique. Weights were assigned to the units constituting a range in a way that the direction from the lowest to the highest in one major technique of conflict management would match with that in another. Both within a range and across the ranges, the lowest-highest continuum reflects persuasive-positive response and repressive-negative response by way of conflict management. It must be admitted that the characterization of the state response to conflict suffers from the fact that it is not based on an

evaluation of the state response by individuals, political formations and classes in conflict with the state, and to whom the state's responses were directed. What is a permissive state, or a persuasive state, or a punitive state, is based on the meaning system peculiar to each political culture. Ideally, we should have founded the characterization on evaluation of the contenders and of the political 'spectators' through some kind of a net balance approach.

It is a standard anticipation on the part of each state that it must respond to a continuing series of conflicts directed against it, i.e. vertical political conflicts. So a part of total exercise on conflict regulation consists of anticipatory conflict regulation. It begins either as a part of the state's normal political socialization endeavour trying to create a pro-system conflict culture, or as an initial response to an emergent conflict. We have considered three measures: (i) the state indicating/informing the contenders of the desirability of placing their demands through the peoples' representatives, peaceful demonstrations, meetings and the media; (ii) the state indicating/informing the contenders the desirability of their refraining from an attempt to arouse public anger against the state and its superordinate personnel, to destroy public property, and to use physical violence against its personnel ; and (iii) the state indicating/informing the contenders that it considers any conflict improper because more vital problems, which it does not specify, need to be solved, or because a conflict poses threat to national integrity or productivity. The first represents a positive approach in anticipatory conflict regulation because it does not de-legitimise articulation of demands, which are at the heart of any conflict. It prescribes the permissible forms. The second represents what the state prohibits as undesirable forms of expression of demands and grievances on the part of the contenders. The third does not have the articulate character of the first two, because the criterion of impropriety is composed in vague terms of national interest. Anything inarticulate has weak instructive power.

The state's conflict regulation exercise can also take place after the occurrence of conflict. Anticipatory conflict regulation can be initiated by either information of a specific emergent conflict or knowledge of the possibility of 'natural' emergence of conflict in any state. Conflict regulation which

follows the occurrence of conflict is induced by a specific conflict/conflicts, but becomes 'educative' for the contenders in future conflicts – educative both ways : ensuring conformity on the part of the future contenders to the state's predictable preferences, as well as stimulating improvisations of appropriate scales of deviation from the same by the future contenders. We have considered four forms of the state's behaviour in response to conflict, representing again a range of positive to negative exercises towards conflict regulation : (i) the state approving democratic forms of the contenders' behaviour in a conflict (ii) the state refraining from penalising what it considers undemocratic forms of the contenders' behaviour (iii) the state penalising what it considers undemocratic forms of the contenders' behaviour, and (iv) the state disapproving even what it considers to be democratic forms of the contenders' behaviour. These are in fact measures of the state's tolerance and intolerance of conflict as a form of expression of demands.

The state's repressive responses to conflict poses problem for operationalisation. First : there can be considerable overlap between conflict regulation (a soft response to conflict) and conflict repression (a hard response) in the perception of at least the contenders conflicting with a state, and of significant outsiders (an international human rights watch-group). It is due to the peculiarity of the meaning system of opponents to the state power. Second : since repression involves both repressor and repressed, a disagreement over what is intended to be repressive and over what is experienced as repressive, between the two is likely. Labelling some behaviour as repression is itself a political act. We tried here to avoid any overlap between 'regulation' and 'repression' while operationalizing them. We also proposed comprehensive operationalization of 'repression' to denote by the term a range of the state repression – to cover all possible meanings.

Normative repression is a standard state response. Use of laws is usually the principal technique of normative repression. The various ways in which the state can use law for repression (which compose our operational meaning) are : (i) the state using constitution and existing laws (ii) the state amending the above to acquire greater repressive capacity (iii) the state using special



powers under constitution (iv) the state reviving or creating special punitive law. These represent an increasing scale of normative repression by the state. Use of law in any way in course of the state's repressive response is intended to project the legitimacy of the state's conduct. But normative repression can also take the form of delegitimization of the contenders' conduct through a pointer to the impermissibility of their identity or conduct. Since this is done publicly, the implicit design is to create a political culture of contention and conflict. Here, also, we operated with a reasonable number of criteria used by the state to de-legitimise some conflicts : (i) violence by the contenders against the state and public property (ii) ideology of the contenders (iii) extraterritorial connection of the contenders (iv) an alleged lack of popular support to the contenders (v) an alleged harmful design by the contenders. The impermissible character of any of these is obviously based on the state's judgement, and may not correspond to either the contenders' self-conception or evaluation by a third party. These represent an increasing scale of normative repression. Our position : any state repression based on the state's allegation of a harmful design on the part of the contenders or of their lack of popular support, has a larger component of arbitrariness in decision on the quantum of repression, compared to, say, repression based on violence by the contenders. Such arbitrariness enhances the repressive character of the state's response to conflict. As an aligned measure of the extent of normative repression, we considered the time lag between publicly noticeable outbreak of conflict with the state and imposition of normative sanction by the state. It is true that a larger time lag need not always mean that the state takes a less repressive stance. It may be due to preoccupation with more critical problems, to use of other techniques of conflict management, or even to indecision on repressive exercises. But delayed repression does cut down repressiveness of which the state power is potentially capable.

Repression can be through financial sanction against the contenders. The specific form of sanction we have considered here relates to employment. Obviously, the state can most effectively apply this form if the contenders are state-employees. But the size of this kind of contenders is evidently large in India. By way



of financial sanction, the state can (i) degrade service status of the contenders in conflict with the state, or (ii) suspend their employment, or (iii) terminate their employment. These measures are evidently increasingly severe. There is a non-quantifiable dimension of financial sanction in the fact that either of the measures is very likely to affect the quality of life of those who are financially dependent on the penalized contenders. In a society in which unemployment and underemployment take the form of stigma, financial sanction can turn out to be very repressive.

While financial sanction affects the purchasing power and occupational career of the contenders, some sanctions can affect the body and the mind of the contenders. We have tried to measure the severity of physical repression by the form of physical sanction as well as by the coercive character of the repressive forces employed by the state in response to conflict. The forms of physical sanction we have considered here are : baton charge, use of tear gas, firing, pre-emptive arrest/curfew, arrest and release later on bail, arrest and imprisonment, and application of more than one of these sanctions at one time or at different phases of a conflictual engagement. We have rated these in an increasing scale of repression. We have located the coercive character of the repressive forces by finding out the punitive capability of the forces, which is a function of nature of organization, equipment and relative autonomy from politics. Police, special police, para-military force, military are ranked from low to high in punitive capacity. Of course, at the fundamental level their punitive capacity depends on a policy choice by the state. As an aligned measure of physical repression, we have considered injury and death as consequences for the contenders. The psychological dimension of repression consists of the state making a public threat to repress physically the contenders or stigmatizing the contenders as 'anti-national' or 'anti-people'.

As a relatively indirect way of repression, the state can stimulate adverse public reaction against the contenders. We have wanted to know whether the state has instructed people (i) to be critical of the contenders (ii) to isolate them (iii) not to respond to the contenders' call for conflict with the state (iv) to organize themselves or use their organizations to create public opinion against the contenders (v) to organize themselves or use

their organizations to meet the contenders' challenge by violence if necessary, and (vi) to join the state authorities to combat the contenders. These represent stimulation of increasing public pressure on the contenders.

It is only possible that the state needs to alter scale of repressive conflict management, particularly responding to a protracted conflict or a conflict which surfaces from time to time. In our attempt to measure the extent of repressive management we have sought data on shift in choice of repressive technique as well as the direction of the shift.

A third major technique of conflict management is the state's attempts at conflict resolution. The exercises we have considered are : (i) the state merely acknowledging the issues generating a conflict but unwilling to interact with the contenders (ii) the state indicating a readiness to listen to the contenders' case for demands (iii) the state indicating willingness to negotiate with the contenders if they would be willing to reformulate their contentious demands, and (iv) the state indicating willingness to negotiate with the contenders without any preconditions to be met by them. These are evidently arranged in a scale of increasingly positive conflict resolution exercises.

It is a good question to answer whether exercises towards management of conflict yield expected/desired result. Even the state is a learning system. The information on efficacy of a particular technique or of a combination of techniques is a vital input in subsequent choice by the state. True, efficacy or inefficacy has multiple determinants, the quality of a technique being only one of these. But any choice of technique or of a combination of techniques, if it must satisfy the test of appropriateness, must take into account the possible range of conjoined determinants. We have enquired about the contenders' response to conflict regulation exercises by the state as an indicator of efficacy. The possible forms of response are (i) response by the contenders to persuasion by the state, (ii) response by the contenders to coercion by the state, (iii) response by the contenders to a combination of persuasion and coercion by the state. The contenders' response concerned giving up either persisting with an already undertaken conflict behaviour, or a publicly stated plan to undertake a particular

form of conflict behaviour. We have also enquired about the contenders' response to conflict resolution exercises by the state. Our specific questions are : (i) whether or not the state and the contenders have redefined their respective positions/demands, indicating reciprocal concessions (ii) whether or not a redistribution of conflict generating object/s or issues has been effected, (iii) whether or not both the state and the contenders have authoritatively stated that the settlement arrived at is just under the circumstances, and (iv) whether or not both the state and the contenders have authoritatively stated that there will be no need to re-open the issue.

### III

The nature of conflict formations in conflict with the state lends character to the process of conflict. The nature can be examined at a rudimentary level of range of membership. It indicates capacity for aggregation leading either to class formation or to federation formation among territorially and interest-wise contiguous interest groups eventually leading to class formation. Larger the range of membership, larger is the area of conflict understood both as space and interest, and greater is the complexity of the process. The membership range is likely to be vital in determining response by the state and groups and classes which benefit from its behaviour ; on the other hand, the behaviour of the state in alliance with certain groups and classes is likely to have a feedback on the range of membership. It may induce federation of interest groups and class formations. For the period of our reference, conflict formations with local membership were the principal type of the contenders' formation, followed by those with regional and local membership (871:95:63). These conflict formations were trade unions, associations of white-collar service men's unions, student unions, peasant associations, political groups and parties. But there had been three manifest tendencies indicating variation over time : (i) a steady decline in incidence of conflict organized by conflict formations with local membership ; (ii) a steady gradual increase in the same by conflict formations with regional membership ;

(iii) a stable level of incidence of conflict organized by national conflict formations during the first three blocs of years, followed by a significant increase in the last (Table 1). It must mean : (i) a decline of local issues as mobilizing causes and of localized

Table 1

Blocs of Years	Range of Membership of Conflict Formations *		
	Range of Membership		
	National	Regional	Local
1948-1952	5.92	1.48	92.60
1958-1962	4.81	5.31	89.88
1967-1971	5.95	12.85	81.20
1977-1981	13.92	22.78	63.30

\* in % of total number of conflicts in each bloc of years.

formations as mobilizing organizations ; (ii) a beginning of confederation formations as a function of discovery of areas of common interest, facilitated by redefinition of interest by each conflict formation in the process of convergence ; (iii) a change in the level of consciousness of kind attending the emergence of more inclusive conflict formations. But total elimination of conflict formations with local membership should not be anticipated. For, most people are not equipped with necessary information and reasoning capacity to discover the connection between the local and the national in developmental process.

Examined again at the level of the total period, we find conflicts in which political parties were the conflict formations, regional membership was the predominant (81.82%) pattern. This fits our experience that the principal opposition parties have been regional in nature. Since these parties have given the political leadership to the Indian working class, the largest number of conflicts (88.31%) had trade unions with regional membership as parties to conflict. Localized conflict formations had been the principal type leading the subordinate state service men in administration in conflict (60.35%) with their employer, the state. But formations with national membership and with regional membership, organized them in significant number of conflicts (23.35% and 16.30% respectively). The other categories of men in conflict had been organized by conflict formations with local membership.

The emergence of national and regional conflict formations can not be a quick development. Because it requires changing consciousness about collective (whatever be the size of the collectivity) interests and a certain education through exposure regarding the appropriate technique of realization of the interests. When we employ a second criterion to measure dynamics of conflict process we notice a feature comparable to the predominance of local conflict formations. We needed to know how many conflicts would remain confined to the territorial point of origin, the theatre of conflict, and how many would spread beyond it. The latter would mean an ability of the conflict elite leading a formation in conflict to induce those with identical interest in contiguous areas (contiguity being a function of state of communication and consciousness) to join – to expand the centre and reduce the periphery, so to say. Organization, resources, responses of the other party in a conflict perceived threat to future positions, would all be vital factors causing an expansion in area of conflict. Almost all the conflicts we have come to know about remained confined to their areas of origin (946:41) (Table 2). The only conspicuous tendency to expand the area was a feature of conflict formations of the state service subordinate employees in administration (89%).

An expansion in the area of conflict is a function, among other things, of the duration of a conflict. The duration indicates both strength of the cause and of the organization particularly when a conflict formation has to contend with the state as the principal

**Table 2**  
Spread of Conflict \*

Bloc of Years	Spread	
	Confined to the area of origin	Spreading beyond the area of origin
1948-1952	.94	.06
1958-1962	.96	.04
1967-1971	.96	.04
1977-1981	.97	.03

\* in % of total conflict for each bloc of years.

antagonist. We have classified conflicts as having six possible different time spans for all the blocs of years taken together. The



overwhelming majority of conflicts were of briefest duration (75.58%) (Table 3). This was true about the individual blocs of years, also. But one stable tendency is evident : a decline in the number of conflict of briefest duration (between 1 and 3 days) over the years. This corresponds with a similar tendency in case of conflicts organized by local formations (Table 1). For the middle-order time spans, an increase in number of conflict is indicated, despite fluctuations.

One major reason why most of the conflicts had no tendency to spread beyond the point of origin or develop into state as the

**Table 3**

Blocs of Years	Duration of Conflict *					
	Duration					
	1-3 days	4-7 days	8-15 days	More than 15 days, less than 1 month	1-2 months	More than 2 month
1948-1952	73.48	9.09	3.79	3.03	6.82	3.79
1958-1962	76.68	4.15	7.77	3.11	5.70	2.59
1967-1971	77.18	6.07	4.61	5.34	4.13	2.67
1977-1981	63.77	11.59	8.70	5.80	8.70	1.47

\* in % of total conflicts in each bloc of year.

principal conflicts, was probably that most of the contenders engaged in conflicts without any ally (78.89% over the entire period) or without any politically significant ally (77.36% over the entire period). Allies are sources of man-power, organizational support, financial and material aid, and tactical calculations. Finding allies and forming alliances are not easy. These require, among other things, an awareness on the part of a conflict elite of the need for allies, which develops out of its own experience or apprehension of its inefficacy as a singular contender vis-a-vis state power and relative apathy of the relevant social segments, perceived common interest on the part of contenders and their prospective allies, a lowering of the ego barrier. There is another side : the allies must be in need of incorporating the contenders in a network of political exchanges, may be even to absorb them by severely curtailing the contenders' functional autonomy. Both sets of preconditions seem to have started to materialize. There had been a steady decline in number

of conflicts in which the contenders engaged in conflicts without any ally or any politically significant ally (Tables 4 and 5). The

**Table 4**

Contenders' Allies (Numbers) \*

Blocs of Years	Number of Allies			
	None	1 - 2	3 - 4	More than 4
1948-1952	78.79	4.55	3.54	13.13
1958-1962	82.97	5.36	0.95	10.73
1967-1971	79.21	7.56	3.78	9.45
1977-1981	53.57	7.14	7.14	32.15

\* in % of total number of conflicts.

number of allies any contender may acquire need not offer a correct clue to the intensity-extensity of a conflict. But it can be used as an approximate indicator of growing strength and of changing tactics of contention. An unilineal increase in the number of conflicts in which the contenders had one to two allies

**Table 5**

Contenders' Allies (Political Significance) \*

Blocs of Years	Political Significance of Allies			
	None	Local Party/ Parties its/their Frontal Organization	Regional Party / Parties its/their Frontal Organization	National Party / Parties its/their Frontal Organization
1948-1952	79.29	13.64	3.03	4.04
1958-1962	81.39	11.99	2.84	3.79
1967-1971	76.89	13.87	3.36	5.88
1977-1981	51.79	26.79	7.14	14.28

\* in % of total number of conflicts.

would suggest some change. It is interesting to note that operating with more than four allies has been a feature of conflict behaviour on the part of the contenders since the first bloc of years. But the number of such conflicts has always been small (11.75% for all the blocs of years, and closer to that for each of the first three blocs of years) except in the last bloc (32.15%), in which there was comparably sharp drop in number of conflicts in which the contenders were without an ally (Table 4).

The political significance of an ally or allies of the contenders is

an important determinant of extensity of a conflict. In this regard, the contenders in a large majority of conflicts (77.36%) during the total period had no political significant ally (Table 5) ; of those who had, the ally/allies was/were mainly local party/parties or its/their frontal organizations. In the last bloc of years (which appear to be distinctive in various dimensions) there was a sharp decrease in incidence of conflict in which the contenders engaged the state in conflict alone. This was due mainly to the contenders turning to local party/parties for support.

A measure of a conflict lies in its demands or issue. This is different from relatively tangible measures we have considered above. A demand over easily quantifiable income still has a psychological or cultural component, may be latent ; it may derive psychological urgency from a sense of relative deprivation on the part of members of a sub-class, or from a feeling, correct or otherwise, that one's income is an important basis for redefinition of one's status. A political demand or a demand for certain administrative policy is obviously based on ideological preference or priority. An overt, even a latent, ideological position revealed in the nature of demand or issue motivating some contenders into conflict with the state, would indicate a high degree of politicization of contention.

The demands or issues which generated most of the conflicts related mainly to either some administrative policy (28.77%), or a compound of income, service conditions and politics (28.65%), or income (22.20%) of the contenders. Exclusively political demands or issues were at the centre of a very small number (2.83%) of total conflicts recorded ; so were exclusively service conditions related demands. Then, income related demands were the single most important causative factor. The centrality of such demands for the contenders belonging to the 'employees' category (95.92% of income related conflicts and 91.70% of income, service conditions and politics related conflicts) compared to the non-employees, is evident and intelligible. Indeed such demands increasingly figured in conflicts with the state (Table 6). The contenders in the other category, on the other hand, have been increasingly confronting the state with political demands (Table 7). But, to repeat, the role of political demands in the context of all the conflicts, has been very weak. And income demands tend to

fragmentize a working class, unless not only the contenders and their conflict formations are significantly politicized but also there is orchestration of all income demands based conflicts by a mass political party of radical left or radical right.

Table 6

Blocs of Years	Major Demands/Issues * of Contenders (Employees) **					
	Demands/Issues					
	Income	Service Condi- tions	Politi- cal	Income/ Service Political	Adminis- trative Policy	Any Other
1948-1952	22.73	4.55	6.82	31.82	29.55	4.55
1958-1962	29.92	8.33	.75	33.71	25.76	1.52
1967-1971	25.16	5.97	.94	37.74	28.93	1.26
1977-1981	44.19	13.95	4.65	20.93	13.95	2.33

\* in % of total number of conflicts.

\*\* Subordinate state employees in Administration, Health, Dock/Port, Municipality and Transport, industrial workers and teachers.

When we conflate all the dimensions of conflicts we have considered so far, most of the conflicts have been of low extensity (Table 8) : mainly localized conflict formations waging conflicts of usually briefest duration and static in nature, without ally or politically significant ally over mainly fractionalizing income demands. (We, of course, do not ignore emergent trends away from these peculiarities of lowly extensive conflicts.).

Table 7

Blocs of Years	Major Demands/Issues* of Contenders (Non-employees) **					
	Demands/Issues					
	Income	Service Condi- tions	Political	Income/ Service Political	Adminis- trative Policy	Any Other
1948-1952	6.85	2.74	5.48	8.22	19.18	57.53
1958-1962	3.28			3.28	39.34	54.09
1967-1971			15.69	18.73	50.98	19.51
1977-1981	3.45		27.59	20.69	37.93	10.34

\* in % of total number of conflicts.

\*\* Refugees, Peasants, Students, men in food movements (i. e. not employees in formal sectors, with the possible exception in the last category).

## IV

The degree of extensity of conflict is but one of the dimensions of conflict to which the state has to respond ; another is intensity of conflict. That the two contribute to each other is a usual assumption. For indicators of the degree of intensity we considered here forms of conflict behaviour indulged in by the contenders. The form of the contenders' conflict behaviour may be a function of their choice. The choice is a product of political socialization through either or a combination of forms like

Table 8

Conflicts classified according to extensity\*

High extensity	4.55
Moderate extensity	37.38
Low extensity	58.07

\* Classification based on summated score on five dimensions of conflict (viz, number and nature of allies to contenders, range of membership, demands/issues, duration of conflict and spread of conflict).

indoctrination, instruction, imitation and experience. The choice is underlined by calculation of costs and benefits in prevalent circumstances ; and by an assessment of the target (the state and the holders of the state power) of such a chosen form of conflict behaviour. An assessment may be based on the nature of the state and the holders of the state power not only at the moment of conflict but also their past behaviour in the face of challenge from any or comparable kind of contenders. The choice, may even be designed to bring out the hidden rapacious-repressive face of the state power. But any choice by the contenders is made in an atmosphere of perceived contingency. Since the contenders' choice of conflict behaviour becomes a vital input in the state's choice of technique of conflict management, and vice-versa, the choices are seldom fixed.

Considered in terms of categories, 'pressurising authority' was the single most preferred form. This preference was complimented at the milder and stricter ends by 'demands articulation' and 'peaceful movement'. Together these three contained the five most preferred constituent forms: strike (18.53%), strike notice (18.23%), public meeting (12.19%), procession by the contenders (11.57%), and office rally (10.27%). The tendency towards



militancy had been very weak (Table 9). The summated scores for

**Table 9**

Types of Conflict Behaviour Ranked in order of Contenders' Preference

Demands Articulation	30.51	72.10	
Pressurising Authority	41.59	66.56	96.07
Peaceful Movement	23.97	27.19	68.78
Defiant Movement	3.22	3.93	27.90
Violent Movement	0.71		

each conflict on forms of the contenders' conflict behaviour and direction of shifts in the contenders' preference regarding forms of conflict behaviour show that in most conflicts the contenders chose either moderate forms or weak forms of conflict behaviour (Table 10). Examined over-time, there was a steady decline in 'demands articulation', the least intense form with a secure

**Table 10**

Conflicts classified according to Moderation-Extremity in Conflict Behaviour\*

Weak Conflict Behaviour	43.02
Moderate Conflict Behaviour	55.75
Extreme Conflict Behaviour	1.23

\* Classification based on summated score on forms of conflict behaviour and shifts in preference regarding forms of conflict behaviour.

legitimacy in democracy. The increase in the use of a form of conflict behaviour which closely corresponded to the above-mentioned decline, had been 'pressurising authority'. There was hardly any escalation in intensity of contention, particularly when there had been halting decline in incidence of peaceful movement, and a steady unwillingness to use violent forms of conflict (Table 11). However, it is interesting that men in course of food movement, school teachers and peasants took greater recourse to forms of conflict behaviour of more intense forms, compared to other groups of the contenders (Table 12). The service sector contenders with the exception of those in lower bureaucracy, were moderate antagonists. There was no signifi-

cant difference among the various categories of the contenders

**Table 11**

Types of Conflict Behaviour\* by Contenders

Blocs of Years	Conflict Behaviour				
	Demands Articu- lation as Rudimentary Conflict Behaviour	Pressuris- ing Autho- rity as Conflict Behaviour	Peaceful Movement as Conflict Behaviour	Defiant Movement as Conflict Behaviour	Violent Movement as Conflict Behaviour
1948-1952	39.02	34.96	21.95	4.07	
1958-1962	33.50	36.04	27.92	2.28	0.25
1967-1971	26.43	47.13	23.69	1.50	1.25
1977-1981	22.67	52.00	8.00	16.00	1.33

\* in % of total number of conflicts.

in preference for/compulsory use of various forms of conflict behaviour; nor had anyone of them evidently altered their preference over-time. It would have been worthwhile if we had the appropriate data to explain whatever difference is noticeable, or even make some categorical statements regarding the preferences.

**Table 12**

Preference for Types of Conflict Behaviour by Types of Contenders

Types of Contenders	Conflict Behaviour *				
	Demands Articulation as Rudimen- tary Conflict Behaviour	Pressuris- ing Autho- rity as Conflict Behaviour	Peaceful Movement as Con- flict Behaviour	Defiant Movement as Con- flict Behaviour	Violent Movement as Con- flict Behaviour
Subordinate Employees					
in Administration :	31.84	38.57	7.17	22.42	00.00
Health	29.69	65.63	4.69	00.00	00.00
Dock/Port	26.14	60.23	6.82	6.82	00.00
Municipality	48.78	39.02	3.66	8.54	00.00
Transport	26.09	56.52	15.22	2.17	00.00
Industrial Workers	21.62	64.86	6.76	6.76	00.00
Teachers	30.69	24.75	21.78	22.77	00.00
Refugees	50.00	20.00	10.00	18.00	2.00
Peasants	23.53	17.65	29.41	29.41	00.00
Students	16.67	50.00	13.89	19.44	00.00
Men in food movement	19.44	16.66	41.67	16.66	5.56

\* in % of total conflict.

## V

While trying to identify the main forms of response to conflict by the post-colonial state in India, we have found that the data in the public medium (the newspapers) on the state response have not matched the data on conflict with the state. It is evident that the total incidence of use of any technique of conflict management (846) : is much less than the (78.48%) number of conflicts (1078) we have identified here (Table 1). The actual number should be smaller considering the possibility that some conflicts must have encountered more than one technique of conflict management. It may mean that the newspapers under-reported on the state response, which should have a bearing on quality of public knowledge of the state behaviour (or vicarious experience of the state phenomenon). It may also mean that the state has not responded to all conflicts (which, again, must have a bearing on public knowledge of the state behaviour). Why the state has not, is an interesting question. It must have been due to lack of various resources (e. g., a readily permissive law, administrative will, a policy on conflict, requisite repressive forces, an economic surplus to develop an appropriate conflict management apparatus). But even the available data point to certain peculiarities in the state response. If we may begin with a summary statement, the post-colonial state mainly used the technique of severe repression of conflict when it decided to respond at all to conflicts (Table 13). The same fact is revealed

Table 13

Incidence of Relative Use of Conflict-Management Techniques (1948-1981)		
TECHNIQUES	Number & % of Conflicts	
Conflict Regulation	22	(2.68)
Anticipatory Conflict Regulation	19	(2.31)
Conflict Regulation after conflict	3	(0.36)
Conflict Repression	502	(61.07)
Normative Repression	317	(38.56)
Financial Repression	20	(2.43)
Physical and Psychological Repression	150	(18.25)
Arousal of public disapproval / hostility	15	(1.82)
Changing repressive techniques	24	(2.91)
Sanction against contenders' family	nil	
Conflict Resolution	298	(36.25)
Total incidence of use of any technique	822	(100.00)

through a complementary exploration (Chapter 3) on conflict between the state and its subordinate employees in a service sector between 1948 and 1985. We are also essentially confirmed by comparative data on the basis of which the Indian state earned a fifteenth rank in the world in terms of imposition of sanctions and a tenth, in terms of relaxation of sanctions. But magnitude of relaxation was much too small compared to that of imposition of sanctions (Table 14). This was between 1948 and 1977, a period smaller than our own here. For a still more brief period, between 1975 and 1977, we have the report by Professor James Fawcett, President of the European Commission on Human Rights. According to it, at least 40,000 and perhaps as many as 100,00 political prisoners were held without charge or trial, most of them being left-wing radicals. This is at least a measure of coercive extreme the state can reach, staying within the framework of a constitution.

Our data indicate that the post-colonial state seldom tried to regulate the form or incidence of conflict. Conflict regulation is the least politically and administratively expensive response to conflict. The state needs only an ability to argue about what is proper and what is desired. The task is to provide definition of appropriate collective political action from a given political cultural standpoint. The political fall-out adversely affecting a fledgling liberal democratic state, is minimum. Even then a very negligible use was made of this technique. Whatever little attempt was made, was almost exclusively in the form of anticipatory conflict regulation, and very weak at that (Table 15). As specific anticipatory conflict regulation exercise, one stood out as a single measure reckonably used: the state indicating to the contenders the desirability of articulating their demands through

**Table 14**

State Coercive Response, 1948-1977\*

Blocs of Years	Imposition of Sanctions**	Relaxation of Sanctions
1948 - 1952	29.4	5.4
1953 - 1957	16.2	2.0
1958 - 1962	20.2	3.0
1963 - 1967	37.8	8.0
1968 - 1972	26.6	3.0
1973 - 1977	26.4	6.0
1948 - 1977	26.1	4.57

\* Taylor and Jodice, (Tables 3.1 & 3.2) Vol. 2, 1983.

\*\* sanction measures do not systematically match our measures.

peaceful demonstration and meeting (in approximately 22 per cent of conflicts experiencing anticipatory conflict regulation). For

**Table 15**

<b>Blocs of Years</b>	<b>Anticipatory Regulation of Conflict</b>	
	<b>Strong Positive</b>	<b>Weak Positive</b>
1948 - 1952	0	5
1958 - 1962	0	6
1967 - 1971	0	8
1977 - 1981	0	0

the first three blocs of years, the frequency of conflict regulation exercise of any kind (within the range chosen here) was almost identical ; a drop from that level in the last is explained partly by a drop in the number of conflicts for the same period. The state did not also vary the degree of conflict regulation in its response to various kinds of contenders. It may mean that forms and methods of conflictual contention by various kinds of contenders did not vary. While the state was reluctant or felt unnecessary to "talk" to the contenders, the latter seemed to be eager to "listen" to the state on the question of choice of permissible/appropriate mode of demands articulation. Could it be because the post-colonial state could imitate easily the behaviour of the colonial state, while the contenders in the post-colonial India did not have a usable tradition of contention against the state? The contenders' readiness to "listen" to the state is indicated by their response to conflict regulation through pursuation by the state (Table 16). The most significant form of response was to abandon an already undertaken form of conflict behaviour coming to know about the state's persuasive arguments. In fact over the years the contenders increasingly responded to the state's conflict regulation based on pursuation by abandoning an already undertaken form of conflict (table 17). In significant number of cases the contenders would give up a publicly stated plan for conflictual engagement (Table 16). On the otherhand, the state could secure compliance from the contenders through demonstration of its intolerance to conflict in an insignificant number of cases.

The most acute expression of state intolerance is repression of conflict. This was the principal technique of conflict management by the Indian post-colonial state. Of its various forms, normative repression of conflict was the most preferred form, the



next being physical and psychological repression ( Table 18 ).

**Table 16**

**Contenders' Response to State's Conflict Regulation Exercises\***

<b>Compliant Response to Persuasion :</b>	<b>80.41</b>
Abandon an already undertaken form of conflict	53.38
Give up a publicly stated plan for conflictual engagement	27.03
<b>Compliant Response to Expressions of State Intolerance :</b>	<b>6.76</b>
Abandon an already undertaken form of conflict	5.41
Give up a publicly stated plan for conflictual engagement	1.35
<b>Compliant Response to Persuasion and Expressions of State Intolerance :</b>	<b>6.75</b>
Abandon an already undertaken form of conflict	4.05
Give up a publicly stated plan for conflictual engagement	2.70
<b>Non-compliant Response to Persuasion and Expressions of State Intolerance :</b>	<b>5.40</b>
Abandon an already undertaken form of conflict	1.35
Give up a publicly stated plan for conflictual engagement	4.05

\* % of conflicts encountering state's conflict regulation exercises

The uniformly high level use of very severe normative response in all the blocs of years must be in good part due to inheritance of a legal framework designed primarily for repressive

**Table 17**

**Compliant Response to State's Persuasion\***

<b>Blocs of Years</b>	<b>Abandon an already undertaken form of conflict</b>	<b>Give up a publicly stated plan for conflictual engagement</b>
1948 - 1952	43.75	25.00
1958 - 1962	42.86	36.73
1967 - 1971	59.15	23.94
1977 - 1981	75.00	8.33

\* % of conflicts encountering state's persuasion when contenders had either undertaken or publicly stated a plan for conflictual engagement.

containment of conflict, from the colonial state. This is evident from the fact that for most conflicts, the normative repression could be based on the existing constitution (Table 19). The state also tended to impose normative repression without giving much time to the contenders to decide on whether or not they would comply with the threat to use normative sanction by the state

**Table 18**

## Normative Repression of Conflict \*

Blocs of Years	Very Severe **	Severe	Moderate	Weak
1948 - 1952	94.44	5.56	0	0
1958 - 1962	91.35	8.65	0	0
1967 - 1971	96.84	3.16	0	0
1977 - 1981	100.00	00.00	0	0

\* % of conflicts which encountered some form of state response.

\*\* The categories are based on divisions of the possible range of score.

**Table 19**Instruments of Normative Repression :  
State's choices and contingencies \*

Existing constitution and laws	43.48
Special powers under constitution	39.13
Amendment to constitution	8.70
Newly introduced law for the purpose	4.35

\* % of conflict encountering all forms of normative repression ; in 4.35% conflicts the state didn't overtly attempt to use law as a repressive instrument.

(Table 20). Because of the brevity of most of the conflicts we have recorded, only a small number might have encountered a combination of conflict management techniques. But normative re-

**Table 20**Difference in Time between Threat of Normative Sanction and Imposition of  
Normative Sanction by State \*

1 to 3 days	55.56
4 to 7 days	14.81
8 to 15 days	11.11
More than 15 days	14.81
1 to 2 months	3.70

\* % of conflicts on which data were available indicating difference in time.

pression was usually combined with physical and psychological repression (Table 21). The latter again was used mainly in its very severe form, with fluctuations in the use of moderate level physical and psychological repression. The state seldom made a weak repressive response, may be on the calculation that it could be counterproductive. In only an extremely small number of conflicts the state varied the scales of repression. But, the direction of variation was towards more severe repression than

the scale with which the state had started to respond to a conflict.

**Table 21**

Physical and Psychological Repression of Conflict \*

<b>Blocs of Years</b>	<b>Very Severe**</b>	<b>Severe</b>	<b>Moderate</b>	<b>Weak</b>
1948 - 1952	46.15	28.21	23.08	2.56
1958 - 1962	69.57	19.57	10.87	
1967 - 1971	59.57	19.15	19.15	2.13
1977 - 1981	83.33	11.11	5.56	

\* % of conflicts which encountered some form of state response.

\*\* The categories are based on divisions of the possible range of scores.

The insignificant use of financial sanction against the contenders was mainly because most of them, we have considered here, were not in state employment. This particular form of repression was used in good measure by the state trying to contain conflicts with its own subordinate employees. (Chapter 3). The state, reportedly applied no sanction against family members of the contenders, like ransacking household objects, destroying living place, or doing something similar. These only marginally reduce the repressive image of the state. What fits this overall character of the state response to conflict, is the fact that the state seldom tried to induce public pressure on the contenders. This would have been congruent with the liberal democratic framework of the constitution. When it did, it merely instructed people to be critical of some contenders' conflictual behaviour. It seems that the state ignored the public as it handled conflicts directed against it. As another indicator, we note the state's unwillingness to try to establish legitimacy in public estimation of its choice of repression of certain conflicts. Only in a small number of cases (4.99%) it explained to the people why it responded to some conflicts using the technique of repressive management of conflict. When it did, it pointed out violence in conflict behaviour of some contenders as a justification for its counter-violence (Table 22). 'Violence in contention' has, as a justification for the state violence, obvious advantages : (i) Violence is visible ; hence the state does not have to impute something (like that the contenders lack popular support or have harmful design, or that they have extra-territorial connection) readily acceptable to or validated by the experience of people. (ii)

**Table 22**

State's Assessment of Contenders in course of Legitimation of Repression

Violent contenders	55.81*
Contenders' impermissible ideological identity	11.63
Contenders' extraterritorial loyalty / connections	00.00
Contenders' lack of popular support	2.33
Contenders' harmful design	20.93
Any other undesirable character of contenders	9.30

\* % of conflicts in which the contenders were at all assessed by the state.

The state benefits from a public conception of the state as a normally coercive institution, while violence by the contenders is acknowledged as legitimate under certain circumstances by radicals only.

Compared to the extent of use of the technique of severe repressive management of conflict, the exercises towards conflict resolution were moderate and lowly positive (Table 23). In most of the conflicts the state would just 'listen' to the contenders'

**Table 23**

State's Conflict Resolution Exercises :  
Public Expression of State's Intentions

Acknowledging the issue generating a conflict but unwilling to interact at all with contenders	33.89*
Intention to 'listen' to contenders' observations and arguments	64.77
Intention to negotiate with contenders after their reformulation of their original demands	1.00
Intention to negotiate with contenders without any precondition	0.34

\* % of conflicts state wanted to resolve.

observations and arguments, or acknowledge the issue producing a conflict condition. However, an increasing choice of a more positive conflict resolution exercise (among those reported here) over time is noticeable (Table 24). Though the conflict resolution exercises were weak, their impact on conflicts was

**Table 24**

State's Conflict Resolution Exercises :  
Public Expression of State's Intentions

Years	Conflict Resolution Exercises			
	Acknowledging the issues generating a conflict but unwilling to interact at all with contenders	'Listening to contenders' observations and arguments	Negotiating with contenders after reformulation of their original demands	Negotiating with contenders without any precondition
1948 - 1952	40.00 *	60.00		
1958 - 1962	42.05	55.68	1.14	1.14
1967 - 1971	28.06	70.50	1.44	
1977 - 1981	23.81	76.19		

\* % of conflicts state wanted to resolve.

significantly positive (Table 25). We could trace the impact on

**Table 25**

Impact on Conflict of State's Conflict Resolution Exercises

Conflict not resolved	15.98*
Conflict resolved through reciprocal concession	56.62
Conflict resolved through redistribution	26.03
Conflict resolved in a form considered just under the circumstances by both state and contenders	
Conflict resolved finally according to both state and contenders	1.37

\* % of conflict the impact of state's conflict resolution on which could be located.

conflict of conflict resolution exercise in a good number (73.49%) of conflicts which were sought to be resolved by the state. It again shows the contenders' willingness to positive gestures by the state.

## STATE AND STATE'S-MEN

### I

How and to what consequence state manages conflicts between itself and its employees is a critical factor in its efficacy in managing conflict in the large arena of society, economy and politics, when the state has acquired through political transplantation a democratic social welfare form somewhat prematurely. The focus is on how the post-colonial state in India manages conflicts in which it is a party in the capacity of (the biggest) employer. The locus of the process chosen here, is the sequence of conflicts between the state and its class III and class IV employees — henceforth referred to as the subordinates — of the Ministry of Posts and Telegraph. It is common knowledge that the state has been a compulsive employer. The state materializes in the state's-men who perform a series of functions, benign or malign. (Remember Bernard Shaw: The law is not executing a criminal.... a man is killing a man). The men are situated, purportedly on the basis of role-specific capability, in a hierarchic organization of statuses. Institutionalized relationships of command and compliance characterize such an organization. This must be a permanent source of conflict between categories of employees, vertically located relative to each other. If this is a conflict endogenic to an organization, another genus of conflict flows into such an organization from society, so to say, through the employees of different categories. We know that the different categories are located in a network of functions bearing different organizational and cultural statuses, and requiring expertise ranked according to scalar evaluation. It is a normal procedure to recruit in a way so that the potential or demonstrated ability matches the rank of an incumbent. While incumbency is a formal grant, ability is acquired through education, training and cultural position. In a social situation in which various kinds of social inequality interfere with acquisition of these preconditions, the social antagonism peculiar to stratification is likely to seep into formal relationships of



command and compliance in an organization. Hence the conflict peculiar to an uneven distribution of authority in a formal organization is likely to draw on conflict peculiar to social stratification. With the feedback of regional and national politics, a third form of conflict, political conflict per se, is likely to join the other two. If a significant majority of the subordinates associate themselves through their unions with working class political parties, a third set of contradiction is likely to exacerbate the conflict situation within the state apparatuses. Hence the apparatuses are characterized by dynamic coalescing of three kinds of conflict, the copula being anything like a wage policy, or an emergent alliance in opposition politics.

But the state apparatuses are evidently vital to the state as institutionalized power as well as to a particular regime. Some of these apparatuses are designed specifically to manage contradictions and conflicts generic to society, economy and politics, in a physical (violent repression) or normative (legal regulation) way. Some operate at a more fundamental level of established patterns of distribution among social classes (resolution through redistribution). Some, again, try to contain conflict psychology (reproduction of a working consensus). We have chosen here an apparatus which apparently provides a vital service, namely, communication, to the community. Because we think that by providing services the state takes care of future conflict. The soft anticipation of conflict by the state matches the weak signals of possible future conflict. We acknowledge the possibility of conflict due to felt insufficiency of services urgent for a decent civic existence. Indeed, a particular service distributed by the state can trigger off expectations of better and greater services on the part of a larger body of citizen-clients. But these do not take away anything from our assumption here that services provided by the state produce a sense of utilitarian attachment on the part of the citizen-clients to the state. This is likely to interfere with any attempt at their rapid mobilization for the purpose of conflict with the state (on any issue). The choice of a service apparatus, a remote control on future conflict, fits the time perspective of our study. Because, the post-colonial states are projecting themselves as service-states. Here we try to identify only how the state manages within-the-apparatus conflicts. The understanding of its consequences for provision of

service by the afflicted apparatus as a subtle tool for conflict management obviously requires a different kind of research design ; and is not attempted here.

## II

It is necessary first to identify the conflict engagements. We use here quantitative data but without a presumption that these suffice. Conflict of any kind is conducted by men (may be incumbents of authority positions through whom the state materializes). And men in conflict may have different dispositions to the same conflict and no equivalent capacity for engagements. A set of presumptions underlie the pointer to the incidence of conflict engagement : (1) The nature of an engagement enters into the state's choice of conflict management technique with a strong probability that the choice prepares the ground for a subsequent engagement. The entry is through the key conductors on two sides (and, we need to remember that they represent different 'social' choices). (2) Any durable collective contender like an employees' union makes multiple uses of the history of conflict relations : in conflict socialization of leading men as well as followers of the organization, in choosing tactics of conflict, in strengthening the organization, in inducing alliance formation with/withdrawal from alliances with relevant social and political forces, (3) To the state, a conflict which has a series of antecedents is easy to manage. The state can be perceived as a learning system.

The antagonists here are the post-colonial Indian state and the unionized employees in class III, IV, 'extra-department' and 'industrial' categories (alternatively referred to as 'the subordinates', and 'the contenders'). The class I and II officers represent the state as they implement the sub-legal rules of the state administration, drawing on the authority of the state. Strike is used here as the principal indicator of conflict. (Table I). But we take into account other expressions of conflict like potential strikes (Table 2) and minor conflicts at local, regional and national levels, throughout every year of the period (Appendix A). These include local strikes of various durations, rallies, sit-ins, deputations etc. A good account is available in Iyer (1984) and in the newsletters of the most powerful union, the National

Federation of Posts and Telegraph Employees (NFPTE). At least in two ways these are processually connected with the major strikes : (1) as preparations of a national-level strike (like the maze of stitches in the underside of an embroidery which offers little clue about the design to the untrained eyes), and (2) as methods to combat victimization following a national-level strike or a major regional strike. The development of these sub-national level conflicts have been uneven among cities/towns and regions. Hypothetically observing, a number of differentials must be responsible for this : (1) differences in the age of the P and T establishments in various cities and towns, (2) differences in the level of radical political consciousness or of oppositional politics in such urban centres, (3) differences in the state of organization of left parties in states of the Indian Federation, where P and T establishments are situated.

**Table I**  
Incidence of Conflict  
(Major all-India Strikes)

<b>Year</b>	<b>Duration</b>
1960	5 days
1968	1 day
1974	3 days
1984	1 day
1985	1 day

Since we treat history as an important determinant of subsequent conflict, we need to note three major strikes against the colonial state. These were in 1880, 1908 and 1946. The first incidence was confined to Puna, but the other two were all-India strikes. The last one continued for 28 days. Strike, then, as a form of conflict is more than one hundred years old in this service sector.

However, we are not in a position to comment on the frequency distribution of the events, that is, we don't have any sound criterion to observe that too many or too few conflicts have taken place. Comparison with conflict between the state and its employees in other states could be a convenient basis but it would have thrown one kind of light only. Nor we can answer the vital

**Table 2**  
**Confictual Engagements Proposed but Called off by the Contenders**

Year	Form of the Proposed Con- flict	Date of the Pro- posed Conflict	Date of Proposition	Date of calling off	Why called off: Major factors		
					Change of decision by some leaders	Authorities Decision to favourably consider the demands	In view of a national emergency
1949	Strike	9.3.49	1.2.49	21.2.49	/		
1957	Strike	8/9.8.57	15.7.57	8.8.57	/	/	**
1961	Hunger strike	7.1.61	Not known	Not known			***
1965	Work-to-Rule/ no Over time	From 14.9.65	"	"			
1966	Work-to-Rule/ no Over time	17.8.66 -23.8.66	29.6.66	14.8.66		/	
1967	Token Strike	11.9.67	11.8.67	5.9.67	/		

■ Three such cases in the colonial period: in 1915, 1927 and 1931.

\*\* Due to serious illness of Central Home Minister.

\*\*\* War with Pakistan.

question : does the extent of conflict justify that of the severity of conflict management ? And no answer will be methodologically sound unless we accommodate in our measure the assessments of the actors and of the counter-actors — a kind of a net balance analysis. 'Do we deserve so much of repression' and 'do they deserve tolerance' are real questions in a conflict situation, after all.

### III

A tradition of conflict, is established through, among other things, the crucial role played by the contenders' conflict formations. We need to remember that managing a conflict is a crucial imperative for the contenders also. (The exclusive focus in literature on conflict management is on the state or the authorities). The conflict formations manage conflict in diverse ways : (1) deciding on a programme of conflictual engagements, (2) inducing escalation or de-escalation of collective conflict behaviour, depending on the course of development of a conflict, (3) Conducting negotiations, and (4) taking care of post-conflict situation. We presume that the conflict formations are not immune from what happens to a conflict. These are contingent formations. Hence they compare badly with the state apparatus.

We take employees' unions as the conflict formations. Unionization as a formal process started in the closing years of the colonial state (Table 3). The Indian Telegraph Association was founded in 1906. This was the first central government employees' union but was recognized only after 1919. (Sen, 1977, pp. 422-423). The Union of Post Office Workers in Great Britain was founded in 1919 (Moran, 1974, p. 16). The other attempts to unite the employees were under the garb of cultural activities as for example, organized as Calcutta Postal Club, founded in 1908 (Sen, 1977, p. 423). Unionization drew on larger political opposition to the colonial state. no less important was the stimulus received from the experiences of the British working class. Since then politicization of unions has continued. Again, the formation of multiple unions with various degrees of viability,



which characterized the colonial phase, as a tendency has not been totally reversed. The continuing politicization has, however, induced two developments. First (and not a chronological 'first'), some kind of centre formation among the employees' unions in various central services, including those in the P and T department (Table 4). This was a result of exercises of tactical choice during a particular phase of conflict — as if to match the

**Table 3**  
Number of Unions \* and Associations  
(1935-1970)

Year <sup>1</sup>	Number of <sup>2</sup> Unions	Year	Number of Unions	Year	Number of Unions
1935-36	13	1952-53	21	1961-62	23
1936-37	12	1953-54	21	1962-63	25
1937-38	11	1954-55	20		
1938-39	11	1955-56	31	1963-64	25
1939-40	11	1956-57	31		
1948-49	20	1957-58	31	1964-65	24
1949-50	19	1958-59	23	1965-66	25
1950-51	20	1959-60	23	1969-70	29
1951-52	21	1960-61	23		

1. The number of unions and associations was not mentioned in the Annual Reports of the Posts and Telegraph Department in the years between 1966-67 and 1968-69, and between 1971-72 and 1973-74, and since 1978-79. Between 1974-75 and 1977-78, federations of unions were mentioned but not the number of constituent unions.
2. A few of the unions represented 'gazetted employees' who do not belong to our "contender" category.
- \*. Recognized all-India unions.

**Table 4**

Incidence of 'Centre' formation and State's Response

<b>Year</b>	<b>Name of the Formation</b>	<b>Immediate Purpose</b>	<b>State's Response</b>
1948	Federation of Central Government Employees	To fight back retrenchment	Withdrawing recognition and dismissing leaders and introducing new Service Conduct Rules
1949	Co-ordination Committee of Central Government Employees' and Workers' Unions and Associations	For a common fight for better living and service conditions	
1956	Confederation of Central Government Employees and Workers	To organize national-level protest against failure of First Pay Commission	Conceding demand for Second Pay Commission, and for interim relief, as well as introducing two new clauses in Conduct Rules to prevent demonstration and promulgating Service Association Rules to curb union activities
1966	12th July Committee *	To fight automation	

\* A front including teachers and middle class workers in West Bengal.

the state power. All the major strikes were organized by such central bodies. It is interesting to note that some such centres lost salience after they had played a vanguard role in particular conflicts, leaving the inertia of an alliance formation, to be subsequently materialized in another name and with an altered scope of activity. The formations have been adaptive responses to the perceived threat of the state power and the social classes it represented. It would be wrong to think that the larger politics played no role in successive centre-formation mentioned above. It did, though in a somewhat covert way. In the second process, of federation formation, politics is more evident because of publicly stated linkages of the unions with competing national-level political parties/party-alliances (Table 5). True, that the

two processes did not converge at the same point of time. But they had deep complementarity. The former development was essentially antedotal, trying to reduce the distance among unions and associations which had emerged on sectoral and local bases. This was the beginning of reaching out for the larger political forces. The latter was the other traffic: political parties trying to secure base in the vital service sector. It is interesting that (1) the Indian National Congress made a belated attempt, and (2) the Janata Party could begin the process of instituting congruent unions only after becoming a ruling party. Hence the major attempt at unionization has come from the leftist opposition political parties. On the whole, the situation has changed from non-antagonistic proliferation of unions to emergence of a few political unions of unions. We need to mention that as early as in 1948, the central government thought that realignment of multiple unions would

**Table 5**

Year	Incidence of Overtly Politicized Federation Formations *	
	Name of the Formation	Political Affiliation
1949	Federation of Post and Telegraph Unions (FPTU)	
1954	National Federation of Posts and Telegraph Employees (NFPTE)	Left opposition parties
1968	Federation of National Posts and Telegraph Organization (FNPTO)	Indian National Congress
1978	Bharatiya Post and Telegraph Employees Federation (BPTEF)	Janata Party

\* Number of constituting unions not known in all cases.

facilitate introduction of an organization on the lines of Whitley Council to secure more effective association of the staff with the administration. This was a factor in the formation of NFPTE.

We find, then, that a 'natural' multiplicity of unions and associations has been replaced by political division of the unionized employees. One of the results has been the intervention in the state-employee conflict by the federation of employees'

unions affiliated to the national ruling party. The immediate benefit/or damage due to successful management of this kind of vertical political conflict is 'political', and accrues to the ruling party. But it has a bearing upon the state apparatus also. The intervention creates an 'ally' for the state, and gives the contenders linked with leftist opposition another target. In order to indicate the role of a ruling party supporting employees' union we can point out the role of the INTUC affiliated to the national ruling party in 1960 strike. (We need to remember that the FNPTO, affiliated to the Indian National Congress was yet to be formed then.): The INTUC was engaged in : (1) projecting the 'beneficial' recommendations of government appointed Pay Commission in 1957 (the report was published in 1959); (2) criticizing the formation of the Joint Council of Action (JCA) by representatives of the NFPTE, The All-India Defence Employees' Federation and All-India Railwaymen's Federation in April 1960, as 'against the express provisions of their service rules'—an argument befitting an administrative authority rather than an employees' union; (The 1960 strike was organized in July and was in protest against 1957 Pay Commission's report) ; (3) publicizing differences between the major constituents of the JCA ; (4) criticizing JCA for ignoring the beneficial recommendations of the Pay Commission; (5) identifying the Communist Party as the main motivating force, and attributing to it a design to capture political power eventually; (6) alleging violent tactics by the JCA in course of the strike. The total thrust was towards de-legitimation of strike as a form of conflict.

It is the perception of the nature, organization and motivations of the conflict formations on the part of the relevant incumbents in the authority positions which significantly influences the response of the concerned apparatus to a conflict. To avoid misunderstanding, a few observations can be made : (1) We do not assume that a response by the state apparatus can not stimulate a fresh bout of conflict. Conflict-management can well lead to reproduction of conflict. (2) But that is not to say that conflicts break out only because of the behaviour of the state apparatus. Both need to be referred to social structure and processes.

The state's perception has been characterised by change over time (Table 6). The question 'how many of them' has lost signifi-

cance, probably with the emergence of stable centres of trade union activity. 'What is their attitude to the policies' has become the guiding question to the state as it decides on appropriate response to conflict. A sample of expressions about the relationship between the state and the principal contending federations can be illustrative : (1) cordial relationship (Annual

**Table 6**

Changing Modes of Perceiving the Conflict Formations by Authorities		
Year	Modes of Perceiving	Indicator
1935-40 and 1948-65	As quantifiable aggregates	Reference to <i>number</i> of union and associations, or of their federation.
1965-79	As object of relationship	Reference to the <i>quality</i> of of relationship between the unions and the authorities.

\* Based on content analysis of Annual Reports of Posts and Telegraph Department of the relevant years.

Report, 1965-66, 1971-72 and onwards); (2) sobering effect of NFPTE in the face of tendency on the part of some unions to resort to agitational method (Annual Report, 1966-67); (3) NFPTE serving a strike notice trying to bypass the machinery for negotiated settlement (Annual Report 1967-68); (4) periodical meetings producing some agreements (Annual Reports 1974-75, 1976-77, 1977-78). We need to note that from Annual Reports 1971-72 onwards, the total space devoted to unions and associations has been drastically reduced and all the reports generally point out 'cordial relationship'. How do we interpret this apparent paradox, that when unions were too many and could hardly develop stable co-ordinating centre, there was elaborate reporting on the unions, but when these have become well-organized constituents of competing blocs of unions with a common imperative that each should utilize a 'cause' for conflict and the process of conflict with the state for its organizational development, the reporting would be reduced to a negligible stereotype? It is necessary to remember that these Annual Reports (sources of our data) were placed before the British Parliament before the Indian independence. These were the



basis of policy towards the colony. Since independence the Indian Parliament has been scrutinising the Reports to secure public accountability. But there is also the other dimension, of politics : a report on the state of unionization is also an indicator of so many other things like the state of political fractionalization of an occupational class, the nature and range of demands and mode of their articulation which the state must take into account as it decides on tactics of re-distribution. This adds to the paradox. By way of its resolution we can at best make some conjectures ; (1) that union politics does not now pose any problem to the state power in as much as its pattern of behaviour has stabilized; (2) that the relationship between the important centres of white-collar trade union activities and the state has now become fairly institutionalized; (3) that the use of the Annual Report to convey to the parliamentarians about administration's information and understanding regarding the subordinates has become unnecessary with the growth of alternative channels of information (a conjecture reinforced by the fact that about the same time the Annual Reports stopped giving the details of welfare institutions for the staff and of punishment to the erring 'servants'). So, a reduced reference does not mean that the state has ceased to have conception of the contenders. What begs a question is how the relationship between the two could remain 'cordial' over a decade.

#### IV

The contenders' conception of the state is equally crucial. We evidently have in mind the shared conception. It can be a result of experience and of ideological socialization, which characterize the life of any conflict formation — more so, in this case because of early politicization of the unions. We can think of the possible ways the contenders' conception of the state enters into the process of conflict : (1) as a source of collective self-image; (2) as an aid to decode the state's gestures and policies; (3) as a setter of goals and of methods to realize them. The clues we have obtained regarding the contenders' conception are from the published documents of NFPTE, a conflict formation with strong affiliation with the left opposition in national politics, and the most powerful of the federations of employees unions. The

published documents usually contain 'working theses' on the nature of the state and on its policies. These generate terse verbal constructions – slogans – used in labelling the state behaviour as the contenders engage in antagonistic communication. We are trying to argue that the contenders' conception of the state are formed and articulated by the conflict 'theoreticians', but it soon percolates to the relatively 'ordinary' participants in conflict engagements through socialization attached to mobilization. Absorption is likely to be uneven, though certain examples of the contenders' conception may be of interest: (1) conception of the state as a repressive apparatus ("What is the stock solid substantial and seemingly sound offensive of the state ?.....repression and victimization", "The strength of the state is not merely the armies, police and para-military forces but the inertia of the vast majority": Prasad in Souvenir, 1975, no p. no.); (2) conception of continuities in administrative policy between the colonial state and the post-colonial state (comparable policies of elimination of selection grade grade in 1922 and in 1974, and 10% wage cut in 1931 being comparable to compulsory deposit scheme in 1974); (3) conception of bureaucracy ("Essentially it is anti-democratic and anti-progress. Radicalization of our present policy would be possible only by destroying the present bureaucratic framework and replacing it with a functional machinery responsive to the needs and aspirations of the people" (Joseph in Souvenir, 1975, no p. no.). It should be noted that these observations were not from party theoreticians or sympathetic academicians; these were from union leaders who operated in the 'field' of conflict, at best with some rudimentary training in theoretical thinking.

The 'field' experience must have gone into the development of such conceptions. But there have been deliberate attempts at socializing the unionized employees into a conflict culture facilitating appropriate role-taking. We obtain glimpses of conflict culture again from the various published documents. Before we point that out, we need to recognize that more effective socialization took place probably through informal groups in course of casual contacts in tiffin rooms or in course of work. For the larger number of the contenders, with only elementary education, this form of oral socialization must have been more "intelligible" than impersonal documents written in English or in non-colloquial vernacular languages. This is not

because of linguistic ease of conversation, only. Since oral socialization is conducted through conversation, who can converse with whom is usually carefully planned taking into account intimacy, trust, respect and obligation between partners in socializing conversation. The socializing discourse is likely to include a defence of conflict built upon easily recognizable persistent deprivations of those for whom it is meant. If these employees are, so to say, at the periphery, only occasionally drawn in to the process of conflict when it involves total disruption of services, there are others, a minority, to nurture the cleavage between the subordinates and the state (gaining from unwitting reciprocation by the latter), to cultivate consciousness of the kind, to liberalize the rules of political 'commensality', and of course to engage occasionally in acutest form of conflict. To this concentric circle arrangement corresponds an identical arrangement of socializing discourses. For, example, the "course" meant for the minority of leaders, can well include some theoretical training to forecast the behaviour of the capitalist state apparatus. There are buckles to keep the rings close ; there are also boundaries to keep up the differences. In all, division (among the contenders into the socializers and the socializees) without distantiation. The published documents we draw on, do not inform us about the above mentioned intricacies to conflict socialization. But they do suggest the framework within which oral socialization has proceeded. We have selected one document (Souvenir, 1975) to indicate the range of issues covered in such communication. All the formulations were by the leaders of employees' union not by functionaries of any political party. These were: (1) birth of the all-India Association of the contenders and its role in the trade union movement (struggle and sacrifice going as inputs in institution building) ; (2) individual versus collective (the necessity to think in terms of collective needs) ; (3) the possibility of confrontation between the subordinates and the state (4) identification of the goals of wage policy ; (5) menace of 'de-recognition' as an example of the state repressive technique; (6) economism or emancipation (appropriate goal of working class movement); (7) job at work place (ruling class behaviour and role of trade union to counter frustration due to deprivation); (8) the strike by the Indian railwaysmen (conflict in another service sector); (9) politics and employees' movements (the necessity of politiciza-

tion of trade union movements); (10) struggles of civil servants of different countries of the world, and (11) the problems of world capitalist economy (crisis of capitalism). What is interesting is that these tried to sensitize the employees about the various dimensions of their working class existence and its environment. Conflict socialization tried also to inculcate conflict behaviour. This would include bantering an important leader for his preference for non-militant path in "Canteen Gossip", a feature in RMS Reporter (Iyer, 1984, p.15); or, informal sessions on how to demonstrate anger and resoluteness. It is a necessary to know how the unionized employees responded to the socializing influences, particularly to the persistent suggestion that they should perceive themselves as part of the Indian working class, when most of them belonged to the white-collar group (Table 7 and Appendix B). 'Spark'; we may note, was the name of the Journal of the All-India Audit and Account Association.

Has the awareness of the necessity of collective action vis-a-vis the state authorities developed significantly and evenly among the unionized employees? Here is a clue :

Often it happens he (the average subordinate) has to be persuaded to join the union. Instances are not a few where one feels his duty in the union is complete by paying the subscription and perhaps a little more participation in the union election. Employees come with varying ideas, outlook and inclinations according to the way of life in which one has grown. The type of education we receive in academic life and in the society around us do breed in us numerous inhibitions. Mostly they are not conducive to the working class approach to problems and their solutions.

(Sen in Souvenir 1975, no p. no.)

**Table 7**

Growth in the Size of the Subordinates (1971-84)

<b>Year</b>	<b>Groups C &amp; D Employees</b>	<b>Extra-depart- mental Emplo-</b>	<b>Industrial Employees*</b>
1971-72	388888	204887	7273
1972-73	390612	205321	7146
1973-74	416312	208938	7113
1974-75	438385	210382	7286
1975-76			
1976-77	467993	222418	6969
1977-78	483600	233877	7063
1978-79	495367	248208	6974
1979-80	519461	275950	7197
1980-81	550592	284419	7084
1981-82	589554	292526	7103
1982-83	622239	294451	7108
1983-84	636801	299468	6998

**Table 7(contd.)**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Industrial Employees as per cent of Gr. C &amp; D Employees</b>	<b>Industrial Employees as per cent of Gr. C and D and Extra departmental Employees</b>
1971-72	1.87	1.22
1972-73	1.83	1.20
1973-74	1.71	1.14
1974-75	1.66	1.12
1975-76		
1976-77	1.49	1.00
1977-78	1.46	0.98
1978-79	1.41	0.93
1979-80	1.39	0.90
1980-81	1.29	0.85
1981-82	1.20	0.81
1982-83	1.14	0.76
1983-84	1.10	0.75

\* Work in factories and stores

Source : Annual Reports of Post and Telegraph Department.

Once in 1946 the Bombay Postmen Union sent a parcel of

bangles (a sign of effeminacy) to some local union leaders in Nagpur for their decision not to join 1946 strike (Iyer, 1984, p.65). It is an interesting recognition on the part of the conflict elite that socialization into conflict culture has to compete with various other socializing tendencies. The limits of socialization during adulthood and within the occupational framework are evident in this case. The self-conception formed early and under the influence of more basic socializing agents like family and educational institutions hinders new role-taking. This is a state of inner fragmentation of an occupational group – a good example of how status stratification interferes with inducement to develop a consciousness of a different kind. (we have already noted the state of political fragmentation). It would have been worthwhile to know what kind of strategy of socialization the ‘theoreticians’ of predominantly white-collar staff unions have been trying to improvise for a correct handling of contradictions within such an occupational class. We definitely do not suggest that socialization is a sufficient condition. But it can help the subordinates re-locate the appropriate antagonistic outgroup by offering them a diagnostic analysis of their condition. Since the contradictions hinted above are not exclusively those of a particular organized sector of employees, the objective conditions for successful re-location must be present in the larger framework of society from which the employees are drawn.

## V

But social contradictions can facilitate conflict socialization also. Of the many possible ways, we cite here one. Antagonism peculiar to a form of social contradiction may imperceptively join with antagonism peculiar to another. We present our data below (Table 8) which point to the possibility that antagonism characteristic of an ascriptive stratificatory order (viz, the division into the caste Hindus, and the scheduled castes and tribes) has reinforced that of an achievement-based stratificatory order (viz, the superordinates and the subordinates in a formal organization). We could be definite about our observation had we probed into the stable conception of the dominant community (the caste Hindus) on the part of the members of the marginal community (the scheduled caste and scheduled tribe), and if we



could know whether the conception would be considered relevant in evaluating the authorities in an imperatively coordinated association. That is, we would have gained from the data on incidence of transference of cognitive stereotypes from the 'social' to the 'official'. We still think that latent socialization

**Table 8**

Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe employees (in per cent) among the Subordinates\* and Superordinates\*\* (1965-84)

Year	Subordinates	Superordinates	Year	Subordinates	Superordinates
1965	14.89	1.46	1976	-	-
1966	15.64	1.60	1977	19.24	6.45
1967	15.89	1.82	1978	19.52	6.91
1968	14.91	2.21	1979	20.03	8.77
1969	16.09	2.13	1980	21.99	11.52
1970	15.80	2.53	1981	21.44	9.85
1971	-	-	1982	21.36	9.51
1972	17.34	2.25	1983	21.37	13.69
1973	16.48	3.29	1984	21.42	14.01
1974	17.39	4.37			
1975	17.98	4.47			

\* Include Class III and IV both permanent and temporary employees ; exclude industrial workers and extra-departmental staff.

\*\* Include Class I and II both permanent and temporary employees.

Source : Annual Report, Posts and Telegraph Department, Government of India of the relevant years.

of the members of the marginal community into conflict culture in such a situation draws imperceptively on the stable feelings about inequality (We do not, however, have data to indicate deliberate use of community sentiments in manifest socialization.)

We have maintained above that collective self-image is a crucial input in the development of predisposition to conflict. But we have not been able to demonstrate how it is, via personality. Through serendipitous survey we have come across a qualitative datum concerning another form of collective self-image as it underlies the subordinates' attitude to the state. (This should hopefully reduce the handicap, due to lack of appropriate data, in our preceding construction) :

What lends significance to the office is the fact that in it works the cream of the universities of the South. It will be difficult to find a single aristocratic family in the city a member of which does not belong to the Accounts Office. Among the common folk the Accounts Office commands veneration as an aristocratic office.

One would imagine that all these factors would create a situation of harmonious and peaceful relations in the office. The staff is well-educated and cultured that the easiest and most natural thing would be to have the best of relations between the staff association and the administration.

(excerpt from Headquarters General Letter No.21/66 dated 10.11.66, concerning restoration of recognition to the N. G. O's association, stoppage of victimization etc.)

What is interesting is that the self-conception draws on both ascriptive status and achieved status.

## VI

We have identified above the subjective dimensions of conflict. Taken together these represent the conflict potential. In the demands the state and the subordinates place on each other, which produce conflictual movements and often coercive responses of the state, we find the materialization of the potential. The demands serve a number of functions, as far as the contenders are concerned, like: a consolidation of "we-feeling" on the basis of awareness of common needs, facilitation of communication, arousal and mobilization, and definition of the area of bargaining.

An overview of the demands placed before the state by the subordinates in all the major incidents of strike is given by the union leadership :

The mobilization for a strike on each occasion primarily centres round the erosion in real wages and determination of a need-based minimum wage while the post-strike situation inevitably calls for fighting back the repressive measures and curtailment of existing benefits and trade union rights.

(Chatterjee in Souvenir, 1975, no p. no.)

This is evident also from the charters of demands in all the major strikes between 1960 and 1985 (Table 9), which should be related to the main demands in the various minor conflictual engagements (Appendix A).I

**Table 9**

Charter of Demands in Major Conflictual Engagements\*

**1946 Strike**

- 1) Revision of Scales.
- 2) Restoration of pre-1931 leave rules.
- 3) Distinction in leave and pension rules of lower grade staff and superior should be abolished.
- 4) The officials who have officiated in higher grade for one year should be confirmed without any examination.
- 5) The percentage of posts should be increased from 20% to 50% for promotion from lower grade to clerical grade.
- 6) No retrenchment and all who have been retrenched should be taken back.
- 7) Holidays should be equal to that of other departments.
- 8) All work done on Sunday and Postal holidays should be compensated by grant of overtime allowance.
- 9) Gratuity at the rate of one month's salary for one year's service should be sanctioned to the family of the employees who die while in service.
- 10) Distinction in the matter of pay, leave, dearness and other allowances and privileges between A, B and C areas should be abolished and all areas should be treated as A area.
- 11) Medical examination for confirmation in higher grades should be abolished and all such who are officiating should be confirmed.
- 12) Adequate leave reserve should be provided and those who have

rendered one year satisfactory service should be confirmed and their temporary service should be counted towards pension.

#### 1960 Strike

- 1) Constitution of Whitley Council.
- 2) Acceptance of the principal of compulsory arbitration.
- 3) Compulsory GPF in its present form be withdrawn.
- 4) For fixation of pay and pensionary benefits 1.7.57 should be the date.
- 5) Formulation of the Varadachariar Commission for grant of dearness allowance with suitable adjustment should be accepted.
- 6) Status quo should be maintained of the earned leave and casual leave. Industrial workers should be put on par with non-industrial workers in these matters and the operative staff should be made eligible for all public holidays or compensated thereof.
- 7) Minimum wage should be on the basis of Recommendation of 15th L. I. C.
- 8) Ceiling on increase as a result of fixation of pay should be lifted.
- 9) Re-classification of cities should be done on the basis of present population. In places with high cost of living adequate compensation should be provided.
- 10) Efficiency bars should be abolished.
- 11) Weekly off, or compensatory leave should be given to all.
- 12) Confirmation in service after one year's service.

#### 1968 Strike

- 1) Need based minimum wage and fixation of differential.
- 2) Full neutralization of rise in prices.
- 3) Merger of D.A. with basic pay.
- 4) Withdrawal of proposal to retire employees at 50 years of age or on completion of 25 years of service.
- 5) No victimisation and reinstatements of 'victimised workers'.
- 6) No retrenchment without equivalent alternate job.
- 7) Abolition of contract and casual labour.

#### 1974 Strike

- 1) Need-based minimum wage.
- 2) Full neutralization of rise in cost of living.

- 3) Bonus for all.
- 4) De-casualisation of casual workers.
- 5) Full trade union rights.
- 6) Vacation of all forms of victimisation.

#### 1985 Strike

- 1) Restoration of all sorting sections/sorting mail office/set and dropping of proposed abolition of night shift in Tamilnadu.
  - 2) Removal of ban on recruitment.
  - 3) Immediate absorption of RTPs/ Casual Labourers/EDAS/Part time workers and approved mailmen for Class III posts.
  - 4) Cancellation of DG's order withdrawing checkers from HROs/SROs, abolition of SORs and Mail offices and restoration of status quo ante.
  - 5) No increase in work-load other than those prescribed in Bewoor-Trapada, Marathe Time Tests and Madan Kishore Formula will be imposed.
  - 6) No introduction of bulk entry system of accountable articles.
  - 7) No mechanisation, no computerisation and no introduction of shorting machines in RMS.
  - 8) Providing Mail Peons/Mail Guards with MMS driver.
  - 9) Standard for sanction of staff for P and T, MMS.
  - 10) No curtailment of MMS Schedules and restoration of Schedules already abolished.
  - 11) Vacation of all forms of victimization.
- \* No details of demands around which strikes were organized in 1949 and in 1957 are available except that 28 short demands in the former and seven economic demands in the later were placed.

We think that the appropriate way of looking at the demands is to take them as collective perceptions of threats basically to the employees' livelihood and to prospects for social mobility. The threats, according to the contenders, have come from the market forces, 'inconvenient' reorganization of work, policy on recruitment and on retirement, and the state's punitive-repressive measures against the employees' articulation of demands. The principal categories of demands have evidently stabilized. This would imply that the principal causative factors, the economy and the state power, have not undergone any, radical transformation during the period. To the extent the

general demands have been shared by the relatively lower categories of employees of the different wings of central government employees, an outline of a service sector occupational class becomes visible during preparation of conflictual engagements, during the outbreak of conflict, and in the immediate aftermath. Whether it will eventually merge into a broader working class is a good question to ponder over.

## VII

A charter of demands is usually a careful formulation. The major contemporary demands which are likely to rally the maximum number of subordinates, and which basically concern their purchasing power, are accommodated in a charter. But we wonder whether these demands 'completely' represent the total need structure of the subordinates. What about the general conditions of work, interactions at work place, perceptions of occupational future, categorizing labels which formalize interpersonal distance? Is it not likely that these generate a conception of need — a need for improvement, or for assurance, or for a little more of dignity? We are unable to make secure observations because we do not have the data which can identify such a conception which buckles the needs articulated in a charter and the needs germane to general existential conditions. But we may indicate factors of this order on the strength of an assumption that these prepare conflict consciousness of the contenders.

First : Immediately after independence the state started introducing measures for staff welfare (Tables 10 & 11). The original policy statement reveals two things : (1) the state's understanding of the subordinate's state of psychological agitation due mainly to high prices causing deterioration in standard of living and acute shortage of residential accommodation; (2) the state's apprehension that this might adversely interfere with the subordinates' efficiency. Obviously these measures were designed to pre-empt conflict arising out of feelings of relative deprivation. But because the measures were introduced in the context of perceived needs, it was only likely that the needs would compose the scales for measurement of the adequacy of the measures. While the state's initiative in introduction of welfare measure and persistence with these, have



Table 10

Growth of Welfare Institutions (1952-1961) \*

Year	Cooperative Societies including stores and Credit	Canteens	Tiffin Rooms	Tea Shops	Recreation Clubs	Night Schools
1952	150	181	181	NR	310	24
1953	165	194	224	44	351	15
1954	167	225	316	46	408	15
1955	179	263	263	33	455	20
1956	276	286	386	67	548	17
1957	325	269	405	59	578	13
1958	208	268	430	70	643	2
1959	213	277	526	64	731	1
1960	6**	320	442	39	807	5
1961	245	251	517	41	815	2

Table 10 (Contd.)

Growth of Welfare Institutions (1952-1961) \*

Year	RMS Rest Houses	Dormi- tory Retiring/ Rest Rooms	Welfare and Works Committees	Holiday Homes	Dispen- saries	Grain Shops	House Building Societies
1952	224	98	NR	7		18	NR
1953	243	136	9	6	7	17	NR
1954	239	175	77	5	7	14	NR
1955	239	197	559	5	7	NR	NR
1956	242	215	652	5	10	NR	NR
1957	240	269	619	4	10	NR	NR
1958	241	317	723	4	10	NR	10
1959	242	325	741	4	12	NR	15
1960	225	374	843	4	14	NR	8
1961	231	374	986	5	16	NR	NR

\* No tabular report available after 1961

\*\* A possible mistake.

Table 11

Government's contribution to Staff Welfare Fund measured in terms of percentage of total revenue and of total expenditure

Year	% of total revenue	% of total expenditure	Year	% of total revenue	% of total expenditure
1964-65	.06	.06	1974-75	.04	.05
1965-66	.05	.05	1975-76	.04	.05
1966-67	.04	.04	1976-77	.05	.05
1967-68	.04	.04	1977-78	.05	.06
1968-69	.04	.04	1978-79	.13	.16
1969-70	.06	.06	1979-80	.12	.14
1970-71			1980-81	.13	.14
1971-72	.05	.06	1981-82	1.12	1.20
1972-73	.05	.06	1982-83	.12	.14
1973-74	.05	.05	1983-84		

Source : Annual Reports, Posts and Telegraph Department,  
Government of India of the relevant years.

institutionalized subordinates' expectation from the state, the persistent discovery of both quantitative and qualitative insufficiency of the measures of the part of the subordinates, have stabilized a potential source of conflict.

Second : More relevant to occupational role performance is the subordinates' perception of opportunities for positional mobility within the hierarchic framework of the same occupation. A suffering from sense of closure can inhibit efficiency, and adversely affect work ethics. Mobilization for conflict becomes relatively easy. An Indian Institute of Management Survey reports :

Inspite of the numerous cadres and various levels of cadres such as Lower Selection Grade (LSG) and Higher Selection Grade (HSG), the promotional prospects for the Group 'C' and 'D' employees have not been perceived to be very good. There are many cases of individual employees who have remained in the same basic cadre for more than 20 years without any promotion and have stagnated at the maximum pay scale (1984, p.19).

The subordinates' occupational prospects are further affected by an increasing use of sophisticated technology in telecommunication. An ILO report points out :

While new technology widens career possibilities, especially at senior level, higher levels of skill requirements, de-skilling and consequent bipolarisation have contributed to a tendency towards reduced career prospects among lower level officials, who are unable to obtain the necessary formal qualifications or retraining relevant to the new requirements (Table 12).

(quoted in Ibid, p.17)

Third : There has been a continuing wage disparity between the employees of public sector undertakings and the central government

**Table 12**

Year	Impact of technology on Manpower Requirement		
	No. of Telephones actual/expected	No. of Employees per 1,000 Telephones	Total Number of Employees
	(Lakhs)	(No)	(lakhs)
1979	24	114	2.75
1985	43	75	3.24
1990	95	50	4.75

Extracted from C.O.T. Report, paragraph 6.1.5, p. 237

(Reproduced as Appendix X in Indian Institute of Management Report, 1984, p. 142).

employees (Report, Fourth Pay Commission, 1986, pp. 71-74). The former have constituted a stable reference group for the latter. The feeling of relative deprivation has facilitated mobilization for conflict in the face of the state's decision not to project itself as a model employer.

Fourth : A steady decline in the ratio of wage to revenue/expenditure has taken place since 1960-61 (Table 13) (Ibid, p.61). This has been justified by the state in terms of expenditure

on infrastructural development, defence, social and community services, out of the surplus retained by the state. In the context of widening economic inequality it would mean that salaried service sector subordinates are to bear the cost of national development while the benefits of development are enjoyed by the affluent class. Such a wage policy combining with publicly acknowledged erosion of real income is likely to create problems for those men in this occupational group who hesitate to associate themselves with working class politics. But the pressure is quite strong in as much as the decline in the ratio of wage to revenue/expenditure is partly due to a reduction in the recruitment to the state services. The growth in civilian employment during the years 1971 and 1984 was 27 per cent while it rose by 71.7 per cent between 1957 and 1971. (Table 14) (Ibid, p.48). There is no empirical proof that the employable adult offsprings of the state service holders would, under Mendelian logic, intend to step into the same rank in the same service. But it is common knowledge that the Indian parent's preoccupation with the

Table 13

Year	Wage Bill and its relationship with Revenue Receipts/Expenditure		
	Wages & Salaries Bill (Rs. crore)	Total Revenue Receipts (Rs. crore)	Total Revenue Expenditure (Rs. crore)
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1960-61	417	1297	1246
1965-66	754	3022	2703
1970-71	1186	4354	4191
1975-76	1887	8075	7189
1976-77	1926	8739	8440
1977-78	2019	9792	9362
1978-79	2153	11240	10948
1979-80	2427	11340	12034
1980-81	2761	12829	14544
1981-82	3183	15574	15868
1982-83	3594	18091	19346
1983-84	4421	20493	22890

**Table 13 (Contd.)**

Wage Bill and its relationship with Revenue Receipts/Expenditure

Year (1)	Wage bill as a percentage of	
	Revenue Receipts (5)	Revenue Expenditure (6)
1960-61	32.2	33.5
1965-66	25.0	27.9
1970-71	27.2	28.3
1975-76	23.4	26.3
1976-77	22.0	22.8
1977-78	20.6	21.6
1978-79	19.2	19.7
1979-80	21.4	20.2
1980-81	21.5	19.0
1981-82	20.4	20.1
1982-83	19.9	18.6
1983-84	21.6	19.3

Source : Report, Fourth Central Pay Commission, 1986, p.66.

**Table 14**

Distribution of Posts by Major Departments

Ministry/Department	No. of regular (in lakh)			Percentage increase	
	1957	1971	1984	In 1971 over 1957	In 1984 over 1957
Railways	9.97 (57.41)	13.99 (46.9)	15.05 (39.7)	40.3	7.6
Posts & Telegraphs	1.98 (11.4)	3.93 (13.2)	6.84 (18.1)	98.5	73.3
Defence	2.60 (15.0)	5.97 (20.0)	7.23 (19.1)	129.6	21.1
Others	2.82 (16.2)	5.93 (19.9)	8.75 (23.1)	110.3	47.6
Total	17.37 (100.0)	29.82 (100.0)	37.87 (100.0)	71.7	27.0

(Figures in brackets are percentages to total)

Source : Report, Fourth Central Pay Commission, 1986, Table, p.48.

problem of appropriate employment of their grown-up children flows from the lingering traditional imperatives of parenthood. A reduction, even closure, in recruitment in the state services, is likely to symptomise the state of employment opportunities. Again, additional posts at higher levels have been created at a much faster rate than at the lower levels between 1971 and 1984 in this service sector (Table 15). We are prevented from making any objective observation because we do not have data on inter-generational occupational mobility, that is, we can not maintain that the subordinates as parents manage to prepare their children only for similar subordinate positions. Since long range social mobility is an exception even in advanced capitalist systems, we may presume that here and now the subordinates 'reproduce' subordinates. Since working class and middle class parents expect support from their working sons, a noticeable shrinkage in the employment opportunities is likely to produce anxieties about future.

### VIII

How has the state been responding to the outbreak of conflicts with the "subordinates" from time to time? We have just a preview of the character of conflict management in the data on demand charter in the particular form of conflictual protest against 'victimisation' during and after a previous conflictual engagement. We present now some quantitative data on the authorities, behaviour in the same category of coercive preemption/regulation/termination of the contenders' movements. But we also think that the psychological impact on the subordinates would remain unknown to us leaving a vital gap in our understanding of effects of conflict management. The recipients' (of coercive sanction) measurement of the magnitude of coercion would depend on a number of variables like: (1) the state of their psychological preparedness, a product of experience and conflict socialization; (2) the state of their financial situation, related to their class; and (3) the degree of moral authoritarianism in their sub-culture.



Table - 15

Distribution of Posts by Groups and by Major Departments in 1971 and 1984

Group	1971	1984	Railways		P&T	Defence		Others		Total	(Figures in hundred)
			Percentage increase	Percentage decrease		1971	1984	1971	1984	1971	1984
A	37 (0.3)	77 (0.5)	108.1		36 (0.5)	67 (1.1)	117 (1.6)	74.6 (3.9)	226 (5.2)	341 (1.2)	680 (1.8)
B	38 (0.3)	36 (0.2)	-5.3		99 (1.5)	63 (1.1)	88 (1.2)	39.7 (5.7)	577 (6.7)	461 (1.6)	800 (2.1)
C	5914 (42.2)	8144 (54.2)	37.7		5410 (79.6)	2336 (39.1)	3419 (47.3)	46.4 (71.1)	5896 (68.7)	15450 (52.1)	22868 (60.7)
D	7997 (57.2)	6790 (45.1)	-15.1		1247 (18.4)	3506 (58.7)	3611 (49.9)	3.0 (19.3)	1661 (19.4)	13375 (45.1)	13309 (35.4)
Total	13986 (100.0)	15047 (100.0)	7.6		6792 (100.0)	5972 (100.0)	7235 (100.0)	21.1 (100.0)	5796 (100.0)	29627 (100.0)	37657 (100.0)

Note :- 1. Does not include unclassified categories.

2. Figures in brackets are percentages to total.

Source : Report, Fourth Central Pay Commission, 1986, Table II, p50.

We have reports on various forms of punishment directed against various categories of staff presented to the Indian Parliament between 1949 and 1969. The publication was not a practice on the part of the colonial state, which however does not mean that it did not punish at all. (But from 1855 the Annual Report did have a tabular report on complaints from public and attention paid to them, projecting on image of a service state). We wonder whether the introduction of very detailed tables (which we have adapted in Table 16 ; see also Appendix C) in Annual Reports of the Post and Telegraph Department, an obvious object of political debates, was designed to demonstrate to the staff, whom it referred to as Government servants, that the post-colonial state had the political will to publicly punish them. (Equally problematic is the decision to discontinue the publication from 1970, when the practice of punishing was not being discontinued. Could it be that the party in power at the nation-state level was trying to weaken the punitive image of the state, and derive a political benefit out of that ?) Almost the entire category of "the punished" was composed of Class III and IV

**Table 16**

Subordinates\* subjected to various forms of official punishment. 1949-1969  
Distribution by Number and Percentage (1949-69)

Years	Forms of Punishment						Total
	Reprimand		Financial Sanction		Termination of Employment		
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	
1949-50**	5055	61.99	2548	31.25	551	6.76	8154
1950-51	6079	61.01	3320	33.32	565	5.67	9964
1951-52	5095	55.30	3633	39.43	486	5.27	9214
1952-53	4084	48.60	3830	45.58	489	5.82	8403
1953-54	3669	43.41	4320	51.12	462	5.47	8451
1954-55	3206	44.82	3547	49.59	400	5.59	7153
1955-56	2910	43.51	3404	50.90	374	5.60	6688
1956-57**	2622	43.91	2992	50.11	356	5.96	5970
1957-58**	2120	44.82	2251	47.59	359	7.59	4730
1958-59	2928	44.73	3190	48.73	428	6.54	6546
1959-60	3065	43.92	3448	49.41	465	6.66	6978
1960-61**	7167	44.88	7931	49.66	872	5.46	15970
1961-62	3250	41.39	4239	53.98	364	4.64	7853
1962-63	3733	43.21	4372	50.61	534	6.18	8639
1963-64	3477	42.89	4138	51.05	491	6.06	8106

Table 16 (contd)

## Forms of Punishment

Years	Reprimand		Financial Sanction		Termination of Employment		Total
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	
1964-65	3151	49.94	3242	47.27	466	6.79	6859
1965-66	3781	48.52	3664	47.02	347	4.45	7792
1966-67	3525	46.89	3663	48.72	330	4.39	7518
1967-68	3402	47.21	3435	47.67	369	5.12	7206
1968-69**	3994	44.71	4495	50.32	444	4.97	8933
1969-70	4639	45.03	5160	50.08	504	4.89	10303
	X = 3854.86		X = 3848.67		X = 459.81		X = 8163.33
	M = 3525		M = 3633		M = 462		M = 7583
	R = 2120-7167		R = 2251-7931		R = 330-872		R = 4730-15970
	S = 1160.49		S = 1119.74		S = 116.64		
	V = .301		V = .290		V = .254		

\* Class III and IV employees. Number of Class I and II officer receiving punishment in a few of the years is extremely insignificant, and punishment was minor.

\*\* Years in which major strike activity took place.

Source : Annual Report, Posts and Telegraph Department, Government of India.

employees – the unwitting state-makers ; And what kind of punishment did they receive ? ‘Statutory’ as would the reports mention in some cases possibly – suggesting legitimacy. What were the forms of punishment ? These were : Censure (in Table 16 here, termed ‘Reprimand’) ; withholding of increment or promotion including stoppage at an efficiency bar, reduction to a lower post in a time scale or to a lower stage in a time scale, and recovery from pay for any pecuniary loss caused to the state (in Table 16 here, termed ‘Financial Sanction’) ; and, removal from service, dismissal from service and compulsory retirement (in our Table 16 here, termed ‘Termination of Employment’). For them, ‘servant’ would be more than a matter of nomenclature. It would symbolize a vulnerability which was due to their (low) positions both in the rational-legal order, and in the ritual ascriptive order

of Hindu society for the many from the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes (Table 8). We have at least one case of a Post Master General, Central Circle, asking an orderly to polish his shoes (Iyer 1984, pp. 94-95).

Considering the detailed form of the tables on punishment, it is surprising that the 'offences' committed by the subordinates were not mentioned except one, namely "pecuniary loss caused to the government". True, we have nothing in the official report to maintain that conflictual activities by the unionized subordinates earned them the penalties. But the conflictual protests against 'victimization' due to participation in strikes, slow process of restoration of jobs, positions and pay to penalized subordinates, politicization of the issue of punishment and reprieve, do indicate a close relationship between strike activity and punishment. From the original tables (Appendix C) it is evident that the postal and RMS categories of subordinates have consistently received major punishments. The initiative and leadership for most of the strike came from the unions of these categories. The Home Ministry's disclosures and Transport and Communication Ministry's statements in response to opposition queries on coercive containment of major strikes like the one in 1960, further confirm our observation (Appendix D).

The forms of punishments had an underlying scalar organization. 'Censure' constituted the mildest form. 'Removal from service', 'dismissal from service with a prohibition on joining any other government service' and 'compulsory retirement' were the severest within the category of statutory punishment. Evidently these operated on the livelihood of the subordinates concerned, but eventually affected their dependents. The quantifiable effect related to consumption and services, for example, milk for the aged parent, or school fee for the young daughter. But there must also be the psychological impact as punishment of this makes one vulnerable to sympathy, ridicule or admonition from one's significant others. One's bonds of relationship could suffer. The cost of conflict for some contenders might become very high indeed. Between the two polar forms were variations in financial sanction. The grades of punishment would imply that the state differentiated among acts of commission on the part of the subordinates. So, an award of punishment must have been

preceded by an assessment of offence. It need not have been a simple case of the state punishing some subordinates found guilty only after an impartial assessment on the basis of objective evidence. The incumbents of various state positions are individuals with political preferences and prejudices, with personalities attended, may be, with the authoritarian syndrome. Could these trespass into what took the form of a rational-legal judgement? Could an office master's ability to punish a subordinate fetch him a promotion to a higher position? We have to remember that the major conflict formations of the subordinates had association with the leftist opposition political parties. The possibility of erroneous assessment of offence committed by any subordinate and of excess punishment was recognized in as much as an Appellate Tribunal was set up on an experimental basis with effect from 1.10.48. The officially stated purpose was "more expeditious and judicious dealing of appeals from the non-gazetted staff of the Posts and Telegraph Department against statutory punishment". But its status was advisory; also its composition had a bias in favour of the state because a retired judicial officer and a retired officer of the P and T department were appointed as members with only the scope for a third member appointed at the instance of the appellant, who could belong to the branch where the appellant worked or could be his nominee or of the union of which the appellant was a member. It was abolished on 1.4.50, apparently after a review which found it had not justified itself. The record of work for the two years, officially presented in the Annual Reports of the relevant years shows an increase in number of appeals received from the penalized subordinates, by the Tribunal but no corresponding increase in number of appeals allowed and an increase in number of appeals dismissed in toto (Table 17). We are not in a position to evaluate the nature of the cases because we do not have data, and hence the correctness of the decision on closure. But we do feel that the closure would adversely affect institutionalization of conflict resolution.

The apprehension is strengthened by the long history of difference and disputes between the unions and the state over creation of a machinery for settling disputes between the two through joint consultation and compulsory arbitration. The

creation of such a machinery like Whitley Council was recommended by the First Pay Commission in 1947. The necessity was recognized by the Indian Prime Minister when a nation-wide strike in 1957 was averted. To quote him :

We should not blame the workers, for they have been hard hit by the economic situation. We must evolve ways of trying to solve problems as they arise and not wait for a crisis. It has always seemed to me that, while economic questions are not often easy to solve in existing circumstances, even greater difficulty comes from the manner of approach to these problems ; if our approach is human, understanding and friendly, then much of the suspicion or distrust goes.

If we are to avoid strikes, lock-outs and the like, we must have effective methods of solving disputes, equitably as they arise. At present, these methods require great improvement, and I recognize that, so far as the Government is concerned, its methods are often cumbersome and slow-moving. We must improve them.

(Jawaharlal Nehru, quoted in *The P and T Labour*, an organ of NFPTE, Vol. XXXII, No. 3, March, 1986, p. 19).

**Table 17**

Record of Work by Appellate Tribunal (1948-1950)

Appeals	Number	
	1948-49	1949-50
Received	93	281
Allowed	30	95
Dismissed in toto	10	69
In which punishment was varied	21	62
Remitted for trial de novo	8	26
Held outside of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal	3	29

Adapted from Annual Reports 1948-49, 1949-50

The setting up of the Machinery of Joint Consultation and Compulsory Arbitration took nearly another decade — after a Second Pay Commission repeating the recommendation of the first in 1960 and a major five-day strike by a large section of central

government employees in the same year. And, in 1986 an Arbitration Awards writ Petition under Article 32 of the constitution of India, was made to the Supreme Court of India by the NFPTE and four other national federations of unions of central government employees against decision by the national government to refer various awards made by the Machinery to the Fourth Pay Commission. This is alleged to be in violation of terms of Declaration of Joint Intent, on the threat is the trust between the subordinates and the state's which is a vital to institution-formation. The state with a liberal democratic framework needs to maintain an institutional distinctiveness for our purpose here, as an employer in the service sector. It can not behave like a private sector employer. We need to note an observation by the Second Pay Commission (1960) in this connection :

The government is no doubt free from the profit motive in the usual sense; and even in Government's industrial and commercial undertakings the profit motive is subordinated to wider considerations of the public interest. But the community's pressure to keep down taxes and the desire for economy in government expenditure may sometimes have the same effect as considerations of profit among private employers. Though divergently inspired, the ultimate result in both cases may be identical resistance to reasonable demands for increased remuneration or for improvements in conditions of service. The Central Government is increasingly undertaking business and industrial functions, which is another factor tending to blur, in the eyes of a considerable proportion of their employees, the distinction between the Government as an employer and other employers.

(Quoted in Ibid, pp.19-20)

Is it possible that the loss of the distinction would be further corroborated by the subordinates' experience of being punished



by the state ? Could the state as an employer be unambiguously equated with a private employer ?

Taking up the question of choice among the three forms of statutory punishments, we notice a persistent preference for reprimand and financial sanction. In between them, these account for more than ninety per cent of punishment awarded mainly to the subordinates. It may mean : that the errors related to official work and antagonistic behaviour in course of conflict were minor in nature according to authoritative evaluation ; that these forms of punishments could be decided at local and intermediate levels of administration; and, what these would have little political fall-out as these would not provoke further conflict as suspension, dismissal or termination from employment, would (in fact, did).

The use of each mode of punishment varied during the twenty-one year period. In the absence of information on the exact size of those engaged in various conflicts during the same period, it is difficult to comment on the size of the yearly average of these receiving each form of punishment. But considering the fact that most of the conflicts were led and undertaken by the subordinates located in a few city offices, the yearly average was quite large. Evidently and explicably there was no uniform application of a particular mode of punishment over the years. In their individual variations from their respective yearly averages, the three modes hardly differed among themselves. So also in regard to the brevity of trends towards either increase or decrease in use of a particular mode (Table 18). Besides these peculiarities of the individual time series, we find a significant tendency on the part of all the modes to increase or decrease together (a multiple correlation coefficient of 64 with a value of 3.63, significant at 5 per cent level). This was because the state was responding either to a spell of intense conflict, or to a period of relative quiet. Though the difference is not strikingly large, the average use of each mode was greatest in the years of conflict, and it progressively diminished in years of potential conflict, and in years without any major conflict (Table 19). That the extensiveness of application and the severity of punishment was a function of the perceived strength of the federal alliance among the unions of different occupational groups of the

subordinates and of the political alliance among the left opposition parties, is best indicated in the data for the years, 1961 to 1963 and 1967 to 1969. On the other hand, the data for the years between 1954 and 1958, when only one intended major strike did not materialize, show successive deescalation in extensity and intensity of punishment (Table 18).

**Table 18**

Three Years' Moving Average of Incidence of use of Modes of Punishment

**Modes of Punishment**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Reprimand</b>	<b>Financial Sanction</b>	<b>Termination of Employment</b>
1950			
1951	5409.67	3167.00	534.00
1952	5086.00	3594.33	513.33
1953	4282.67	3927.67	479.00
1954	3653.00	3899.00	450.00
1955	3261.67	3757.00	412.00
1956	2912.67	3314.33	376.67
1957	2550.67	2882.33	363.00
1958	2556.67	2811.00	381.00
1959	2704.33	2963.00	417.33
1960	4386.67	4856.33	588.33
1961	4494.00	5206.00	567.00
1962	4716.67	5514.00	556.67
1963	3486.67	4249.67	463.00
1964	3433.67	3917.33	497.00
1965	3469.67	3681.33	434.67
1966	3485.67	3523.00	381.00
1967	3569.33	3587.33	348.67
1968	3640.33	3864.33	381.00
1969	4011.67	4363.33	439.00

**Table 19**

Difference in Use of Punishment Related to  
Periods of Different Magnitude of Conflict

Period	Forms of Punishment		
	Reprimand	Financial Sanction	Termination of Employment
	Use in yearly mean of subordinates penalized		
1. Years <sup>1</sup> of major Conflict (Strike)	4427.00	4892.33	558.33
2. Years <sup>2</sup> of major Conflict (Strike) notified but not undertaken	4228.50	2991.50	460.00
1 & 2. Years of potential conflict and actual conflict	4347.60	4132.00	519.00
3. Years <sup>3</sup> without conflict	3700.88	3760.13	441.31
4. Total period (1949-69)	3854.86	3848.67	459.81

1) 1957, 1960, 1968.

2) 1949, 1967.

3) Rest of the years between 1949 and 1969.

However, punishment would not be the only form of response on the part of the state (Table 20). Attempts at symbolic manipulation and symbolic compulsion combined with punishment. The contenders would usually locate these as preparation for the state's harsher response later. May be, the contenders were culturally accustomed to these sequence of responses, which might have appeared analogous to childrearing practices in a moral-authoritarian culture. A good example is Prime Minister's broadcast to the nation before the 1960 July strike. He had just come back from a visit to forward army positions in Kashmir. He projected the soldiers stationed in adverse locations as the ideal model for all the state employees, whom he called 'the nation-builders'. That the employees intending to strike risked being stigmatized as 'saboteurs' of national economic development, was duly communicated. An appeal for peaceful consultation was coupled with a strong criticism of formation of a vanguard conflict formation (JCA) by the employees, and denying it an interview. A symbolic begging (of the employee's withdrawing the strike call) by the highest real executive was combined with his announced decision to deal firmly with the strikers. A second

Table 20

Authorities' Response to Conflict 1 : Repressive Regulation

Major Conflict Strike	Forms of Repressive Regulation				Delegitimation Target : Conflict Formation Withdrawal of recognition / delaying restoration of recognition
	Physical Target : Individual Contender Arrest/ Conviction	Livelihood Denial Target : Individual Contender Suspension/Termination/compulsory retirement	Psychological Target : Individual Contender Threat/Stigmatization/not censuring information on repression on a part of conflict formation	Legal Target : individual Contender Formulating a rule/ an ordinance a law, or using a prevalent but special law	
1 1949	2 Mainly <sup>2</sup> (number not stated)	3 Mainly (number not stated)	4 Not reported	5 Safeguarding of National Security Rules, 1949 <sup>3</sup>	6 Not reported
1957	No cause for as the strike did not materialize <sup>4</sup>		A threat of catastrophe for strikers' families in case employees join the strike, mediated through important union leaders <sup>5</sup> .	Essential Services Maintenance Ordinance, 1957, introduced	Not reported

Table 20 (contd)

1	2	3	4	5	6
1960	20,139/1,844	25,000 <sup>6</sup>	Stigmatization : the striker projected as saboteurs (who should have been nation-builders), and the strike as 'civic rebellion' by Prime Minister; open punitive measures against striking railwaymen.	Essential Services Maintenance Ordinance, 1957, and amendment of conduct Rules 4A and 4B to cover under the term 'strike' go-slow, refusal of OT, any retardation of work.	Principal contending unions derecognized on 22.7.60; restoration of recognition in September 1961.
1968	3677 <sup>8</sup>	29,198 <sup>9</sup>		Essential Services Maintenance Act, 1968	De-recognition of NFPTE and its affiliates on 21.9.68; restoration of recognition on 7.9.68.
1974	Mainly (number not stated)	Mainly <sup>11</sup> (number not stated)	Not reported	Defence of India Rules and Maintenance of Internal Security Act.	Not reported

Notes :

1. Except the data on 1968 strike, the data on all other strikes have been collected from contenders' reports.
2. Arrest of front ranking young radical section of the conflict leadership, reported.
3. Notable is the reference to legal concerns like 'national security' and 'essential services' which are apparently non-negotiable social imperatives, the vagueness of their reference notwithstanding.

4. No significant pre-emptive arrest reported.
5. Demoralisation of employees intending to undertake the strike due to threat of persecution cited as the principal factor compelling unconditional withdrawal of the strike notice.
6. These are numbers of central government employees who jointly undertook the strike. The number of P&T employees arrested and/or convicted is not known. The officially released number of arrests was 17,780, and of derecognized unions and association, 85. The majority of those arrested were released by 31.8.60.
7. Vacation of victimization of individual employees reportedly continued till June 1962.
8. Firing on striking railwaymen in Punjab on 19.4.68. Casualties not reported. Pre-emptive arrest of leaders.
9. The numbers are of P&T striking employees. Of these, 24,848 were temporary employees. All the numbers are of P&T employees. Approximately 12,000 central government employees were arrested, and 10,000 had their employment terminated or suspended. Victimization was mainly directed towards striking P&T employees as the AIRF and AIDEF, who were parties to the strike decision by Joint Council of Action, did not noticeably join the strike. The total number of P&T employees joining strike was 1,23,000.
10. Vacation of victimization was not completed even by 30.7.72 when an Anti-victimization Convention was held in New Delhi.
11. The extent of victimization must have been significant as confederation of Central Government Employees and Workers and NFPTE had to observe Anti-Victimization Day on 7.6.74., victimization was directed against striking railwaymen.

example : A Government of West Bengal notification concerning the 1960 strike was through a sketch of Kalidasa trying to fell the branch of a tree on which he was sitting. The contenders were being projected as idiots because, the sketch symbolically implied that they were hurting democracy by using democratic rights.

These are examples of stigmatization of individual contenders. But the object of threat could also be the family members of the contenders. Before the proposed strike in 1957, such a threat was communicated to the potential contenders, strangely through the leaders of the principal conflict formation. The techniques of conflict management mentioned above had mainly the individual contenders as the target. The authorities would direct their management to the conflict formations as well. The main technique would be incapacitation through delegitimation of unions following a major conflict (Table 20 and Appendix A). This was compelling the contenders to fight for their only weapon for fighting. To legitimize the use of all the techniques, the state would formulate appropriate ordinances and laws (Table 20). The development of laws was evidently rooted in the urgency to manage conflicts.

Since the basic state apparatus the authorities in the post-colonial state has been using was developed by the colonial state, it is worthwhile to know the techniques of conflict management by the latter. It is necessary to remember that the challenge of the contenders before independence had distinct developmental peculiarities : First: An individual leader (Babu Tarapada or Henry Burton), who was more of a humanitarian than of a politician, was more important than a conflict formation in the first few years of this century. Personality rather than organization was the source of motivation. Second : There was marked hesitation due to fear of administrative relation or to greed among the subordinates to even sign a memorandum to be submitted to the colonial state. Many would withdraw their signatures. Evidently, commitment to antagonistic expression of demands was scattered and weak. Third : Memorandum with a modest prayer for improvement in service conditions, anonymous letters in newspapers to register employees' grievances, were the principal methods of articulation of demands. There was neither threat nor violence in their articulation. Fourth:



The employees' formations initially took the form of cultural associations (Bombay Postal Club in 1903). The Indian Telegraph Association, the precursor of the post-colonial conflict formations, was founded in 1906. The conflict management techniques corresponded to these peculiarities : The relevant authority in the colonial administration would summon the important individual leader giving him a hearing and promising to look into the grievances.. This was after petitions by Babu Tarapada in 1904. Also the administration would concede some of the demands of the employees as in the case of first all-India strike in 1908. But Mr. Burton, one very important leader, was interned after the 1908 strike. With employees movement taking more planned and organizational character, the colonial state started adopting unambiguous punitive posture : A planned united movemnet by the subordinates in 1915 drew as a response from the colonial state, internment of Mr. Burton. The protest meetings against his internment, organized by the Calcutta Postal Club symptomized for the first time an incipient unity between the different categories of central government employees. To nip it in the bud, the colonial state threatened and actually did, to transfer the leaders in charge of organizing and mobilizing the subordinates, to Burma; and manipulated some by promising personal promotion. (3) In 1921 Babu Tarapada was dismissed from the service on grounds of organizing trade union. A few pro-authority unions were formed to weaken the emergent unity among the subordinates. For the colonial state, it produced a positive result : a call for a strike in 1927 by the Indian Telegraph Association failed to materialize. A largely attended session of an all-India Conference of Postal and RMS employees in 1931 resolved, by way of protest, to wear 'dhoti' at work place, to refuse to work for more than eight hours and to maintain the time test of work. The colonial state immediately retaliated by withdrawing recognition of Postal and RMS Unions, and succeeded in foiling the conflict programme. However, the state's threat of severe action to prevent the proposed strike in 1946, became counter-productive. The eleven-day strike was conducted jointly by twenty two/twenty three unions of Postal, RMS and Telegraph departments in Bengal and Assam. As a demonstration of support, there was an all-Bengal general strike a week later. The entire conflict became merged into movement

for national liberation. The politicization of the subordinates conflict formation began. And with it the colonial state became overtly repressive. It withdrew recognition of Bengal and Assam Branch of All-India Postal and RMS union, the most defiant unit, for four months in 1946.

We find then a close similarity between the choice of conflict management techniques in the colonial and the post-colonial periods. What is important is the fact that the senior leaders of employees' union do not find, when they expected to, any basic discontinuity due to change from the colonial to the post-colonial statehood. It would have been worthwhile to know how this loss of distinction affects the subordinates' attitude towards the authorities and towards the state materializing through them.

## IX

We have provided a mainly descriptive exposition on a series of conflictual collective action between predominantly non-industrial occupational class of subordinate state employees in the service sector and the state, their employer and obviously not an employer only ; and on a corresponding series of responses by the state, the employer, as mediated through the superordinates who exercise the state power and define the reasons of the state. We have also noted certain stable tendencies : (1) A steady sequence of conflicts, connected with each other by the common concerns but not coinciding with the scheduled political conflict like election. (2) An increasing politicization of unions creating blocks of unions and association of the subordinates ending a 'natural' spontaneous proliferation but also imposing division on lines of partisan alignment. (3) Manifest socialization of the subordinates by the conflict elite into a culture of conflict, and latent socialization 'caused' by the state policy on wage, conditions of work, employees right to demand improvements through collective action. (4) Conflicts primarily due to the non-fulfilment of demands related to wage, promotion and conditions of work. (5) A reliance on the part of the state on punitive management of conflict marginally complimented by persuasive-mainpulative containment, rather than on resolution of conflict through redistribution.

## SOBS AND SHRIEKS

The standard way of locating the level of coercion / repression is to quantify its consequences, like the number of the contenders killed, injured, imprisoned, interned, excommunicated, dismissed from job etc., or number of times press censorship is introduced, or outlawing of political party, group or personage, or the length of the period of emergency. We also need to know the level of suffering as a psychosomatic process on the part of the contenders. Otherwise, we reduce a political actor to a digit or to a phantom. We propose here that we should try to know not only how *many* are coerced / repressed but also *how* many experience coercion / repression, how the state agonizes many through punitive sanctions in course of conflict management – their sobs and shrieks. Such sobs and shrieks are personal expressions of suffering. These may be known only to the agonised – the victims and the co-victims, because they are physically and personally punished in isolation from the public ; or, they are silenced by their own need for ego defense ; may be, to the members of security forces or their hierlings exercising the state's repressive power, who however locate sobs and shrieks as noises confirming their punitive ability ; may be to the persons with whom the victims have biological and emotional bond, whose empathy however can never be sufficient for a complete understanding.

Such data, then, call for attention to different sources. A departure from official data and data collected by any public agency, is obviously needed. Sobs and shrieks are composed of words, themes, images and noises specific to the cultural background of the coerced/repressed. Hence, the data should be gleaned from their articulations, not articulations by sympathetic or opportunistic media. Best are the articulations in spontaneous period literature. When radicalism as a political mode combines with literary composition as an artistic mode – as was the case of many of Bengal's Naxalites – we have the best resource of qualitative data on the state's coercive/repressive response to conflicts.

Let us begin the presentation of qualitative data with reference first to a poetry which laments the tendency of the outsiders (to the radical movement) to measure deaths of radicals in the state action in terms of discreet alphabets or numbers (for it is how the state informs the people) :

Death, one after another,  
becomes routine in the metropolis.  
All are busy with number  
Mihir, Samir, Ashok, Ananta, Dipak, et al gradually  
lose their identity,  
submerged in alphabets and numericals

(‘Bloodshed’ by Krishna Dhar)

Quantification is the negation of the human. It counts the inanimate or impaired bodies, but does not understand the loss of human essence : the capacity for visions of a better future, the capacity for commitment, and the will to self-sacrifice. Counting has a touch of bureaucracy as has the typical urban milieu. Quantification of dead or injured or imprisoned due to the state action is a continuation in repression which begins with killing, injuring, imprisoning. This is repression by numeralization — subjecting someone to the indignity of a digit substituting one’s whole being.

Obviously, such repression is a subjective experience. A radical must have both an inner sensitivity and intellectual competence to locate it. (It is not like discovering blood). But a large number of radicals of this phase of left movement came from educated, progressive, urban middle-class background. They had both. A rich variety of prose, poetry, painting, drama, film and music, much of which reached the necessary artistic standard, is the proof. Let us read the following :

To go back home now is difficult.  
Who will recognize us ?  
Death has put its mark on the forehead,  
Friends have left their foot prints on the face.  
Another face stares at me from the mirror.  
My eyes sparkle with a dead glow  
Like the light from the broken roof of a house.

To go back home now is difficult.

.....  
 For, now in my heart I'm more alone.  
 Like a spy of an enemy country.

(‘To go back home now is difficult’ by Surjit Pattar)

A massive repression leading to alienation, fragmentation of self and self-stigmatization of a radical. A consciousness filled only by the memory of death :

Eight corpses  
 Lying across the flow of consciousness.

(‘This valley of death is not my country’  
 by Nabarun Bhattacharyya)

Death has always haunted my peace,  
 Disturbed my sleep and dreams.  
 It was beyond my reach to endure torture.

(‘An evening note’ by Udayabhanu)

A consciousness without the comfort of known enclosures of relationship. Lonely. Because the fear of repression emasculates people :

This day the identity of men  
 Appears as jokes obscene.

(‘Identity of men to-day’ by Birendra Chattopadhyay)

No one came out  
 from the circle of one's own self  
 overwhelmed with fright.  
 No one dared to say  
 He is my son,  
 He is my brother,  
 He is my beloved.  
 They were all made inert  
 by the rule of terror.  
 His staring eyes,  
 His lips  
 His still body in a pool of blood  
 flowing from his breast,  
 Watched everything as a witness.

No love  
 offered to embrace him.  
 No responsibility  
 offered to lift him up.  
 All around  
 the crowd of corpses walked by,  
 each his own way –  
 a way of purposelessness.  
 A generation lay on the road  
 crying shame on all births.

(‘This is the country’ by Shovan Shome)

The feeling of loneliness is complete as repression stupefies individuals closest to a radical : parents, brothers and sisters. A tremendous void in a mother’s breast ; a long, lonely, waiting by a mother rendered more painful by a dim sense of hopelessness ; destruction of essential human faculties :

The sky darkens with ashes  
 Such is God’s sensitivity  
 And a pervading dark wind wells up from our breasts.  
 This apart  
 there is neither any peace, nor turmoil.

(‘Mother of a dead son’, by Sankha Ghosh)

Clinging to the bars of the jail  
 You still stand there outside,  
 Mother of a destroyed child !  
 From the mangled lumps of flesh,  
 From the depths of blood and pus,  
 Bones and muscles and marrow,  
 You hope to discover  
 the dear face of  
 Your son.

(‘Clinging to the bars of the jail’  
 by Dhurjati Chattopadhyay)

One after one shattered mothers  
 One after one petrified fathers  
 One after one brothers and young sisters  
 With enforced forgetfulness of asking questions.....

(‘Another library’ by Prasun Mukhopadhyay)

Repression never touches a radical only. Hence, a correct measure of repression is not to be found in the experience of a radical only. It further requires understanding of consequences of repression for future radicalism. A vicarious sufference from repression inflicted on an adult can shape a child's conception of state, and impinge on the possibility of a to-day's child becoming a to-morrow's radical, protestor. One wonders what would happen when children see police through fear's large eyes :

(why) our children cry out 'Police', 'Police'  
in their dreams at the sight of a black van ?

(why) our teenagers become pale seeing a police  
in broad daylight and change their path ?

(‘Why our children’ by Birendra Chattopadhyay).

Or, a child finally resolves the initial mystery about the state behaviour :

[The following is an excerpt from a short story about political goons, hierlings of the party in state power during emergency, beating up Kanti, a high school teacher, for his association with a communist named Tamal. The conversation here is between Kanti and his eight-year old daughter, Deepa, after the incidence.]

Had they given you a sound beating, papa ?  
.....They are very tough goons, aren't they, papa ?

Yes, my child.

Why didn't you get them arrested by police.

Then the police would have given them a severe beating.

Would it have been so ?

Why not ? The other day you purchased me a book. Isn't there a story where we find the police arrests thieves, goons, decoits, keep them in lock-up and beat them mercilessly. Then, why didn't you get them arrested ?

No, my daughter, the police won't arrest such persons.

Why not papa ? Did they not beat you ?



Did they not split your head with blows ?  
 Even so the police would not arrest them ?  
 Why would not they papa ?

Because it is 'emergency' now.

Is it a fact that thieves and goons go  
 scot-free during emergency ?

Yes, my child the police does not apprehend them.

But why have they taken away uncle Tamal under arrest ?  
 Every body knows that he is a good and honest man. Then  
 it appears that only good people are arrested by the police.  
 Isn't it so papa ?

Yes, my child.

(‘Instructive’ by Amal Chakrabarti).

Here, the father reluctantly leads his child-daughter to  
 political literacy. Reluctantly, because how can a father  
 willingly destroy his offspring's childhood ? Unless, he locates  
 child's innocence as a threat to his/her sheer survival :

Oh little girl, pluck the flowers carefully  
     on the branches of the tree  
     under the blossoms  
     lie the policemen

Oh little boy, like to move in the gardens ?  
     Open the door with caution  
     on the threshold  
     conceal themselves  
     the policemen like a snake.

The potrait of Rabindranath brightens your wall  
     Place your garland with care  
     like black shadow the policemen  
     hide even behind poet's picture.

Drummers beat the tune of immersion  
     Don't make any mistake

Behind them stand hundreds of police  
     Police, everywhere police.

(‘Pluck flower carefully’ by Atanu Chattopadhyay)

The disorientation of self of a radical or of his/her relation begins of course with repression at the physical level. In fact a breakdown of the frontier between mind and body is a usual part of repressive design. Subversion of spirit is synchronised with physical torture. A radical is made aware of double vulnerability:

How many nights and days of torment !

How many days and nights of torture !

(We saw some of us bid their last.

We saw some of us torn to pieces.)

Our brains have been shattered

And space and time mixed up in a muddle.

What has been drained off us ?

Our rebellious dreams ?

Or their throbbing veins ?

How many days and nights of torment !

How many nights and days of torture !

(‘In memory of April mid-days’ by Civic Chandran)

Physical torture can be mediated through conditions of confinement :

It’s a little piece of paved flower.

Every day and every night

The sun and the moon here

hang themselves to death

on the sooty noose

of a forty-watt electric bulb

burning overhead.

The stench of the latrine

carves the pain of a surgical operation

from my nose to the root of my navel,

There’s no water ;

the oasis is far away.

(‘In the Jorasanko lock-up’ by Samir Roy)

For someone condemned to death, conditions of confinement create a longing for renewal of relationship :

[The following is a part of letter, written by Aijun Samanta, condemned to death, to Superintendent, Central Jail, Mahendripur, as he

waited for his execution.]

The mute countenance of the prison cells on the other side looms through the prison bars — replete with long concrete walls. The structure brings to the mind an impression of irrationality. A largish ventilator may be seen about thirty cubits above the floor. According to the authority, this is an approximation of a window to prevent breathing trouble of prisoners. But, before one's eyes how many phases of full moon diminished, how many prolonged heated days summoned late nightly cool. But nothing could be experienced except the dark cloudy pensiveness of life confined as if in the coops for hens and ducks. Spells of feverish feeling come to all as they sit on their folded knees all alone in dim darkness of (respective) solitary cells. The life left behind throws a dragnet of attraction. The mind shrivels up, the vision dims, lines appear on the forehead. An uncontrollable desire knocks at the mind — oh if the stream of life outside could be perceived, if the faces of villages, cities and slums could be seen even for a moment, an intimate communion with close relations, or comrades at least for once! How many days are we to live with this deprivation?

(‘To the Jail Superintendent’ by Swarna Mitra)

Repression can be more directly physical—say, directed toward life itself:

We walked —  
 sharing hand-cuffs  
 and chained, one to the other.  
 We walked —  
 between fixed bayonets  
 in torn and dirty garments  
 and wounded all over the body.

(Just one nod, just one look, just a sound  
 was enough to end up in those bayonets.)  
 Yes, we came from the same destiny  
 and we came to the same destiny.

(‘In memory of April mid-days’ by Civic Chandran)

and what destiny they could not defy despite their resolve ?

Day and night long interrogation,  
 scorching the eyes with thousand watt light  
 I defy

Driving needless through nails,  
 Keeping laid on ice-slabs  
 I defy

Hanging held over heels  
 till blood drips through the nose  
 I defy

Trampling over the lips with boots,  
 inflicting burns all over the body with burning torches  
 I defy

Sudden spray of alchohol over the back-side  
 oozing blood from wounds by sharp whip cracks  
 I defy

Electric shocks to the naked body  
 Vulgar perverted sexual abuse  
 I defy

Beating to murder,  
 firing revolvers pressed against the skull  
 I defy.

(‘This valley of death’ by Nabarun Bhattacharyya)

In case of a radical woman, these forms are added to by serial  
 rape ; only one case when repression in not blind. In it are  
 conflated the legal superiority of the ‘official’ over the ‘marginal’  
 and the physical superiority of man over woman, ; perversion  
 of sexuality and subversion of radicalism.

[This is the story of radical Santal woman,  
 Dopdi Mejhen, who was violently raped by a  
 number of policemen on apprehension.]

Draupadi Mejhen was apprehended at 6:53

P.M. It took an hour to get her to camp. Questioning took another hour exactly. No one touched her, and she was allowed to sit on a canvas camp stool. At 8:57 Senanayak's dinner hour approached, and saying, "Make her. Do the needful," he disappeared.

Then a billion moons pass. A billion lunar years. Opening her eyes after a million light years, Draupadi, strangely enough, sees sky and moon. Slowly the bloodied nailheads shift from her brain. Trying to move, she feels her arm and legs still tied to four posts. Something sticky under her ass and waist. Her own blood. Only the gag has been removed. Incredible thirst. In case she says "water" she catches her lower lip in her teeth. She senses that her vagina is bleeding. How many came to make her?

Shaming her, a tear trickles out of the corner of her eye. In the muddy moon-light she lowers her lightless eye, sees her breasts, and understands that, indeed, she's been made up right. Her breasts are bitten raw, the nipples torn. How many? Four-five-six-seven — then Draupadi had passed out.

She turns her eyes and sees something white. Her own cloth. Nothing else. Suddenly she hopes against hope. Perhaps they have abandoned her. For the foxes to devour. But she hears the scrape of feet. She turns her head, the guard leans on his bayonet and leers at her. Draupadi closes her eyes. She doesn't have to wait long. Again the process of making her begins. Goes on. The moon vomits a bit of light and goes to sleep. Only the dark remains. A compelled spread-eagled still body. Active pistons of flesh rise and fall, rise and fall over it.

Then morning comes.

Then Draupadi Meihen is brought to the tent  
and thrown on the straw. Her piece of cloth is  
thrown over her body.

(‘Draupadi’ by Mahasweta Devi).

Repression enhances itself by denying any discourse on it or by  
enlarging items of radical behaviour impermissible to the state :

Tongue will be torn out  
from mouth, limbs dismembered,  
if you try to speak about your rights  
No, no noise about rights  
not even in black and white.  
Blunt the edges of your pen  
otherwise it will be driven  
at your own throat.  
No polemics on the issue  
Stitch up your lips.  
What a desire  
to live like a free man !

(‘Prisoner’ by Satyen Bandyopadhyay).

To serve the Muse is sedition  
Sedition is assemblage  
To think about the country is sedition  
Sedition is to speak about hunger  
To continue living in this country is sedition.

(‘Sedition’ by Prasun Mukhopadhyay)

The period literature we have selectively drawn on, is rich,  
varied and voluminous. Many dimensions of repression are re-  
vealed in it. The compositions are by radicals at the time of  
confinement or in its immediate aftermath or by writers who  
shared their commitment and empathetically explored the  
many manifestations of agony. For both, writing surrogated  
counterviolence. The recourse to surrogation can be constructed  
as an indicator of the state repression.

## CONCLUSION

The state-conflict interaction is a complex process. A knowledge of the dimensions of such interaction, the concrete institutional details, and contingent historical factors demands a conjunctural analysis. We have made such an exercise. The process has been explored to find out whether the state response to conflict has varied when conflictual contenders differ in their social character, and over time; whether the state has differentiated, discriminated and done so in a stable way. We have complemented this enquiry by another: how the state has responded to a series of processually and organizationally inter-linked conflicts with a single kind of contender, an occupational class, over a time. For both, the primary time span within which the conflicts occurred is the same. In the second, the time span has been extended back to the colonial period in order to find continuities, if any, between the colonial state and the post-colonial state. The second set of conflicts has an additional significance that it has its institutional venue in public service under direct state control. Public service can be conceived as anticipatory conflict management process. Though we have focussed on a particular public service, it correctly represents conflicts and the state response in a number of public service organizations. For all the conflicts, we have examined subject to the availability of recorded data, the framework of oppositional politics has been common. To be specific in almost all conflicts, political parties, trade unions and voluntary formations with varying degree of commitment to Marxism or association with Marxist political formations have taken the initiative in conflictually engaging the post-colonial state.

The post-colonial state in India has drawn on the culture of conflict management by the colonial state. Colonialism has turned to be a socializing experience for the post-colonial state. The apparatus for conflict management inherited from the colonial state has been enlarged, re-legitimated, and used in attempts towards consolidation of the transplanted state form. The post-



colonial state has demonstrated a stable preference for severe and increasingly severe normative repression for all kinds of conflicts though not always. Punitive laws have been revived or formulated to preempt conflict or coercively terminate conflict behaviour. The perceived threat of conflict has motivated legal development, and new laws or extremist application of existing laws, in turn, has provoked conflictual challenge from the concerned conflict formations. Legal development should be understood in a sense broad enough to include operationalization of original constitutional provisions, which has to take into account political feasibility. A level of severe physical and psychological sanction has joined normative repression. The boundary is low and weak as physical and psychological sanction is usually justified by a reference to the constitution, and laws and, also by labelling the contenders as violent, antinational or whatever characterization is thought to be politically suitable. When the post-colonial state has control over livelihood of the contenders, as in case of its own subordinate employees, it has used multiple forms of financial sanction. In years of greater incidence of conflict or of greater potentiality for conflict, the state has responded, taking recourse to various combinations of repressive techniques. Since a major part of repressive management of conflict has been conducted publicly or in most cases the post-colonial state has not prevented public access to relevant information, a percolation of conception of the state as an instrument of conflict management must have taken place. This is another kind of state penetration, penetration in public consciousness. What is transmitted through experience, original or vicarious, of the state coercion is likely to form state consciousness. It is likely also that this specific experience is interpreted in the light of wider experience of the state policy and performance—even absence of policy and non-performance. Learning about politics through mainly sense experience would be of an order different from learning through mainly intellection. Observing the state trying to non-coercively regulate the incidence and conduct of conflict or to resolve conflict through persuasion, negotiation and redistribution, would involve the second mode. But the post-colonial state in India has made marginal use of conflict resolution techniques, even when this would evidently end conflict on a positive note. Again, the tendency among

various contenders to comply when the state would use persuasion, did not stimulate the state to try to regulate incidence of conflict and to shape form of conflicts rather than take easy recourse to repression of conflict.

Such preference on the part of the post-colonial state is inexplicable by a reference to the general character of the conflicts it has encountered. The conflicts have been mainly localized, brief in duration and centered at the point origin. The contenders have usually engaged the state alone, without an ally or a politically significant ally. The only exception has been the conflict formations of the subordinate employees in the state service administration in general and in the Posts and Telegraph Ministry, in particular. Their conflicts, have also tended to spread beyond the point of their origin, sometimes taking an all-India form. The multi-layer functional inter connections among local and regional units of the same and status-contiguous occupational sub-classes, would facilitate the spread of conflict. The corridors of the state power have become the passages of conflict.

It is these conflict formations – the unions, associations of clerks, manual workers/low-skilled technical workers and still lower categories of employees and casual labourers – which have developed working relationship with principal left parties. The party or party-alliance has strengthened the conflict formations by inducing 'federation' formation among the unions and associations of categories of employees holding analogous positions in different service sector ministries. But such working federation would be operative only at the time of preparation for a conflictual engagement, during a conflict and in the immediate aftermath of a conflict. Evidently, the post-colonial state has not been confronted even with a number of stably buckled occupational sub-classes, hinting at an impending working class formation. The post-colonial state formation as revealed in consolidation of conflict management techniques, has tended towards development of a harsh state.

But we need to know more, though not so much by way of more extensive data on the state behaviour in the face of vertical political conflict. The implications of such state behaviour for future conflict and for the state itself need to be identified. It is

worthwhile to ponder over an agenda of research and reflection.

An extension of the conjunctural level enquiry may be towards location of data on consequences of publicly known state's choice of techniques of conflict management for formation of consciousness of the state among the present and potential contenders. We do not postulate that consciousness of the state begins with the experience/knowledge of the state's dominant mode of conflict management on the part of the contenders. A wide range of factors, some of which can predate the experience/knowledge through a conflictual encounter with the state, is likely to intervene in formation of consciousness of the state. However in the context of the post-colonial state, such conflictual encounters become a critical factor in consciousness formation for a number of reasons. We have drawn on some generalizations about the post-colonial state.

First : The post-colonial state has an increasing centrality. All kinds of demands are always addressed in the first instance to the state, to the public decision-makers in politics and administration. One consequence is the expansion and monopolisation of power by the central government in the post-colonial state. (Norbert Elias quoted in Hanisch and Tetzlaff, 1983, p.81.) However, the state suffers from a political paradox also. Its situative and resource based power makes it the only initiator of national level planned change. But it is also the political locus where the various obstacles to overall social development congregate. (Hanisch and Tetzlaff, 1983, pp. 61-62.) The post-colonial state automatically penetrates and permeates public consciousness. To draw on Dyson's pointer (despite the fact that the west-European state is his empirical referent) : "The notion of the state offers a mental picture of the political world in terms of which individuals and groups can communicate with one another : it affects entire intellectual process - what questions are raised and what answers presented " (Dyson, 1980, p. 205). This is a kind of penetration, not sufficiently explored in the major works on state formation.

Second : Very often penetration into public consciousness is intended and conducted by institutions and political elite of the post-colonial state (Saul, 1974, pp. 349-372). The attempt is to reorganize political consciousness in terms of new identities (e.g.

state-induced ethnicity), new values (e. g. secular politics), new loyalties (e. g. to public bureaucracy) – may be, even new political prejudices. At a fundamental level, this may be understood as an attempt at ‘consent’ formation through concept-sharing. (Godelier, 1980, 610-611)

The initial ‘choice’ of ideology on the part of the post-colonial state was collectivist and socialist in tone. But such an ideology has been increasingly subjected to contestation by communal and sectarian ideologies or para-ideologies, located by political literates as at least a latent function of the state policy. Also the rise of new individualism in western capitalist democracies (the principal models for the post-colonial state) and consolidation of capitalism, the post-colonial state itself is likely to shift towards individualist ideology. This must necessitate state’s intervention in public consciousness.

Third : But the success of intervention by the post-colonial state into public consciousness is severely limited by its inability to respond positively to structural economic crisis, complicated by inter-regional, inter-ethnic and social distribution conflicts. This adversely affects the vital state apparatus, too. Take the example of increasing discontent among the quaternary service sector employees (who facilitate or effectuate the capitalist division of labour) (Crouch and Pizzorno, 1978, Vol.2, p.41). This is also an instance of state becoming an institutional arena of class conflict. The apparatus vital for the post-colonial state in its imperative drive towards penetration, standardization and redistribution (Tilly, 1975, p. 66), is likely to suffer extensively. (Since, service sector employment is a response to the need of contemporary capitalism to socialize an increasing proportion of costs (though not of profit), the consequences will be far reaching for the post-colonial state in peripheral capitalism.)

Fourth : The inefficacy of consensus creation processes is sought to be compensated by increasing use of the coercive apparatus to manage vertical and horizontal political conflicts. Noticeable is formulation of repressive laws as well as revival of the colonial law to manage violent class conflict (take the Indian example : use of 1948 Madras Suppression of Disturbances Act to contain Naxalite movement in Srikakulam in Andhra in 1968-69) (Amnesty, 1983, p. 63). The harshness of received colonial law

is due to its lack of many welfare provisions, protection for workers and farmers against legal coercion and guarantee of human rights, which one normally associates with rule of law (Ghai, et al, 1987, pp. 7-8.) One can identify periods and regions when and where extensive use of notion of law and order has been made to curb vital political freedoms. These combine with politicisation of police and judiciary (Bayley, 1983, pp. 484-496).

The 'educative' impact of state coercion on consciousness is recognized in a wide variety of empirical observations (Marx, 1875; Tilly 1978 p. 114) as is the integral relationship between the state and violence in a wide variety of theories in political anthropology and political sociology. Conflicts are integral to state formation any time any where. The post-colonial state is no exception. In fact it is more prone to conflict as it legitimises political participation, generates new antagonisms, facilitates emergence of antagonistic classes, or becomes captive to a ruling class (Sobhan, 1979, p. 428). Rokkan's schematic checklist of differences between state formation between sixteenth and eighteenth century Europe and in twentieth century post-colonial systems is very suggestive of immense conflict generative potential of the post-colonial state. (Rokkan in Tilly, 1975, pp. 598-599). Greater the number and complexity of conflicts, greater is the pressure to manage conflict. Since conflict resolution as a technique of conflict management would involve a fundamental redistribution for which the post-colonial state does not have commensurate autonomy, resort to coercive/repressive management becomes compulsory. Repressive management tends to reproduce a conflict at a different time in a different scale. The new idea of the state can survive, one apprehends, the proliferation of conflicts of different kinds which attends its concretization, at the expense of the democratic institutions with which the idea of the post-colonial state began. If the coercive repressive management of conflict is an imperative of a given political economy, it has also consequences for economy. It adversely affects macro-economic relations (Gupta/ and Venieris, 1981). If the state's coercive/ repressive management of conflict is likely to have consequences beyond the phenomenon of conflict, a knowledge of the state becomes a difficult-to-avoid political education. Hence we need to extend the conjunctural analysis to incorporate an empirical reference to political education of the contenders due

to experience of/exposure to the state's choice of technique of conflict management.

We also need to move into a different level of analysis—beyond the level of appearances tapped in our empirical investigation—to locate modes of determination : relationships of determination between structural elements and appearances. We may identify, following the logic of structural analysis, some of the relationships, it is worthwhile to explore : (i) the post-colonial state as a selection mechanism on forms of conflicts, shaping those conflicts within limits established by the underlying economic structure and character of consciousness of kind ; (ii) conflicts as generating transformation of the state structure and state process ; (iii) class conflicts within the state apparatus — within the bureaucratic structure — 'as mediating the selection relation of the state apparatus vis-a-vis the actual activities of the post-colonial state (e.g. policies, interventions) ; that is affecting the capacity of the bureaucratic structure to effectively select state policies which optimally serve the interests of the capital ; (iv) mainly economic and weakly political class conflict in the post-colonial state as facilitating state's reproduction of capitalist economic relations — by displacing struggles over fundamental interests into struggles over immediate interests, by encouraging a division between state workers at the lower bureaucratic level and other workers, eventually affecting process of working class formation ; (v) the post-colonial state's imperative to rationalise its own labour process in order to cope with the fiscal crisis of the state as producing tendencies of proletarianisation of subordinate state employees (clerks and manual/lowly skilled technical workers), who in any case occupy working class positions because they are excluded from both the creation and execution of the state policy) ; (vi) the post-colonial state's overall economic policy and cultural policy (a function of its class character) as shifting students, primary school teachers and the unemployed from one potential trajectory of class position to another, or from one position within a potential trajectory to another within the same ; (vii) political culture antedating the experience of the post-colonial state as mediating the relationship between the state's conflict management and formation of state-consciousness among the contenders ; (viii) the contenders' capacity for ideological comprehension (of say, a

contradiction between immediate interests, e.g., wage, better conditions of work, better living conditions taking the capitalist mode of production as given, and fundamental interests, viz., questioning the mode of production) as mediating the relationship between the contenders' experience of the state's management of conflict and their continuing political learning, (ix) forms of political class struggle and perception of threat (arising out of these) to the capacity for domination by ruling party, and to the functionality of the state administrative apparatuses as selecting the techniques of conflict management by the post-colonial state ; and (x) conflict and conflict management as mediating the relationship between state formation and class formation. These relationships point to a terrain of further investigation.

## NOTES

### Notes on the Chapter on State and states-man

1. It was not that the conflict elite did not understand that the realization of their various demands was dependent on the authorities taking some fundamental decisions on reorganizing economy. Here is an indicator : The Federal Council of the NFPTE placed the following demands in February, 1965 :
  - 1) Rapid increase in food production.
  - 2) Prevention of hoarding and black-marketing and speculation.
  - 3) Unearthing of black money.
  - 4) State trading in food grains and proper distribution machinery.
  - 5) Take over of rice and flour mills.
  - 6) Prevention of tax evasion.
  - 7) Deterrent punishment of hoarders, black marketeers, black money holders.
  - 8) Nationalization of banks.
  - 9) Ushering in of socialism.
2. In the mainstream literature on conflict-management there is a bias in the sense that conflict management is considered as a 'task' performed by the authorities. But we think that the need to manage a conflict is no less for the conflict elite, and for the 'ordinary' contenders as well. These 'ordinary' contenders may consider uncompromising antagonism to the authorities and state power as the only appropriate method of realizing their demands. Then they have to manage conflict so that conflict is kept alive, and stepped up. This they do by criticizing their leadership who, on the plea of political pragmatism, try to de-escalate conflict. We give below three examples drawn from publications of the subordinates :



# 1) An imaginary dialogue :

Ramaji - Have you noted Kaluji that Shri B. S. Kamble (a Vice-President of Postal Class III union) has been rehabilitated as Vice President by postal people ?

Kaluram - Yes, indeed ? Probably Shri Kamble thinks that hereafter everything will be peaceful and there will be no struggle for some years.

Ramaji - By peaceful, you mean, monthly meetings with officers, attending conferences and occasionally addressing general body meetings.

(RMS Reporter, August, 1958)

# 2) An accusation : conflict elite stigmatized as left arisoracy.

(RMS Worker, October, 1967)

# 3) An exposure : In P and T as well we witness a glaring contradiction. The present topmen in Federation (NFPTE) who at bottom level let fire and brimstone against the class policies of the Government and give call for struggles and strikes, now after ascending to the position from where policy of trade union should be given a mould, a direction to fight the oppressive policy of the Government, are receding back and fighting those who want to fight in a sustained manner They are now speaking the voice of bureaucracy and the ruling class and demoralize the ranks.

(RMS worker, March, 1968)

# 3. The data on suspension, dismissal or termination are in a way misleading because in some cases some subordinates were restored to their jobs under the pressure of oppositional politics before the Annual Report of a year was drafted and placed before Parliament. But we do not know their number. The size of those who received this major punishment can be taken as an indicator of that of the active contenders among the subordinates, who would compose the vanguard. Considering the fact that these are all-India data, the size of the activists has been rather small. And they must have operated mainly in important

cities. The cities offer older office establishments, concentration of the subordinates, easy linkage with oppositional politics, and access to public media – to the subordinates in conflict ; and concentration of superior officers, ease of mobilization of police and security forces – to the authorities.

4. It is interesting to note how Mr. Jawharlal nehru, the then Prime Minister began his broadcast :

One of these pictures is of the mighty Himalayas and their snow-covered and rugged peaks which have stood as sentinels on our borders for long ages past. I saw many a well-remembered and friendly peak and glaciers and snow fields, as well as mighty mountains bare of almost everything except their dignity and strength and beauty. Part of this territory was across the great Himalyan range which effectively stopped the vain clouds from going across. And so we reach an area dry and almost rainless and above the altitude where trees grow.

(quoted in AITUC, 1960, p. 31)

It is necessary to ponder what kind of reaction this 'poetry' would produce in the contenders who were engaged in a conflict over the material pre-requisites of decent civic existence. We need to ask also : is institution-formation immune from the peculiarities of personalities of incumbents in authority positions ?

### Note on translation used in the Chapter on Sobs and Shrieks

1. The English versions of the following are from *Thema Book of Naxalite Poetry* by Sumanta Banerjee (Thema : Calcutta, 1987)
  - 'This is the Country' by Shovan Shome
  - 'Clinging to the bars of the jail'  
by Dhurjati Chattipadhyay
  - 'In the Jorasanko lock-up' by Samir Roy
  - 'In memory of April mid-days' by Civic Chandran
  - 'To go back home now is difficult' by Surjit Pattar.
2. The English version of 'Draupati' by Mahasweta Devi is by Gayatri Chakravarty Spivak in her *In other worlds : Essays in Cultural Politics* (Methuen : New York and London, 1987, pp. 179-196).
3. The other compositions have been translated by Pranab Roy, Raghabendra Guha, and the present writer.  
This writer is indebted to Pulak Chanda for his basic education in radical literature.

## Appendix A

### Minor Conflictual Engagements (1955-1983)

Event Date	Principal Conflict Formation / s Organizing Engagements	Name of Engagement (if) given by Conflict Formation, and / or Major of Conflict Behavior Demand Day	Range of Observance	Major Demands / Issues
20.4.55	NFPTE		All over India	Right to be consulted on policy matters
19.10.55	West Bengal P and T Coordinating Committee	Demonstration, rallies and strike threat	West Bengal	Festival Advance
18.10.56	RMS Union, Delhi	Sit-in-strike (till 22.10.86)	Delhi	End of Harassment
1.1.57	NFPTE	Pay Boycott	All over India	Appointment of Second Pay Commission
4.2.57	P & T Employees in North Bihar	Demonstration	North Bihar	Flood Advance
12.2.57	P & T Coordinating Committee of Assam	Demonstration	Assam	Restoration of Compensatory Allowance
16.2.57	Confederation of Central Govt. Employees and Workers (henceforth, 'Confederation')	Wearing badges	All over India	Appointment of Second Pay Commission and Five other pay, D.A., promotion and leave related

## Event Date

Principal Conflict Formation / s Organizing Engagements	Name of Engagement (if) given by Conflict Formation, and / or Major of Conflict Behavior	Range of Observance	Major Demands / Issues
Major conflictual engagement : An all-India strike proposed by Joint All-India Conference of nine Unions and NFPTE on 15.7.57 to be undertaken on 8.8.57 (midnight) but called off because of the authorities' favourable response, and reversal of strike decision by some leaders.			
13.9.57	Confederation and Interim Relief Day NFPTE	All over India	Interim relief pending Pay Commission Report
7.2.58	RMS Workers in Delhi	Delhi	Against police arrest of a colleague
20.1.59	Confederation	Protest Day	Against victimization for trade union activities
11.2.59	Federal Council of NFPTE	Demands Day	"
2.3.59	Federal Council of NFPTE	Pay Strike	Pay and D.A. related
1.5.59	Federal Council of NFPTE	"	"

Event Date	Principal Conflict Formation / s Organizing Engagements	Name of Engagement (if) given by Conflict Formation, and / or Major of Conflict Behavior	Range of Observance	Major Demands / Issues
7.1.60	Confederation	Protest Day	All over India	Against the report of Second Pay Commission (submitted in last week of November, 1959)
13.2.60	Confederation	Abstention from work	"	"
10.6.60	All-India RMS Employees Union, Class III, Nagpur	Work-to-rule	Nagpur	Local employees' grievances
25.6.60	Local Unit of NEFPTTE, Nagpur	Rally by 15,000 employees	Nagpur	Against the report of Second Pay Commission
Major conflictual engagement :	An all-India strike for 6 days (11.7.60-16.7.60) organised by Joint Council of Action representing NEFPTTE, AIRF, AIDEF and Confederation			
January, 61	Audit and Accounts association, Engineering Clas III Union, AIDEF	Hunger-strike from 7.1.61 ** by Secretary Generals or representatives of the conflict formations	Irrelevant*	Against victimization for participation in 1960 strike, and for restoration of recognition to employees unions

\* 'Irrelevant' denotes irrelevance of territorial spread because the conflict act is symbolically national.

\*\* Postponed due to serious sickness of Union Home Minister.

Event Date	Principal Conflict Formation / s Organizing Engagements	Name of Engagement (if) given by Conflict Formation, and / or Major of Conflict Behavior	Range of Observance	Major Demands / Issues
12.1.61	Civil Accounts Staff Association, Gwalior	Fast till 18.1.61 by its President	Gwalior	Against dismissal of eight employees (including himself) for participation in 1960 strike
18.2.64	Confederation	Demands Day	All over India	Against D.A. recommendation
29.5.64	NFPTE and Confederation	Rallies and processions	All over India	Full neutralization
1.6.64	NFPTE and Confederation	Pay strike	All over India	Against a D. A. award
12.8.64	Confederation	All India Day mass rallies, processions, presentation of memorandum	All over India	Against price rise; for appropriate D.A., correction of cost of living index etc.
11.12.64	Confederation	Audit Recognition Day	All over India	Recognition of union of audit employees vulnerable to the Controller and Auditor-General, not controlled by a popular minister

....(5)

Event Date	Principal Conflict Formation / s Organizing Engagements	Name of Engagement (if) given by Conflict Formation, and / or Major of Conflict Behavior	Range of Observance	Major Demands / Issues
1.5.65	Confederation	Pay Strike	All over India	Non-settlement of financial demands
15.7.65	Class III, IV MMS and RMS employees	Wearing badges	Delhi	Against highhandedness of superior officials (in dismissing from service of mechanic, also a union office bearer)
July, 1965	Joint C.W.C. of R III and IV	Work-to rule/no over - time proposed to begin from 14.9.65*	All over India	Sectional demands
1.5.66	RMS Class III union	Demands Day	"	"
8.5.66 - 13.5.66	All India Administrative Employees Union	Stopping work for half an hour every day	"	Sectional demands
9.5.66- 13.5.66	"	Hunger strike by General Secretary in front of Parliament	Irrelevant	"

\* Postponed because of India's war with Pakistan.



Event Date	Principal Conflict Formation / s Organizing Engagements	Name of Engagement (if) given by Conflict Formation, and / or Major of Conflict Behavior	Range of Observance	Major Demands / Issues
29.6.66	NFPTE	Work-to-rule/no over time between 17.8.66 and 23.8.66, proposed*	All over India	Working and Service Conditions
13.2.67-15-2-67	Federation of Central Secretariat and Allied Employees	Hunger-strike by the President in Delhi	Irrelevant	Delay in recognition of the Federation
24.6.67	RMS Class III Union	Call Attention Day	All over India	Working conditions
1.7.67	Confederation	Pay Boycott	"	Against Gajendragodkar Commission Report on pay
11.8.67	NFPTE, AIRF, INDWF, AIDEF, Confederation	Token strike, proposed** to be undertaken on 11.9.67	"	Against wage freeze policy

Major conflictual engagement : Strike on 29.8.68 all over India organized by NFPTE, AIRF and AIDEF

\* Postponed because of India's war with Pakistan.

\*\* Called off by a section of leadership on the plea of obtaining opinion from employees.

.....(7)

Event Date	Principal Conflict Formation / s Organizing Engagements	Name of Engagement (if) given by Conflict Formation, and / or Major of Conflict Behavior	Range of Observance	Major Demands / Issues
25.6.69	Confederation	Anti-victimization Day	Kerala	Against continuing derecognition of unions following 1968 strike
14.7.69	Confederation	Anti-victimization Day (fasting for one week)	"	"
19.8.69	Confederation	"	All over India	"
16.12.69	Confederation	Demands Day	"	Against continuing derecognition of unions and victimization for participation in 1968 strike
6.6.70	NFPTE	Satyagrah	Kerala	Against transfer of union office bearers, denial of promotion and victimization
8.6.70 - 13.6.70	NFPTE	Hunger strike by office bearers	Punjab	"
19.9.71	CHQ	Remove all scars of Victimization Day	All over India	Against victimization

Event Date	Principal Conflict Formation / s Organizing Engagements	Name of Engagement (if given by Conflict Formation, and / or Major of Conflict Behavior	Range of Observance	Major Demands / Issues
10.10.71	CHQ	Demands Day	All over India	Better working conditions reduced work hour for drivers and despatch riders
3.12.71	Federal Council of NFPPE	Proposal for dharna/ mass hunger strike/one hour token strike in the first week of February 1972	"	Release of Third Pay Commission Report
12.7.72	Confederation	Dharna	"	Release of Third Pay Commission Report
12.12.72	Extra-Departmental Employees Convention	Dharna in Delhi	Irrelevant	Sectional demands
31.1.73	Confederation	24-hour fast by office bearers	Delhi	Release of Third Pay Commission Report
1.2.73	Confederation	Pay refusal	All over India	"
				.....(9)

Event Date	Principal Conflict Formation / s Organizing Engagements	Name of Engagement (if) given by Conflict Formation, and / or Major of Conflict Behavior	Range of Observance	Major Demands / Issues
27.2.73	Confederation	Proposed All India Demands Day on 2.4.73; Mobilization campaign between 16.4.73 and 25.4.73; Relay squatting during office hour in all offices between 26.4.73 and 28.4.73; Joint mass rallies on 28.4.73.	All over India	Release of Third Pay Commission Report, vacation of victimization, grant of full trade union rights
1.5.73	Confederation	Unity Day	"	Against the Third Pay Commission Report
9.5.73 - 11.5.73	Confederation	Mass squatting	"	"
1.6.73	Confederation	Pay Strike	"	"
14.6.73	FNPTO	A joint protest meeting	"	"
24.7.73	Confederation	A decision to organize an indefinite strike after taking opinion	Irrelevant	"
28.8.73	Confederation	Unity Day	All over India	Against Pay Commission recommendation, victimization - for withdrawal of DIR and ban on strike
				.....(10)

1.12.73

NFPTE

Pay Strike

All over India

Against Pay Commis-  
sion recommendation

21.2.74

NFPTE

Dharna

"

Ad hoc D.A for Extra-  
departmental employ-  
ees8.5.74-  
9.5.74NFPTE and Confedera-  
tionNon-cooperation, work-  
to-me and O-T duty

"

Need based minimum  
wage, full neutraliza-  
tion of rise in cost of  
living, full trade union  
rights, vacation of vic-  
timization

Major conflictual engagement : Strike for 3 days (10.5.74 - 12.5.74) organized by NFPTE and Confederation of Central Govt. Em-  
ployees and Workers (original proposal was for an indefinite strike)

9.8.74

Convention of Central  
Trade Unions (except  
AITUC, HMS & IN-  
TUC)Mass rallies united with  
the entire working class  
in front of Parliament

Irrelevant

Against Compulsory  
Deposit Ordinance9.8.74-  
15.8.74

Convention

Protest week through  
daily demonstration

All over India

"

.....(11)

Event Date	Principal Conflict Formation / s Organizing Engagements	Name of Engagement (if) given by Conflict Formation, and / or Major of Conflict Behavior	Range of Observance	Major Demands / Issues
28.8.74	National Convention of all working people			Against Compulsory Deposit Ordinance
28.1.76	NFPTE	Worker's Participation Day	All over India	"
29.7.77	NFPTE	Call Attention Day	"	Against victimization for trade union activities
19.9.77	NFPTE	"	"	"
26.9.77 - 27.9.77	RMS, Group C & D, Delhi	Protest	Delhi	Suspension of two employees for boycotting O.T.
24.10.77 - 30.10.77	Six Central Trade Union (including NFPTE), and delegates from public sector, private sector, employees of Central and State Governments)	Demand Week	All over India	Emergency excesses and victimization, banning of closure, retrenchment, price control through effective distribution system etc.
20.1.78	Confederation and NFPTE	Anti Wage Day	"	Wage increase, need-based minimum wage

Event Date	Principal Conflict Formation / s Organizing Engagements	Name of Engagement (if given by Conflict Formation, and / or Major of Conflict Behavior	Range of Observance	Major Demands / Issues
23.3.78	NFPTE, AIRF, AIDEF	Dharna	All over India	Vacation of victimization, pay and D.A. related demands, removal of ban on recruitment in class III & IV
19.9.78	NFPTE	Anti-victimization Day	"	Vacation of victimization
20.11.78	All Central Trade Unions, Confederation and independent Federations	Mass Demonstration	Irrelevant	Industrial Relations Bill (declaring P and T, Railways, Port and Dock essential services) which intended to ban strike
20.2.79	NFPTE	Sectional Demands Day	All over India	Settlement of long-standing demands
12.12.79	NFPTE	Demonstration	Delhi	Demands of Extra-departmental workers
20.1.81	NFPTE and Confederation	Mobilization Day	All over India	5-days extra bonus
				.....(13)

Event Date	Principal Conflict Formation / s Organizing Engagements	Name of Engagement (if) given by Conflict Formation, and / or Major of Conflict Behavior Dharna in front of P.M.'s house	Range of Observance	Major Demands / Issues
27.2.81	Central Trade Unions, Confederation and NFPTE		Irrelevant	Negotiation with public sectors unions in Bangalore, withdrawal of ordinance on LIC, restoration of unfettered trade union rights including collective bargaining, ending wage-freeze
11.3.81	Central Trade Unions, Confederation and NFPTE	Token Strike	All over India	"
17.8.81	8 Central Trade Unions, NFPTE and Confederation	Black Day	"	Against enactment of ESMO on 26.7.81 banning strikes in all central govt. services
12.8.81	Federal Executive, NFPTE	Decision on indefinite hunger strike by union leaders from 12.10.81 ; same by intermediate level leaders from 15.10.81; country-wide mass hunger strike on 16.10.81 ; non-cooperation from 12.10.81 *	Irrelevant	Service related demands

\* Postponed because of a letter of appeal from the relevant minister.



Event Date	Principal Conflict Formation / s Organizing Engagements	Name of Engagement (if) given by Conflict Formation, and / or Major of Conflict Behavior	Range of Observance	Major Demands / Issues
28.8.81	NFPTE	Protest Day : wearing black badges	All over India	Against relevant Minister's allegation against P & T employees in a Press Conference on 1.8.81
10.9.81	Confederation	Demands Day	"	General Demands
29.9.81	Confederation	24 hour hunger strike of all the members of affiliates and leaders	Irrelevant	Cash payment of D.A.
3.11.81	Central Trade Unions and National Federations	Demonstration, Rallies in all district headquarters and industrial centres	"	13 point charter of demands
23.11.81	Employees in Private Sector, Public Sector, Banks, LIC, State Govt. and Central Govt. Employees	Mammoth procession in Delhi	"	"
19.1.82	National Campaign Committee (including AIRF, AIDEF, NFPTE)	Token Strike	"	Against anti-trade union and anti-working class policies of the government

....(15)

Event Date	Principal Conflict Formation / s Organizing Engagements	Name of Engagement (if) given by Conflict Formation, and / or Major of Conflict Behavior	Range of Observance	Major Demands / Issues
27.4.82	National Campaign Committee	Solidarity Day	All over India	Against victimization in 19.1.82 token strike, in support of Bombay textile workers strike
4.6.82	National Campaign Committee	Protest	"	Against wage freeze and anti-labour policies
12.7.82	CWC, NFPTE	Kerala Day	"	Vacation of victimization of Kerala P & T employees demanding better service conditions
20.7.82	NFPTE	Demonstration	"	Focusing attention on government's negative attitude to P & T employees' problems
25.8.82	NFPTE	Call Attention Day wearing badges	"	Restoration of trade union rights, vacation of victimization

Event Date	Principal Conflict Formation / a Organizing Engagements	Name of Engagement (if) given by Conflict Formation, and / or Major of Conflict Behavior	Range of Observance	Major Demands / Issues
21.9.82	Confederation and AIDF	All India Protest Day	All over India	Common demands regarding pay and D.A.
9.11.82	CWC, NFPT	Threat of work-to-rule for 5 days followed by 1 day strike in December	"	Against reorganization of RMS work and staff distribution
15.1.83	All India RMS and MMS Employees Union, Class III Mail Guard and Class IV	Threat of strike from 30.1.83*	"	Against reorganization of RMS work and staff distribution, for new principles of recruitment and of regularization
3.2.83 - 10.2.83	PMG Maharashtra Circle	Strike	Maharashtra	Against victimization for non-cooperation in course of support to the members of PMG Bihar Circle
16.3.83	Confederation, AIRF, AIDF including NFTR	Rally	All over India	Against appointment of Fourth Pay Commission on 28.2.83

\* Postponed on 27.1.83 partly because of threat of administrative relation, and partly because of some concessions on the part of the government.

.....(17)

Event Date	Principal Conflict Formation / s Organizing Engagements	Name of Engagement (if) given by Conflict Formation, and / or Major of Conflict Behavior	Range of Observance	Major Demands / Issues
21.3.83 - 6.4.83	Kerala P & T Coordinating Committee	Hunger Strike	Kerala	Against continued suspension and harassment
30.7.83	CWC, NFPTE	Black Badge Campaign and demonstration	All over India	Pay & D.A. related demands
17.8.83	CWC, NFPTE	Dharna at divisional and circle headquarters	"	"
25.8.83	CWC, NFPTE	Dharna before Directorate and procession to P.M's residence	Irrelevant	"
30.9.83 - 4.10.83	National Campaign Committee and 5th National Federations	Relay fast of 24 hours by batches	"	Problems of closure, lock-outs, retrenchment lay-off; demands of working class and peasants
5.10.83	National Campaign Committee and 5th National Federations	Continuous fast by Central leaders	"	"
7.10.83	"	Continuous fast by divisional leaders	"	"
11.10.83	"	Mass fast, demonstrations	"	"

## Minor Conflictual Engagements (1955-1983) : An Overview

Major issue	Range of observance			Nature of conflict formation	
	Trade union activity related	Local	National	Singular	Alliance
Service					
44.44	35.72	18.37	81.63	44.44	55.56

## Notes

All the data are drawn from contenders' publications or recollections.

The 'Major-minor' distinction is based on contender's perception.

In a few cases events are deliberately planned phases of a particular conflictual engagement.

The events are not terminal developments.

## Appendix B

### Distribution of Industrial Workers by Major Departments

(figures '000)

Ministry/Department	1971	1984
Railways	361 (50.4)	491 (54.2)
p & T	6 (0.8)	12 (1.3)
Defence	310 (43.3)	351 (38.7)
Others	39 (5.5)	52 (5.8)
Total	716 (100.0)	906 (100.0)

Source : Report, Fourth Central Pay Commission, 1986, Table V, p53.

Category of Staff	Censure	With holding of increment or promotion including stoppage at an efficiency bar	Punishments 1949-50					Total
			No. of officers	Reduction to a lower post of time scale or to a lower stage in a time scale	Recovery from pay	Removal from service	Dismissal from Service	
1. Postal including RMS	CL III CL IV	1 2 4124 505	3 472 98	4 249 63	5 1122 70	6 101 52	7 166 47	8 6234 835
2. Telegraph Engineer including Wireless	CL III CL IV	107 13	28	152 9	8	42 17	19 3	356 42
3. Telegraph Traffic	CL III CL IV	132 128	10 18	36 50	22 38	7 11	3 8	210 253
4. Telephone	CL III CL IV	45 1	17 1	28 3	54	2 4	41 28	187 37
Total.	CL III CL VI	4408 647	527 117	465 125	1206 108	152 84	229 86	6987 1167

# Punishments 1950-51

Category of Staff		No. of officers Punished with						Total
		With holding of increment or promotion including stoppage at an efficiency bar	Reduction to a lower post of time scale or to a lower stage in a time scale	Recovery from pay any pecuniary loss caused to Government	Removal from service	Dismissal from Service		
1. Postal including RMS	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
	5200 498	788 123	406 80	1109 39	III 59	169 60	7770 859	
2. Telgraph Engineer- Cl.III including Wireless Cl.IV	116 7	98 5	138 5	11	27 9	17 4	407 30	
3. Telegraph Cl.III Traffic Cl.IV	89 124	20 41	58 126	152 29	7 17	10 5	336 342	
4. Telephone Cl.III Cl.IV	45	34 3	17 3	34 1	41 7	26 9	197 23	
Total. Cl.III Cl.VI	5450 629	940 172	619 214	1306 69	173 92	222 78	8710 1254	
							129	



## Punishments 1951-52

Category of Staff	Censure	With holding of increment or promotion including stoppage at an efficiency bar	No. of officers Punished with					Dismissal from Service	Total
			Reduction to a lower post of time scale or to a lower stage in a time scale	Recovery from pay any pecuniary loss caused to Government	Removal from service				
1. Postal including RMS	1								
	2		4	5	6		7	8	
2. Telegraph Engineer-CL III including Wireless CL IV	4212	844	299	830	56		171	6412	
	462	187	75	46	48		48	866	
3. Telegraph CL III Traffic CL IV	161	41	296	5	27		21	551	
	17	9	15	1	16		4	62	
4. Telephone CL III CL IV	80	36	57	557	11		13	754	
	54	40	131	65	18		3	311	
Total.	103	38	38	11	16		25	231	
	6	4	7	1	3		6	27	
Total.	4556	959	690	1403	110		230	7948	
	539	240	228	113	85		61	1266	

# Punishments 1952-53

Category of Staff		Censure	With holding of increment or promotion including stoppage at an efficiency bar	No. of officers Punished with					Dismissal from Service	Total
				Reduction to a lower post of time scale or to a lower stage in a time scale	Recovery from pay any pecuniary loss caused to Government	Removal from service				
1. Postal RMS	Cl. III Cl. IV	2 3169 491	3 832 160	4 458 84	5 724 54	6 69 35	7 190 48	8 5442 872		
2. Telegraph Engineer-Cl. III including Wireless Cl. IV		122 11	69 11	159 30	9 14	10 12	17 4	386 82		
3. Telegraph Cl. III Cl. IV		104 68	23 44	72 103	850 37	6 14	13 11	1068 277		
4. Telephone Cl. III Cl. IV		107 12	36 5	42 5	9	22 5	32 1	248 28		
Total.	Cl. III Cl. VI	3502 582	960 220	731 222	1592 105	107 66	252 64	7144 1259		

## Punishments 1953-54

Category of Staff	Censure	With holding of increment or promotion including stoppage at an efficiency bar	No. of officers Punished with					Dismissal from Service	Total
			Reduction to a lower post of time scale or to a lower stage in a time scale	Recovery from pay any pecuniary loss caused to Government	Removal from service				
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8		
1. Postal CL.III including RMS CL.IV	2781 408	849 145	410 126	853 51	61 38	228 55	5180 823		
2. Telegraph Engineer- CL.III including Wireless CL.IV	160 33	51 14	108 21	12 4	14 8	21 5	426 85		
3. Telegraph CL.III Traffic CL.IV	72 125	13 36	32 113	1255 105	3 8	3 6	1378 393		
4. Telephone CL.III CL.IV	81 9	29 6	26	1	6 4	4	147 19		
Total. CL.III CL.VI	3094 575	942 201	636 260	2121 160	84 58	254 66	7131 1320		

# Punishments 1954-55

Category of Staff	Censure	No. of officers Punished with					Total
		With holding of increment or promotion including stoppage at an efficiency bar	Reduction to a lower post of time scale or to a lower stage in a time scale	Recovery from pay any pecuniary loss caused to Government	Removal from service	Dismissal from Service	
1. Postal including RMS	2 2410 433	3 789 183	4 282 74	5 697 40	6 68 33	7 188 51	8 4434 814
2. Telegraph Engineer-Cl. III including Wireless Cl. IV	130 19	50 ■	120 11	13 1	11 6	13 4	337. 49
3. Telegraph Cl. III Cl. IV	55 114	21 31	13 73	1043 59	3 4	3 7	1138 288
4. Telephone Cl. III Cl. IV	42 3	19 3	14 1	1 1	4 3	2	82 11
Total. Cl. III Cl. VI	2637 569	879 225	429 159	1754 101	86 46	206 62	5991 1162

Category of Staff	Censure	With holding of increment or promotion including stoppage at an efficiency bar	No. of officers Punished with				Dismissal from Service	Total
			Reduction to a lower post of time scale or to a lower stage in a time scale	Recovery from pay any pecuniary loss caused to Government	Removal from service			
1	2		4	5	6	7	8	
1. Postal CL III including RMS CL IV	2147 295	621 147	158 60	806 64	77 41	153 45	3962 652	
2. Telgraph Engineer-CL III including Wireless CL IV	141 13	57 7	104 12	6	7 9	7 2	322 43	
3. Telegraph CL III CL IV	60 84	5 25	16 62	1162 18	5	1 6	1244 200	
Traffic CL IV								
4. Telephone CL III CL IV	158 12	30 1	30 5	8	4 5	12	242 23	
Total CL III CL VI	2506 404	713 180	308 139	1982 82	88 60	173 53	5770 918	

# Punishments 1956-57

Category of Staff	Censure	With holding of increment or promotion including stoppage at an efficiency bar	No. of officers Punished with					Dismissal from Service	Total
			Reduction to a lower post of time scale or to a lower stage in a time scale	Recovery from pay any pecuniary loss caused to Government	Removal from service				
1. Postal including RMS	1 2 1925 368	3 663 158	4 151 42	5 830 40	1 52 20		7 172 39	8 3793 667	
2. Telgraph Engineer-Cl. III including Wireless Cl. IV	159 8	80 19	93 6	8 1	13 2		15 6	368 42	
3. Telegraph Cl. III Traffic Cl. IV	39 72	8 20	17 32	756 21	1 11		6 3	836 159	
4. Telephone Cl. III Cl. IV	48 3	22 2	18 2	3	5		7 4	103 4	
Total.	217 451	723 199	279 82	1606 62	71 33		200 52	5100 879	135

## Punishments 1957-58

Category of Staff	Censure	No. of officers Punished with					Dismissal from Service	Total
		With holding of increment or promotion including stoppage at an efficiency bar	Reduction to a lower post of time scale or to a lower stage in a time scale	Recovery from pay	Removal from service			
1	2	3	4	5	■	7	8	
1. Postal CL.III including RMS CL.IV	1503 302	524 111	88 19	660 36	47 17	161 63	2985 (Com. retirement-2) 548 (*)	
2. Telegraph Engineer-CL.III including Wireless CL.IV	144 22	108 14	28 5	16 1	12 9	12 7	320 58	
3. Telegraph CL.III Traffic CL.IV	31 52	15 23	5 42	509 3	1 10	2 4	563 134	
4. Telephone CL.III CL.IV	54 12	31 1	8	2 2	3	8	103 18	
Total. CL.III CL.VI	1732 388	678 149	129 66	1187 42	60 39	183 74	3371 (Com. retirement-2) 759	

# Punishments 1958-59

No. of officers Punished with										
Category of Staff	Censure	With holding of increment or promotion including stoppage at an efficiency bar	Reduction to a lower post of time scale or to a lower stage in a time scale				Recovery from pay any pecuniary loss caused to Government	Removal from service	Dismissal from Service	Total
			4	5	6	7				
1. Postal including RMS	CL.III	2	1947	328	809	57	185	4084 Comp.		
	CL.IV	438	50	71	34	73	839 Retirement 7 Comp.			
2. Telgraph Engineer-CL.III including Wireless	CL.IV	170	24	33	9	11	409			
		7	2	1	3	4	25			
3. Telegraph CL.III Traffic	CL.IV	90	488	61	3	3	676			
		58	41	14	11	9	162			
4. Telephone CL.III CL.IV		193	5	4	7	2	294 Comp. Retirement 1			
		25	6	4	2	4	57 Comp. Retirement 1			
Total	CL.III	2400	845	907	76	201	5463 Comp. Retirement 8			
	CL.VI	528	99	90	50	90	1083 Comp. Retirement 3			





# Punishments 1960-61

No. of officers Punished with								139
Category of Staff	Censure	With holding of increment or promotion including stoppage at an efficiency bar	No. of officers Punished with					Total
			Reduction to a lower post of time scale or to a lower stage in a time scale	Recovery from any pecuniary loss caused to Government	Removal from service	Dismissal from Service		
1. Postal including RMS	2 4517 766	3 2979 476	4 938 162	5 818 68	6 91 31	7 450 110	8 9831 Comp. 1618 Retirement 38 Comp. Retirement 5	
2. Telegraph Engineer-Cl. III including Wireless Cl. IV	602 82	677 49	97 21	40 4	7 7	11 7	1438 Comp. Retirement 4 1438 Comp. Retirement 1	
3. Telegraph Cl. III Traffic Cl. IV	382 241	265 162	68 83	19 42	3 13	11 22	Comp. 750 Retirement 2 576 Comp. Retirement 13	
4. Telephone Cl. III Cl. IV	530 47	683 38	128 6	100 8	15 8	17 1	1478 Comp. 108 Retirement 5	
Total. Cl. III Cl. VI	6031 1136	4604 725	1231 272	977 122	116 59	489 140	Comp. 13497 Retirement 49 2473 Comp. Retirement 19	

## Punishments 1961-62

Category of Staff	Censure	With holding of increment or promotion including stoppage at an efficiency bar	No. of officers Punished with			Removal from service	Dismissal from Service	Total
			Reduction to a lower post of time scale or to a lower stage in a time scale	Recovery from pay any pecuniary loss caused to Government				
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
1. Postal including RMS	CL III 2247 CL IV 258	1300 306	371 31	695 49	73 28	126 51	487 Comp. Retirement 11 724 Comp. Retirement 1	
2. Telegraph Engineer-CL III including Wireless	CL IV							
2. Telegraph	229	277	15	35	7	15	578	
CL III	48	42	6	5	3	6	110	
CL IV								
3. Telegraph	139	92	620	10	3	3	867 Comp.	
CL III	134	89	48	26	9	4	311 Retirement 1	
CL IV								
Traffic								
4. Telephone	172	154	21	30	5	13	397 Comp.	
CL III	23	15	1	1	1	2	43 Retirement 2	
CL IV								
Total.	2787	1823	1027	770	88	157	6665 Retirement 13	
CL III	463	452	86	81	41	63	1188 Comp. Retirement 2	
CL VI								

# Punishments 1962-63

## No. of officers Punished with

Category of Staff	Censure	With holding of increment or promotion including stoppage at an efficiency bar	Reduction to a lower post of time scale or to a lower stage in a time scale	Recovery from pay any pecuniary loss caused to Government	Removal from service	Dismissal from Service	Total
1. Postal Cl. III including RMS Cl. IV	2 2459 339	3 1419 313	4 314 42	5 703 61	6 67 44	7 207 79	8 Comp. 5186 Retirement 17 889 Comp. Retirement 11
2. Telegraph Engineer-Cl. III including Wireless Cl. IV	206 62	238 36	25 16	26 4	10 3	12 5	519 Comp. 126 Retirement 2
3. Telegraph Cl. III Traffic Cl. IV	129 117	54 32	476 32	16 35	10	3	875 Comp. 234 Retirement 5
4. Telephone Cl. III Cl. IV	352 69	281 63	56 4	102 24	12 4	23 5	Comp. 837 Retirement 11 173 Comp. Retirement 4
Total. Cl. III Cl. VI	3146 587	1992 444	871 94	847 124	89 61	242 92	Comp. 7217 Retirement 39 1422 Comp. Retirement 20

## Punishments 1963-64

Category of Staff	Censure	With holding of increment or promotion including stoppage at an efficiency bar	No. of officers Punished with	Removal from service	Dismissal from Service	Total
			Reduction to a lower post of time scale or to a lower stage in a time scale	Recovery from pay any pecuniary loss caused to Government		
1. Postal Cl. III including RMS CL IV	2 2428 319	3 1455 307	4 176 53	5 677 43	7 175 54	8 4992 Comp. 818 Retirement 29 Comp. Retirement 5
2. Telgraph Engineer- Cl. III ing including Wireless CL IV	264 62	233 37	28 7	37 2	14 2	603 Comp. 113 Retirement 1
3. Telegraph CL III CL IV	125 86	59 131	4 40	615 13	3 9	832 302
Traffic CL IV						
4. Telephone CL III CL IV	167 26	158 28	19 6	9 1	5 4	369 77
Total CL III CL VI	2984 493	1905 503	227 106	1338 59	197 69	Comp. 6796 Retirement 30 1310 Comp. Retirement 5

# Punishments 1964-65

Category of Staff	Censure	No. of officers Punished with					Total
		With holding of increment or promotion including stoppage at an efficiency bar	Reduction to a lower post of time scale or to a lower stage in a time scale	Recovery from pay any pecuniary loss caused to Government	Removal from service	Dismissal from Service	
1. Postal including RMS	I Cl. III Cl. IV	2	4	5	6	7	8
		2262	114	632	53	182	4547
2. Telegraph Engineer-Cl. III including Wireless	Cl. III Cl. IV	290	36	86	13	68	792
							Comp. Retirement 5
3. Telegraph Cl. III Traffic	Cl. III Cl. IV	228	30	14	27	21	592
		36	10	3	4	3	78
4. Telephone Cl. III Cl. IV	Cl. III Cl. IV	114	9	11	4	1	218
		95	29	6	10	6	264
Total.	Cl. III Cl. VI	103	18	13	9	7	288
		23	6	5	8	7	80
		2707	171	670	93	211	5645
		444	81	100	35	84	1214
							Comp. Retirement 9

Category of Staff	Censure	With holding of increment or promotion including stoppage at an efficiency bar	No. of officers Punished with				Dismissal from Service	Total
			Reduction to a lower post of time scale or to a lower stage in a time scale	Recovery from pay any pecuniary loss caused to Government	Removal from service			
1. Postal including RMS	I	3	4	5	6	7	8	
	CL.III	2432	173	618	28	127	4729 Comp.	
	CL.IV	382	47	33	17	29	822 Retirement 34 Comp.	
2. Telegraph Engineer-CL.III including Wireless CL.IV			45	17	20	4	478 Comp.	
		183	5	2	6	2	71 Retirement 2 Comp.	
		31					Retirement 1	
3. Telegraph CL.III Traffic CL.IV			28	20	2	1	186 Comp.	
		105		14	15	3	282 Retirement 3	
		111						
4. Telephone CL.III CL.IV			33	150	18	18	1000 Comp.ret	
		447	10	12	9	3	224 Retirement 3	
		90						
Total			254	805	68	150	6393 Comp.	
	CL.III	3167	90	61	47	37	1399 Retirement 39 Comp.	
	CL.VI	614					Retirement 6	

Statutory Punishment 1966 - 67					
No. of officials punished with Minor penalties					
Category of Staff	Censure	With holding of promotion	Recovery from pay of the whole or part of the pay any pecuniary loss caused to the Govt. by negligence or breach of orders	With holding of increments of pay	
1	2	3	4	5	
<b>Class III</b>					
Postal and RMS	2613	107	707	1280	
Telegraph. Eng. including Wireless	236	2	24	249	
Telegraph Traffic	85	1	12	83	
Telephone	107	27	16	77	
<b>Class IV :</b>					
Postal and RMS	320	17	29	258	
Telegraph Eng. including Wireless	39	4	5	52	
Telegraph Traffic	100	2	1	110	
Telephone	25	11	6	26	
<b>Class III</b>	3041	137	759	1689	
<b>Total</b>	484	34	41	446	
<b>Class IV</b>					



Statutory punishment 1966 - 67  
No. of officials punished with  
Major penalties

Category of Staff	Reduction to a lower stage in post or time-scale of pay for specific period	Reduction to a lower time-scale of pay, grade, or service from which he was reduced	Compulsory Retirement	Removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment under the Govt.	Dismissal from service which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment, under the Govt.	Total
1	6	7	■		10	11
<b>Class III</b>						
Postal and RMS	106	22	16	47	112	5010
Telegraph Eng. including Wireless	347	1	1	17	14	891
Telegraph Traffic Telephone	4		2	3	1	191
	6	1	5	5	7	251
<b>Class IV :</b>						
Postal and RMS	33	4	1	29	47	798
Telegraph Eng. including Wireless	10	2		2	3	117
Telegraph Traffic Telephone	12	2		7	2	236
	6	1		7	2	84
<b>Class III Total</b>	463	24	24	72	134	6343
<b>Class IV</b>	61	9	1	45	54	1175

Statutory Punishment 1967-68					
No. of officials punished with					
Category of Staff	Censure	Minor penalties			
		With holding of tion	Recovery from pay of the whole or part of the any pecuniary caused to the Govt. by negli- gence or breach of orders	With holding of increments of pay	
		1	2	3	4
<b>Class III</b>					5
Postal and RMS	2352			185	589
Telegraph. Eng. including Wireless	233			18	20
Telegraph Traffic	111			3	14
Telephone	110			11	5
<b>Class IV :</b>					
Postal and RMS	426			23	28
Telegraph Eng. including Wireless	43			1	6
Telegraph Traffic	118			1	2
Telephone	9				1
<b>Class III</b>	2806			217	628
<b>Total</b>					1710
<b>Class IV</b>	596			25	37
					446

Statutory punishment 1967-  
No. of officials unished with  
Major penalties

Category of Self	Reduction to a lower stage in time-scale of pay for specific period	Reduction to a lower time-scale of pay, post or serve which shall be bar to the promotion of the Govt. servant to the time scale of pay, grade, post, or service from which he was reduced	Compulsory Retirement	Removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment under the Govt.	Dismissal from service which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment under the Govt.	Total
1	6	7	8	9	10	11
<b>Class III</b>						
Postal and RMS	85	160	20	59	109	4823
Telegraph Eng. including Wireless	26	3	3	37	9	621
Telegraph Traffic	8		1	4	3	240
Telephone	7	4		4	7	231
<b>Class IV :</b>						
Postal and RMS	18	13	7	32	43	822
Telegraph Eng. including Wireless	7	2		2	4	123
Telegraph Traffic	19	8	1	20	1	305
Telephone	6	1		1	2	41
<b>Class III Total</b>	126	172	24	104	128	5915
<b>Class IV</b>	50	24	8	55	50	1291

Statutory Punishment 1968-69  
No. of officials punished with

Minor penalties

Category of Staff	Censure	With holding of promotion	Recovery from pay of the whole or part of the pay any pecuniary loss caused to the Govt. by negligence or breach of orders	With holding of increments of pay
1	2	3	4	5
<b>Class III</b>				
Postal and RMS	2862	202	672	1774
Telegraph. Eng. including Wireless	317	46	22	275
Telegraph Traffic	104	16	10	96
Telephone	137	12	11	149
<b>Class IV :</b>				
Postal and RMS	352	36	58	295
Telegraph Eng. including Wireless	29	7	9	26
Telegraph Traffic	185	21	4	183
Telephone	8	1	4	18
<b>Class III</b>				
<b>Total</b>	3420	276	715	2294
<b>Class IV</b>	574	65	75	522

**Statutory punishment 1968-69  
No. of officials punished with  
Major penalties**

Category of Staff	Reduction to a lower stage in time-scale of pay for specific period	Reduction to a lower time-scale of pay, grade, post or service which shall be bar to the promotion of the Govt. servant to the time scale of pay, grade, post, or service from which he was reduced	Compulsory Retirement	Removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment under the Govt.	Dismissal from service which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment, under the Govt.	Total
	6	7	8		10	11
<b>Class III</b>						5973
Postal and RMS	99	114	35	94	121	782
Telegraph Eng. including Wireless	58	45	5	12	2	
Telegraph Traffic	14	5	3	36	2	286
Telephone	102	11	1	11	4	438
<b>Class IV:</b>						852
Postal and RMS	25	13	15	27	31	111
Telegraph Eng. including Wireless	6	18		13	3	
Telegraph Traffic	17	12	1	18	1	441
Telephone	7	2		9		50
<b>Class III Total</b>	273	175	44	153	129	7479
<b>Class IV</b>	55	45	16	67	35	1454

Statutory Punishment 1969-70					
No. of officials punished with					
Category of Staff	Censure	With holding of promo- tion	Minor penalties		
			Recovery from pay of the whole or part of the pay any pecuniary loss caused to the Govt. by negli- gence or breach of orders	With holding of increments of	
1	2	3	4	5	
<b>Class III</b>					
Postal and RMS	3281	338	848	1885	
Telegraph. Eng. including Wireless	332	77	25	317	
Telegraph Traffic	221	32	31	153	
Telephone	225	11	10	196	
<b>Class IV :</b>					
Postal and RMS	342	60	36	310	
Telegraph Eng. including Wireless	29	8	4	26	
Telegraph Traffic	183	12	10	158	
Telephone	26	3	3	19	
	4059	458	914	2551	
<b>Class III</b>					
Total	580	83	53	513	
<b>Class IV</b>					

## Statutory punishment 1969-70

## No. of officials unished with

## Major penalties

Category of Self	Reduction to a lower stage in time-scale of pay for specific period	Reduction to a lower time-scale of pay, post or service which shall be bar to the promotion of the Govt. servant to the time scale of pay, grade, post, or service from which he was reduced	Compulsory Retirement	Removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment under the Govt.	Dismissal from service which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment under the Govt.	Total
1	6	7	8	9	10	11
<b>Class III</b>						
Postal and RMS	243	48	69	158	115	6985
Telegraph. Eng. including Wireless	72	12	4	16	11	866
Telegraph Traffic	23	6	2	9	1	478
Telephone	33	1	2	10	2	490
<b>Class IV:</b>						
Postal and RMS	64	22	14	31	29	908
Telegraph. Eng. including Wireless	11			5	5	88
Telegraph Traffic	38	13	5	7	5	431
Telephone	2			3	1	57
<b>Class III</b>						
Total	371	67	77	193	129	8819
<b>Class IV</b>						
Total	115	35	19	46	40	1484

## Appendix D

### Repression during July, 1960 strike

	Central Government Employees	Others
Arrested	17,780	2,359
Released	17,759	2,355
Convicted	1,630	214
Sentence Remitted	915	1
Dismissed	1,244	
Discharged	244	
Suspended	9,590	

As on August 31, 1960 : from reply by the Home Minister  
on September, 1960 in Lok Sabha.  
Source : AITUC, 1960.



## Appendix E

Growth in the Size of Subordinates\* (1952-84)

Year	Number	Year	Number	Year	Number	Year	Number
1948	Not reported	1958	205713	1968	348515	1978	483600
1949	"	1959	216074	1969	357038	1979	495367
1950	"	1960	231858	1970	373712	1980	519461
1951	"	1961	237877	1971	-	1981	550592
1952	160260	1962	247869	1972	388888	1982	589554
1953	175771	1963	267107	1973	390612	1983	622239
1954	177839	1964	286226	1974	416312	1984	636801
1955	184884	1965	298563	1975	51585?		
1956	191298	1966	320942	1976	-		
1957	200103	1967	337575	1977	467993		

\* Class III and IV employees excluding extra-departmental and Industrial workers.  
Source : Annual Report, Posts and Telegraph Department, Government of India.

### Appendix F

Table showing employment in organised sector  
(Lakh of persons as at the end of March)

Sector	1961	1966	1971	1976	1981	1984
<i>Private</i>						
Industry*	13	19	23	34	41	44
Social and Community Services	37	50	56	66	74	80
Others	21	25	28	33	40	45
Total	71	94	107	133	155	169
<i>Public</i>						
Industry*	39	47	45	44	48	47
Social and Community Services	3	8	10	11	12	13
Others	8	13	12	13	14	13
Total	50	68	67	68	74	73

# CONTENT ANALYSIS MANUAL

## INSTRUCTIONS TO RECORDER

1. Read every daily edition of the newspaper and try to locate a political conflict in which the state is a party and not a mere intervening agency between two parties in conflict. (By 'party' we refer to both political party and any group with or without any political affiliation)
2. As you locate one, **give the conflict a title** referring to the main issue. If pinpointing the main issue appears to be a problem, record it as 'the State vs....' (mentioning the other party by name). You can wait till you read an adequate number of reports. You can use a label for the conflict formulated by journalists.
3. Then begin to record facts in the process of answering questions which appear on the schedule. Better you first read all the questions, develop some idea about them, and then try to answer them. It is possible that the sequence of reports on a conflict you come across does not match the sequence in which the questions appear. Don't hesitate to answer the questions as you come to know the relevant information. In case you come across information you feel necessary/relevant, record it on a separate sheet of paper.
4. Record facts regarding **each conflict in a separate schedule-book**. Note date of the daily editions of the newspaper against each information relevant to a question on the schedule. As a result of the first operation we'll have all the information on a particular conflict spread over a period in a single schedule-book. The second operation will help us to know the career of a conflict.

5. Since it is likely that a single edition of the newspaper may contain reports on more than one conflict, you may be filling in more than one conflict-specific schedule-book at the same time.
6. Concentrate on news reports. Feature articles, essays etc. should be used for information only.
7. In case of an interruption in news reporting on a particular conflict (which may be due to a temporary suspension of a conflict) be on the look out for a resumption of news reporting.
8. Whenever you come across contradictory information on the same item – very likely since it is conflict with antagonistic parties, and when the news reporting wants to be fair to both – record both sets of information keeping a note on the sources of information.
9. Read the definitions of various concepts used in the framed questions, make sure you've understood them, and then proceed to collect data.
10. Keep a precise and detailed record of exactly how you handle each non-routine decision.
11. Handle no exception without consulting your supervisor.

### **Clues to the identity of vertical political conflict**

Any political behaviour on the part of a group of contenders in the form of/nature of :

- 1) anti-government procession demonstration\*
- 2) political strikes, hartals, bandhs
- 3) armed attack on government personnel or property
- 4) assassination of government official of any rank etc.

\* including any anti-authority demonstration, stoppage of work, work-to-rule, gate-meeting etc.

Any governmental decision/action in the form of/nature of :

- 1) arrests and imprisonments
- 2) inflicting physical pain or death
- 3) banning of political activity by a party / group
- 4) restrictions on/total prohibition of certain kinds of political behaviour e.g. organizing protest meetings/processions
- 5) censorship of media etc.

## MANUAL

Name of the recorder.....

Time of data collection

(by month and year).....

1. **A Brief identification of the conflict :**
2. **First public expression\* of the conflict**  
(mention date according to the newspaper)

3. **Duration of the conflict :**

(mention, only after the entire career of the conflict has been followed by you, the last date on which the conflict ceased to be publicly observable; for our purpose here the date in which there was the last reporting in the newspaper; then calculate the period in terms of number of years, months and days; in case the conflict is still unresolved/suppressed, indicate it)

- (a) **Exact duration :**                      **Years      Months      Days**

or, continuing

\* "Public expression" is indicated by any manifest political activity intended by the contenders (press conference, use of the general or special media, street processions, public meetings, strike, violence to the authorities, destruction of public property etc) as well as by any manifest measure on the part of the authorities (cautioning, applying or threatening to apply preventive or punitive law, denial of freedom of political activity, censoring contenders' views, use of violence, imprisonment, killing etc.).

(b) **Duration in terms of period :**

(tick the appropriate period)

Less than 1 day

1 to 3 days

4 to 7 days

8 to 15 days

More than 15 days

but less than a month

Between 1 to 2 months

More than 2 months

(c) **Was it a conflict without any temporary cessation ?**  
(tick the appropriate answer)

Yes

No

(If No, record duration of time when the conflict was temporarily not taking place; if there were more than one spell of cessation, record duration of each in year, months, or days).

4. **The territorial spread of the conflict :**

(tick the appropriate answer)

(a) confined to a fixed territorial area

Spread to areas beyond the area of origin

(b) in case the conflict spread to other areas, record the speed of spread in days, months and years (whichever is appropriate) (best would be to record dates of occurrence at each area).

(c) urban in origin

semiurban in origin

rural in origin

(d) confined exclusively to urban areas

confined exclusively to rural areas

occurring in both kinds of areas

5. **Parties to the conflict :**

(tick the appropriate identity)

A. **The authorities :**

Central Government

State Government

Central and State Governments

**B.(1) The contenders : identification by name**

(identify by their official name or by the name given by the authorities, or by the name used in mass media; if none is available you give them a name; in case more than one part/group is involved, or the original party/group is joined by other parties/groups identify all of them; if possible mention the original and/or the dominant group; if the alliance, formal or otherwise assumes a name, mention it)

**B.(2) The contenders : identification by character :**  
what is the character of the group/groups of contenders ? (tick the appropriate label)

(i) identification by range of membership

National

Regional

Local

(Membership should be considered as 'National' if the organization/s involved have units in a majority of states and in the national capital; as 'regional' if there are units of the same in contiguous states, as 'local' if units are confined to a particular state only)

(ii) identification by foundation

evidently ideology based

demands-charter based

both

(iii) identification by local basis

economic class based

ethnic group based

any other social basis

**The issues in the conflict :**

(A) What is/are the major issue/issues in the conflict ?

(i) **According to the contenders' announcement**

(Locate statement/s issued by the contenders, if available; record the issues using the contenders' language/formulation as far as possible; Record statements indicating the issues in the sequence they appear noting dates against each so that we may locate the evolution/redifinition, if any, of the issues; Exact

repetition of an earlier statement need not be recorded but note all the dates against a particular form of statements on issues)

(ii) **According to the authorities' construction**

(Follow the instructions for recording issues according to the contenders' announcement; If there is no deliberate statement/s indicating that the authorities recognize the issues as projected by the contender and/or that the authorities have their own understanding of the issue/s, infer from authorities' contestation of/comments on the contenders; professed issue/s)

- (B) Is there any difference between the contenders' announcement of the issues and the authorities' construction of the same ? (tick the appropriate answer)

Yes

No

If 'Yes', briefly state the respective positions :

(C) (i) **identify the nature of the issue/issues :**

reference to the demands on the part of the contenders (Locate the demands from the contenders' charter of demands if available, or from their formal public pronouncements; Keep in mind the distinction between an issue which refers to a problem, and demands which indicate the conditions of a resolution of a problem; Arrange the demands in a scale of importance attached to them explicitly or implicitly by the contenders themselves)

- (ii) **identify the nature of the issue/issues :** reference to an agreement or lack of it between the parties' construction : (Locate the identity by noting the character of major and immediate demands on the part of the contenders and that of arguments, in whichever direction, put forward by the authorities in the process of responding to the contenders' demands, and tick the appropriate label; In case of difference between the two, e.g. when economic demands of the contenders are contested by the authorities by using political arguments [ a demand for eco-



conomic redistribution is countered by a political argument concerning difficulty of managing a welter of demands likely to follow this ], note in some detail (tick the appropriate answer)

Political

Economic

Cultural

Not exclusively either

7. The forms of conflict behaviour on the part of the contenders :

(Given below are some forms of conflict; Note against each the dates and number of times each has been used, if at all; If one form has developed into another in course of the same conflict, record it)

(i) form of conflict : frequency and number

Form of conflict	Dates (if continuing over a number of days, mention the two polar dates)	Number of time used on any day (use tally marks)	Number of times used in course of the same conflict (count after the conflict has been entirely surveyed)
1. Communication to press			
2. Deputation/Agitation/Demonstration			
3. Office rally/Demand Day/Picketing			
4. Go-slow / No Work/Boycott/Sit in/Fast			
5. Gherao			
6. Satyagraha Notice / Movement Notice / Strike Notice			
7. Strike			

### (i) form of conflict : frequency and number

Form of conflict	Dates (if continuing over a number of days, mention the two polar dates)	Number of time used on any day (use tally marks)	Number of times used in course of the same conflict (count after the conflict has been entirely surveyed)
8. Procession by directly related contenders			
9. Procession by broad formations			
10. Meeting			
11. Civil Disobedience Satyagraha			
12. Deliberate Disruption of public Life			
13. Damage to Public Property			
14. Violent clash with police-ment			
15. Causing death to policemen			

### ii) form of conflict : development (escalation-deescalation)

Initial form of conflict (identify)	Development into (identify)	Initial form retained but complemented by other forms
-------------------------------------	-----------------------------	---

- (iii) **form of conflict: (a) measures of damage, destruction, injury, death in course of the conflict caused by the contenders**

**(Keep on recording information as they come; when the entire conflict will be surveyed, count the totals**

---

Damage	Destruction	Injury	Death
(Mention the object and the number)		(Mention the number the category and the rank in case of public officials)	

---

- (b) **measures of interruption in the civic processes due to contenders' conflictual activities**

**(keep on recording information as they come; when the entire conflict will be surveyed, count the total etc.)**

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Closure of shops and markets, partial or total	disruption in transport communications	closure of educational institution	flight of people unrelated to the conflict from their residential area
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(mention number of full days or part days)

**Note any other type of interruption (e.g., interruption confined to an organization which contain both the authorities and the contenders).**

## 8. Techniques of conflict management

### (A) Techniques used for conflict regulation :

- (i) Did the authorities, while responding to the conflict point out to the contenders the desirability of placing their demands in a democratic way through

**Number of times**

their representatives

the media

peaceful demonstrations

and meeting

any other (specify)

and/or,

the desirability of refraining from :

arousal of public anger

destruction of public property

use of physical force against

government personnel like

ministers, bureaucrats,

police etc.

any other (specify)

(tick the appropriate answer/s) (in order to count the number of times use tally marks whenever you come across the necessary information, then add them up, and mention the total under "Number of times")

- (ii) Did the authorities point out to the contenders that it was not the proper time for such a conflict whatever the legitimacy of their demands because

there were more vital problems to be solved

there was already too many conflicts and a new conflict would increase the threat to national unity to national productivity

Any other ground (specify)

(tick the appropriate answer/answers)

- (iii) Did the authorities *actually* allow those forms of pursuit of conflict which they had identified as permissible, and penalize the pursuit of those it disapproved of ? (tick the appropriate answer)

**Allowed Not Allowed**

contenders' formal representation to authorities

contenders' use of different media without being censured

contenders' peaceful demonstrations and meetings

Any other (specify)

and/or,

**Penalized Not penalized**

contenders' efforts to arouse public anger

contenders' efforts to destroy public property

**Penalized Not penalized**

contenders' use of physical force against the authorities

Any other (specify)

- (iv) Did the contenders positively respond to the authorities' efforts at persuasive regulation and/or coercive regulation of the formers' form of conflict behaviour in the sense that they

abandoned a publicly stated plan to pursue a form of conflict

Yes

No

persuasive arguments

or, determination to use coercion

or, both

or,  
abandoned an already undertaken form of conflict behaviour  
once they

Yes  
No

came to know the authorities  
persuasive arguments  
or, experienced coercion used  
by the authorities

or, both

(tick the appropriate answer)

- (v) Did the authorities inform the contenders that they should pursue only those forms of conflict which were permissible by the former, and/or should not pursue those which were not, before any dialogue on the latters' demands between the authorities and the contenders could take place? (tick the appropriate)

Yes  
No

**(B) Technique used for conflict resolution**

- (i) Did the authorities inform the contenders that they were ready to :  
listen to the contenders' arguments and view  
negotiate with the contenders and concede  
some of their demands if these would be  
reformulated  
negotiate with the contenders without any  
precondition (tick the appropriate answer)

Yes  
No

- (ii) Was the conflict resolved in the sense that both the authorities and the contenders redefined their positions/demands,

indicating mutual concessions ?

a redistribution of the object/s over which the conflict broke out was effected ?

both sides officially state that

the settlement arrived at was just

under the circumstances ?

both sides, and the contenders particularly, agreed that there would be no need to reopen the issued again ? (tick the appropriate answer/answers)

Yes

No

- (iii) In case there was factions within a group of contenders, did the terms of settlement satisfy all the factions ? (tick the appropriate answer)

(as evidence locate press statements given by such factions, record the number of members of such factions, importance of their leader/s, and their observations in the space below ) :

### (c) Techniques for conflict suppression

Yes No

- (i) Did the authorities formulate or revive any preventive/punitive norm ? (tick the appropriate answer)

Yes No

- (ii) Did the authorities make public an intention to terminate the conflict, if necessary, by use of force against the contenders ? (tick the appropriate answer)

- (iii) Did the authorities actually use different kinds of coercion - from normative coercion to physical sanction - in suppressing the conflict ? (tick the appropriate answer)

- (iv) Did the authorities try to justify use of coercion ?  
(tick the appropriate answer)

(a) If yes, did they refer to :

(tick the appropriate answer/s)

the violence of the contenders

the ideology of the contenders (specify)

the extraterritorial connections of  
the contenders

an alleged lack of sufficient popular  
support for the contenders

an alleged harmful design of the  
contenders

(specify)

Any other factor related to the contenders  
(specify in the space below)

- (v) Mention the appropriate answer/s :  
(tick the appropriate)

The use of coercion (of any kind)  
to terminate the conflict :

was permissible under the constitution  
and the laws

needed introduction of new legislation

needed an amendment of the constitution  
and repeal of existing laws

needed use of special powers under the  
constitution

was not at all sought to be based on  
law, prevalent or the newly formulated

[ Location of data here is likely to need use of  
judgement. Best would be to note any report or  
comment on the use of coercion from any quar-  
ter, and to try locate its evidential basis, and  
eventually to find out its validity ].



- (vi) Were the courts allowed by the authorities to conduct its proceedings in pursuance of allegations against the authorities by the contenders actually or reportedly subjected to coercion/repression? (Appeals to the courts could be made by the contenders individually or collectively, or by their sympathisers or relations). (tick the appropriate answer)

Yes

No

- (vii) Was there any allegation of manipulation or use of 'pressure'—of whatever form and magnitude—on the judiciary and the judges by the authorities? (tick the appropriate answer)

Yes

No

- (a) If yes, what was the source of allegation?

(tick the appropriate answer)

the contenders claiming to be victims of coercion and repression

the sympathisers or the other opposition parties/groups

the judge claiming to be victims of such pressure

the judges not directly involved in the trial of the cases

the authorities themselves

some of the authorities not directly involved in conflict suppression

some political personage/s usually considered to be non-partisan

authorities in some other state

some international body

Any other (specify)

- (b) If yes, what was the form of pressure ?  
(tick the appropriate answer)

appropriate instruction,  
formally delivered

appropriate instruction, informally  
delivered through messengers

transfer of judges

suspension of court proceedings

Any other (specify)

- (viii) Were some special courts or some such bodies created to try the contenders ? (tick the appropriate answer) Yes No

- (a) If yes, were they composed of  
(tick the appropriate answer)

individual with training in law

members of the usual courts

individuals drawn from the police,  
military and similar forces

individuals not belonging to either  
of the categories mentioned above

- (ix) What was/were the reaction/s of the authorities to the forms of contenders' political behaviour noted below ? (tick the appropriate answer/s; it is probable that the contenders had used more than one form of conflict behaviour while the authorities might have responded first by imposing restriction on one form of behaviour and later, total ban on the same. Best is to record dates against each form of behaviour involved and each response by the authorities.)

**Restrictions    Total ban**

**Processions**

Public meetings

Distribution of leaflets  
and similar materials

Usual publications like  
party journals

Publicity to reports and  
views through general media

Mobilization of people for  
movements against the  
authorities

Formation of organization  
for the conflict

Raising resources for the  
conflict

Developing international  
contacts

Any other (specify)

- (x) What technique/s of coercion was/were used by the authorities against the contenders' conflict behaviour? (It is possible that all kinds of techniques were used against a range of political behaviour by the contenders over the entire period of conflict or in a single day in different outbreaks of conflict in different areas. Best is to record dates against each technique used by the authorities and use a tally mark under 'frequency' every time use of any technique by the authorities is reported and under 'casualty').

Name of technique of coercion used by the authorities	Frequency	Injured			Casualties Killed		
		Source of information			Source of Information		
		Authorities	Contenders	Other Specify	Authorities	Contenders	Other (Specify)
Baton Charge							
Tear Gas							
Firing							
Pre-emptive Arrest							
Arrest and later release on bail							
Imprisonment							
More than one technique used							

- (xi) What kind/s of force was/were used by the authorities ? (tick the appropriate answer ; note the numbers if available)

Kind of force	Number
Police	
Special Police	
Paramilitary force	
Military	
More than one kind	

- (xii) Did the authorities use forces of another state/s ? (tick the appropriate answer)

Yes  
No

- (xiii) Were there cases of

Number

Injury

Death

while the contenders were in prison ? (tick the appropriate answer/s; indicate also the number of contenders involved, as well as the source of information (the authorities, the contenders, and others – if the last is the source, specify identity; if there is difference among the sources, mention in detail)

- (xiv) Did the authorities

instruct

prohibit

encourage

discourage

ignore

prevent

use of violence against the contenders by pro-authorities political group ? (tick the appropriate answer/s)

- (xv) Were the authorities aided by pro-authority formations ?

Yes

No

- (xvi) Did the authorities urge upon the  
citizens to be critical of the contenders ?  
to isolate the contenders ?  
not to respond to the contenders  
call to join them ?  
to organise themselves or use their  
organizations to create public  
opinion against the contenders ?  
to organize themselves or use their  
organization to meet the contenders'  
challenge violence if necessary ?  
to join the authorities to combat  
the contenders ?
- (xvii) Did the authorities  
suspend employment  
terminate 'employment  
degrade the conditions of service  
any other of similar kind  
in case the contenders were in the  
employment of the authorities ?  
(tick the appropriate answer/s)
- (xviii) Did the authorities  
ransack or/destroy  
household a objects of the contenders at any time ?  
destroy home/living place of the  
contenders ?  
did something similar (specify)  
(tick the appropriate answer)
- (xix) In case there was an evident division of the contend-  
ers into the 'hardliners' and the 'moderates' did the  
authorities  
(a) employ greater legal and physical sanction against  
the former ? (tick the appropriate answer)

Yes

No

If yes, state briefly the evidence :

(b) try to win over the moderates by offering them

immunity from legal proceedings against  
them because of their association with/  
participation in conflictual activities

release from detention

permission to leave the country

monetary compensation, or reemployment,  
or different employment

position with in the political formation  
to which the authorities belonged

position within the governmental  
framework

Any other

(tick the appropriate answer/s).

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## CONFLICT AND STATE EXPLORATION IN THE BEHAVIOUR OF THE POST-COLONIAL STATE IN INDIA

In two complimentary research exercises, the process of conflict management by the post-colonial state in India has been explored. The focus is on choice of conflict management techniques by the state. Because the nature of conflict is one crucial basis of choice, certain quantitative dimensions of conflict have been identified. The first series of data concern conflicts between various social formations and the state in alternative blocs of five years between 1947 and 1981. The second series relate to the state response to some processually and organizationally linked conflicts initiated by an occupational class composed of the subordinate service sector employees of the state between 1947 and 1985. For quantitative and qualitative data, newsdailies, official reports, publications by frontal organizations of men in conflict, radical literature and interviews have been used.

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